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ABSTRACT	
 
In this thesis financial movements are considered in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and a related way to international banking. In Chapter 2 FDI is 
analysed in terms of the major G7 economies. Then this is further handled in Chapter 3 
in terms of bilateral FDI (BFDI) data related to a broader group of economies and a 
main mode of analysis the Gravity model. Gravity models are then used in Chapter 4 to 
analyse bilateral cross border lending in a similar way. While the exchange rate effect is 
handled in terms of volatility and measured using models of conditional variance.  
The analysis focused on the bilateral data pays attention to the breakdown of 
crises across the whole period. With further consideration made of the Euro zone in 
terms of the study of BFDI and cross border lending.  
The initial study looks at the determinants of the inflow and outflow of stocks of 
FDI in the G7 economies for the period 1980-2011. A number of factors, such as 
research and development (R&D), openness and relative costs are shown to be 
important, but the main focus is on the impact of the real and nominal effective 
exchange rate volatility. Where nominal and real exchange rate volatility are measured 
using a model of generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) to 
explain the variance. Although the impact of volatility is theoretically ambiguous 
inflows are generally negatively affected by increased volatility, whilst there is some 
evidence outflows increase when volatility rises.  
In Chapter 3, the effect of bilateral exchange rate volatility is analysed using 
BFDI stocks, from 14 high income countries to all the OECD countries over the period 
1995-2012. This is done using annual panel data with a gravity model. The empirical 
analysis applies the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator to a gravity 
model of BFDI stocks. The findings imply that exports, GDP and distance are key 
variables that follow from the Gravity model. This study considers the East Asian, 
global financial markets and systemic banking crises have exerted an impact on BFDI. 
These effects vary by the type and origin of the crisis, but are generally negative. A high 
degree of exchange rate volatility discourages BFDI.  
 
 II 
 
Chapter 4 considers the determinants of cross-border banking activity from 19 
advanced countries to the European Union (EU) over the period 1999-2014. Bilateral 
country-level stock data on cross-border lending is examined. The data allows us to 
analyse the effect of financial crises – differentiated by type: systemic banking crises, 
the global financial crisis, the Euro debt crisis and the Lehman Brothers crisis on the 
geography of cross-border lending. The problem is analysed using quarterly panel data 
with a Gravity model.  The empirical "Gravity" model conditioned on distance and size 
measured by GDP is a benchmark in explaining the volume of cross border banking 
activities. In addition to the investigation of the impact of crises further comparison is 
made by investigating the impact of European integration on cross-border banking 
activities between member states. These results are robust to various econometric 
methodologies, samples, and institutional characteristics. 
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1 Chapter	One	
Introduction	
 
As international flows enable capital diversity, they reduce the risks faced by 
capital owners. Global movement of capital limits the impact of Governments following 
negative policies (Razin and Sadka, 2007). Capital flows are realised in different ways. 
The main forms are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), foreign portfolio investment and 
international banking.  
In recent years, FDI has been identified, as a key factor that may help to resolve 
both the gap in savings and foreign exchange. Therefore, FDI has been identified as an 
important catalyst for economic growth and development. This has led many countries 
to try to enhance the business climate to attract FDI. 
FDI reflects a long term interest and control by a foreign investor or parent 
company in one country, in a company in another country. Such investments may help 
to solve a range of problems by the creation of new job opportunities and by enhancing 
economic stability. Foreign companies’ presence is, as demonstrated by a large body of 
economic literature on this subject often associated with positive externalities for the 
host economy. Foreign corporate presence may support technology transfer. In 
particular, FDI transfers financial resources, technology and managerial know-how 
from companies in investing countries to those in countries in receipt of FDI and hence 
boost economic growth. In terms of developments in the the host economy, FDI can 
assist project development and restructuring, contribute to fuller international trade, 
enhance business sector competition and support human capital formation. According to 
common estimates, FDI has a positive effect on macroeconomic performance as it is 
capable of completing missing domestic resources needed for the implementation of 
economic reforms and there may be positive secondary effects that follow from the 
impact of foreign corporations on a hist economy  
Furthermore, FDI may also be responsible for enhancing growth potential. In 
particular, it was suggested by Barrell and Pain in 1997 that this occurs, because it can 
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act as a conduit for technical knowledge and so improve the capacity of a host economy 
to benefit from firm specific technological innovation. Moreover, FDI may also 
generate higher than expected returns in the host country that may help develop a safety 
net for the poor. While Klein and co authors suggested that this occurs as FDI might 
reduce the adverse impact of shocks on the poor stemming from financial instability and 
that it may improve corporate governance. 
This area has been an actively studied over the past few decades and more 
recently there has been a rapid advance in the literature that has increased greatly in the 
last three decades. Much of this research has examined the drivers of FDI especially 
how exogenous macroeconomic variables can affect the FDI decision. An important 
focus at the macro level has been on the impact of exchange rate volatility. This 
empirical literature built on the early work of Cushman, and Dixit and Aizenman 
considered the role played by exchange rate volatility in FDI attraction/repulsion in 
developed countries. 
It is important to understand how exchange rate volatility and other factors impact 
the FDI; as such information might be helpful to policymakers and governments in 
designing more effective strategies and growth policies.  
It is expected that the direction of the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI is 
ambiguous. More volatility could expose companies involved in international trade to 
more uncertainty and therefore would lead to the substitution of FDI for trade flows and 
thus a positive effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI. On the other hand, a more 
volatile environment exposes companies to more uncertainty when investing abroad (for 
example, the size of profits in local currency terms would be more uncertain) and this 
reduces FDI flows.  
The evidence of the link between exchange rate volatility and FDI is quite mixed; 
this lack of consensus might be because the data and sample periods used in the studies 
are not the same and this is also a reflection on the complex nature of FDI. Due to this 
complexity, it may be reasonable to suggest that exchange rate volatility will have an 
ambiguous impact which is reflected in empirical and theoretical research. At the 
theoretical level, a lot of ground has been gained. Some of this research focuses on 
exploration of these complexities. In particular, there are a large number of behavioural 
assumptions that underlie the motives for FDI. While the nature of the investment 
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environment, has increased the understanding of the links between FDI and the 
exchange rate volatility.  Alternatively, empirical models could yield mixed results due 
to problems with the specification in the model and issues with the data. 
FDI can be measured either in flow or in stock terms.  Earlier studies of FDI often 
used flow data. While Stein and Daude (2007) suggest the use of stocks rather than 
flows, because they are interested in the level of activity of multinational enterprises; 
capital stock being a closer proxy to multilateral activity than investment flows. The 
stock of FDI is defined as the value of the share of the foreign project capital and 
reserves (including retained profits) attributable to the parent project plus the net 
indebtedness of affiliates to the parent enterprise.  
In the first empirical chapter, unlike much of the earlier literature, country-
specific measures of conditional real and nominal exchange rate volatility are looked at. 
Furthermore, since the G7 countries are the major source of FDI activity, the initial 
focus is on FDI stock in and from the G7 countries to all other countries. The sign and 
magnitude of the effect of exchange rate volatility in the long run can be empirically 
determined. This is accomplished by constructing measures of exchange rate volatility 
based on GARCH(1,1) models. To capture the impact of exchange rate volatility on FDI 
a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method is adopted. The impact of exchange 
rate volatility on FDI in the G7 countries is investigated after controlling for 
conventional determinants of investment over the period 1980 to 2011. The countries 
included in this study were Germany, Italy, Canada, France Japan, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
This chapter considers FDI in developed countries as compared to developing 
countries as it is viewed here that pooling developed and developing countries in an 
empirical study is not appropriate as these behaviours are not the same. Furthermore, 
this chapter takes into consideration the importance of outward FDI on the economy and 
this has been largely ignored in the literature. Hence, the outward FDI drivers are 
analysed in addition to FDI inflows. In contrast to most of the previous research which 
use firm-level, bilateral FDI data or industry-level data this chapter aims to make a 
contribution to the empirical literature on the FDI inflows/outflows by using aggregate 
country level data. The choice of this topic is to consider the nature of these aggregate 
relations, because this may help derive policy and aid decision making. 
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This chapter applies traditional time series methods to the aggregate data. Firstly, 
the order of integration of the aggregate FDI series is of interest as it impacts the way in 
which these series are to be modelled. Finding that the data is non-stationary or 
integrated of order one (I(1)) has implications for some of the existing research as it 
suggests that the analysis is either conducted on data in first differences or that the 
series normally used to analyse FDI are cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). The 
first implies that only the short-run can be analysed, and the second that FDI has a 
short-run dynamic and a long-run static explanation of the data. This investigation seeks 
to find explanations of inflow and outflow data that depends on either real or nominal 
exchange rate volatility. As the time series dimension to this data is relatively short, 
these investigations rely on cointegrating regressions. To identify the long-run the 
cointegrating regressions are tested sequentially following the method of (Davidson, 
1998). This implies from the finding of a single cointegrating relation for each of the 
country data sets using both inflow and outflow data. 
The cointegration results for the inflow models show that openness and relative 
labour cost (RLC) are always required to find cointegration, while return on equity 
(ROE) is needed to find cointegration for France, Germany and Italy. For the 
investigation of the exchange rate, the real and nominal volatility variables were 
investigated. Real exchange rate volatility is needed for cointegration for Canada, the 
US and the UK, whilst nominal volatility is needed for the other four countries. For the 
outflow data for all the countries a series of common cointegration results are found that 
include openness, RLC, research and development (R&D) and nominal exchange rate 
volatility. The volatility of the exchange rate was measured using a GARCH(1,1) model 
for each country in the sample.  
These core long run relations are initially found from cointegrating regressions, 
and these long-run equations embedded in equilibrium correction models (EqCMs). 
Such models are then estimated using SUR on a balanced panel over the period 1980 to 
2011. Seven FDI equations are jointly estimated under the assumptions of the SUR 
model. In addition, a Wald test is used to further check the model specification 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). This allows a test as to whether common 
coefficients can be imposed across different countries within the panel. Regarding, the 
Wald test findings for the inflow model, none of these variables can be removed from 
the panel. The findings for the outflow model show some signs of a systemic pattern for 
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G7 countries, and same to the inflow model, all variables on this basis appear important 
in explaining FDI outflow from the G7 countries in the long-run.   
Cross-border capital movements play a critical role, as greater capital inflows 
facilitate growth by completing local resources and bringing new technological know-
how. However, capital inflow could suddenly stop and reversal is the partial cause of 
the financial crises that have hit many economies over the last two decades. Given its 
importance, there has been a lot of research dealing with the determinants of cross-
border capital movements. The earlier research by Calvo et al. in 1996, and Dasgupta 
and Ratha in 2000 using aggregate country data concentrated on “push” and “pull” 
factors. The more recent availability of data on a bilateral basis between countries has 
motivated a large literature attempting to understand the trends and drivers of capital 
movements between country pairs. Many of the studies using bilateral data apply the 
Gravity model to different types of international capital movements.   
An interesting question that comes up is to what extent the gravity variables affect 
different forms of capital movements differentially. Especially when including risk 
factors such as exchange rate volatility in term of financial crises. This issue has not 
systematically been examined. Therefore, it opened a new field of research in terms of 
testing how capital movements have been impacted by exchange rate volatility and 
other determinates during the crises periods. This is the question that is considered in 
the chapter 3, and chapter 4. Due to data availability, the focus is on cross border FDI, 
and cross border lending only.    
Additionally, Financial crisis is often thought to affect FDI. In principle it is 
expected that a significant financial crisis affects both the host country and foreign 
business engaged in FDI. As a result of the turmoil that is caused by the crisis 
government policies in the host and the doner country are directed to encourage 
investors in both economies to be more active. Thus it is to be expected that financial 
crisis will reduce FDI and this suggests why it is important to trace the impact of 
financial crises on BFDI. Especially were this to enhance our understanding of the 
mechanism by which financial shocks influence the allocation of FDI.  
Interest in the meltdown in FDI following the global financial crisis has arisen as 
a result of the extent of the impact across different parts of the globe. Before the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis, foreign investors were 
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encouraged to relocate their funds to such financial and capital markets as a result of 
strong economic growth and highly attractive stock returns. While in comparison during 
crises other forms of capital movements were reduced drastically and sometimes there 
might be a flight of portfolio investment from crisis economies. The recent global 
financial crisis led to a collapse in global FDI falling in 2008 by 16% while in 2009 
worldwide output contracted and FDI by 40%. So 2009 was the year when the recession 
became global.  
In the second empirical chapter, BFDI stock is analysed over the financial 
crises using a Gravity Model to which is added the impact of exchange rate volatility 
and currency union (CU). The effects of financial crises are also looked at in some 
detail. Specifically, the Asian crisis, global financial markets crisis and systemic 
banking crises. While FDI is viewed as being based on the long-term linkages between 
firms, to reflect the permanent benefits that arise from control by foreign investment on 
investment in another country. The Gravity often used to investigate international stocks 
of goods and capital is used to analyse BFDI from 14 high income countries to all the 
OECD countries over the period 1995-2012. Exchange rate volatility is measured for 
most of the bilateral currencies using the GARCH(1,1) model. The Gravity model is 
also extended to investigate institutional factors linked to exports, GDP and distance.  
Given the persistent nature of the data and the dimensions of the panel the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied to the problem. The panel 
method is applied as the time series is short and the approach used can control for 
heterogeneity. A further issue that links with the persistence found in the previous 
chapter in relation to the aggregate data is the conventional Gravity equations without 
dynamics have serially correlated errors and would require at least a lagged dependent 
variable in the regression to capture this. This further emphasises the need to control for 
endogeneity in the estimations and so the need to apply a dynamic panel model. Here 
the two-step GMM estimator is used to extract the non time varying components of the 
Gravity equations with corrected standard errors (Windmeijer, 2005, and Roodman, 
2009).  
Understanding the drivers of cross-border asset movements is an important topic 
of research in financial and international economics. Recently attention has moved to 
cross-border banking. While the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has indicated 
 7 
 
in the last decade that cross-border banking has increased significantly, especially 
between international banks and their non-bank customers. With international banks 
that move abroad becoming one of the most important sources of finance recently. 
Furthermore, bank lending has also become a major channel for the transmission of the 
financial crises. This suggests that the determinants of cross-border banking should be 
considered when analysing how the crises were transmitted and the degree to which 
most markets were impacted. Understanding the most important variables cross-border 
banking is also necessary for financial stability in advanced countries, due to the 
negative way in which financial crises have affected the banks. This has been especially 
important in the Euro area, where banks have built up core exposure to cross-border 
activities especially in eastern and central Europe.   
The market for financial services has become better integrated in the EU. This 
cross-border expansion has operated differently, depending on the country, the business 
and institutions. In the EU, following the introduction of the Euro, cross-border banking 
created financial linkages with the banks on the periphery getting funding from new 
sources. While especially following the failure of Lehman Brothers there was a 
substantial decline in the financial transactions both across the Atlantic and within the 
Euro zone. It would seem that such cross-border banking activity may have intensified 
the crisis across Europe. This suggests further investigation of the role of the Euro on 
cross-border activity in the EU.   
The third empirical chapter tries to clarify on top of the usual push and pull 
factors, the impact of systemic banking crises, the global financial crisis, the Euro debt 
crisis and the Lehman Brothers crisis. In addition to the gravity factors this study 
includes variables that are expected to have a significant impact on cross border banking 
such as European integration. This enables an evaluation of the mechanism by which 
financial stress is effectively transferred from more advanced economies across the 
European market economies. This includes lending to all the EUs 29 member states in 
the European market over the crises periods. It is felt here that the EU is particularly 
suitable for this purpose since the regulatory system and national banking markets 
though still heterogeneous are moving together. This investigation covers the period 
1999:01 – 2014:04. The impact of the Euro zone is investigated along with the impact 
of exchange rate volatility. 
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2 Chapter	Two	
Does	 Exchange	 Rate	 Volatility	 Affect	 Foreign	
Direct	 Investment?	 Evidence	 from	 the	 G7	
Countries	
2.1 Introduction 
The latest trends in globalisation have led to both increased trade and large 
increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world. An important impetus to 
this has been as a result of the liberalisation of the rules governing the flow of 
investment into and out of the major world economic blocks such as the G7 countries 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations. In addition, the transformation 
of the previous centrally planned economies in Eastern and Central Europe and after 
this the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) towards market economics. As 
companies that are engaged in activities at the global level seek out more cost effective 
production facilities and profitable overseas markets with associated sales and 
marketing networks, it is expected that growth in overall FDI will increase. 
A common claim in the international economics community is that exchange rate 
volatility is one of the most important factors in decisions regarding a firm’s FDI 
policies, because a devaluation of a country’s currency can give foreign investors an 
advantage in buying the country’s assets. However, the direction of the effect is not 
clear as increased volatility may have differential impact on cost that will lead some 
producers locate in overseas markets as this reduces their costs, whilst others may 
choose to locate at home in order to achieve this objective. 
The interest in the effect of the exchange rate and its volatility on international 
capital flows, for example FDI, is growing among policy makers, as the number of 
countries that are adopting the floating exchange rate system has increased. Empirical 
investigation of the relationship between the exchange rate and FDI is critical for the 
formulation of FDI policies, because FDI brings benefits to both investing and recipient 
countries. 
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Recent fluctuations in the exchange rate in developed countries have led to 
renewed interest in the effect of exchange rate volatility on the economy. A series of 
papers have analysed the effect of exchange rate volatility on a number of macro 
variables including trade (Pattichis (2003) and Clark et al. (2004)). Both empirical and 
anecdotal evidence supports a link between exchange rate volatility and FDI. There has 
been a significant body of work, for example, Cushman (1985 and 1988), Dixit (1989), 
Bailey and Tavlas (1991), Sercu and Vanhulle (1992), Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), 
and Sung and Lapan (2000) that has until now been contradictory as to whether there is 
a positive or negative effect. Such findings depend on the assumptions employed in 
relation to the risk preferences of foreign investors, cost reversibility and the timing of 
entry and production. We can infer from this that findings may not be robust to their 
conditioning. Much of the existing research suggests that FDI responds differently to 
macroeconomic fluctuations over the cycle. There is little research to indicate a key 
contribution from other sources of volatility. To this end, it is not clear whether it is real 
or nominal exchange rate volatility which matters for FDI activity. 
The empirical findings and general predictions of the previous research call for a 
fresh look at the relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI. This study looks 
at country-specific measures of conditional real/nominal exchange rate volatility, unlike 
much of the early literature. Furthermore, since the G7 countries are the major source of 
FDI activity, this study only focuses on the G7 inward and outward FDI both from and 
to the rest of the world, so this chapter takes into consideration the outward FDI 
importance on the economy, which has been largely ignored in the research. Hence, it 
analyses the outward FDI drivers in addition to FDI inflows. The sign and magnitude of 
the effect of exchange rate volatility can be determined empirically. Therefore, the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on the level of FDI in the G7 countries is investigated 
after controlling for conventional determinants of investment over the period 1980 to 
2011,  Openness, relative unit labour cost and return on equity are included in the FDI 
inflow model. However, replacing return on equity by research and development (R&D) 
in the case of FDI outflow. The countries included in the study are Germany, Italy, 
Canada, France Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. A Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model is estimated that contains the determinants of FDI 
in this study. It was found that exchange rate volatility had an effect on the long run 
behaviour in the dynamic models.  
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the most recent literature 
concerning the correlation between the exchange rate volatility and FDI, in addition to 
the determinants of FDI. Section 2.3 describes the data and model design. Section 2.4 
explains the methodology and the results, which looks for cointegrating sets of variables 
and then embeds them in an equilibrium correction model. Whilst section 2.5 offers the 
conclusion.  
2.2 The Recent Literature 
Since the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system in 1972, both nominal and 
real exchange rates have fluctuated, in a broad sense. It has been shown that extreme 
short-term volatility can arise with flexible exchange and this is consistent with the 
overshooting hypothesis (Dornbusch, 1976) that may also result in episodes of currency 
misalignments. 
The exchange rate level affects FDI in many channels, depending on the 
destination of the produced goods and this does not depend on whether or not the 
investor wants to produce for the domestic market. In this situation, the local currency 
appreciation increases FDI inflows by increasing the purchasing power of local 
consumers. Meanwhile, a depreciation of the real exchange rate of the host country 
increases FDI by reducing the capital cost (Benassy-Quere et al., 2001). 
The effect of exchange rate volatility has been seen in the case of Merger & 
Acquisition (M&A) flows as ultimately being an empirical question. On the one hand, if 
there are fixed costs involved in the acquisition of a firm, standard option theory 
predicts that firms will delay their acquisitions when faced with higher exchange rate 
volatility. Meanwhile, depending on how the home currency equivalent of expected 
future cash flows from the target firm is correlated with other assets in the acquiring 
firm’s portfolio. Hence, high exchange rate volatility may have a positive or negative 
effect on the investment decision.  
There are competing opinions of how exchange rate volatility impacts FDI flows. 
One strand of the research indicates the effect of risk aversion on foreign investors who 
want to delay investment decisions (see; Kohlhagen, 1977; Dixit, 1989 and Campa 
,1993) who showed that risk neutral investors may also support the evidence that 
exchange rate volatility made FDI inflow in the US decrease in the 1980s. The effect 
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was found with industries with high sunk costs in tangible and intangible assets. 
Another strand indicates the adjustment costs of investment, particularly the difficulty 
of reversing an investment decision once it is made (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Though delaying investment will eliminate any expected return stream from that 
investment, the ability to make more profitable options in the future will be retained. 
Blonigen (1997) and Dunning (1993) among others explain that the probability of 
deferring investment when faced with change is greater for enterprises where the 
product has an extended life cycle or a long anticipated lifespan for the firm-specific 
assets. Esquivel and Larrain (2002) show two channels in the literature linking 
exchange rate volatility with FDI. First, potential investors will invest in a foreign 
country as long as the expected returns are high enough to cover currency risk. 
Therefore, higher exchange rate volatility will lead to lower FDI. Second, changes in 
the bilateral exchange rates of the G-7 countries could directly impact the amount and 
direction of FDI through its effect on the real wealth in these countries. This may 
decrease or increase FDI depending on some factors including the change in the 
particular currency value, relevance of FDI in addition to its wealth elasticity in the 
home countries. 
The effects of exchange rate volatility on FDI have been discussed in the literature 
for some time, but there is currently little agreement on the direction of these effects. 
The existing theoretical literature is mainly focused on the consequences of volatility in 
the exchange rate on different time horizons in relation to FDI. There are several ways 
to extract indicators of volatility, and early studies tended to use unconditional estimates 
where trends had not been extracted, whilst latter studies have tended to use techniques 
such as generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) to estimate 
the conditional, or the component generated by unexpected components in the exchange 
rate. 
2.2.1 Is there a negative link between exchange rate volatility and FDI? 
The first approach focuses on the negative impact of the volatility of the exchange 
rate on FDI. Jeanneret (2006) found a negative and significant relationship on average 
for exchange rate volatility in a bilateral panel data set of 28 OECD countries over the 
period 1982-2002 when standard ordinary least squares (OLS) fixed effects and 
generalised least squares random effects estimators were considered. They also used the 
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systems generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data (DPD) estimator 
to control for endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable in a short panel and found 
that the corrected average response is smaller and statistically insignificant. 
Additionally, they show that the negative effect decreases significantly over the period 
1990-2002, even becoming positive since the 1990s. Therefore, policies that aim to 
attract FDI through the stabilisation of the relative exchange rate appears’ to be less 
efficient than might be expected. 
Campa (1993) found volatility to be negatively linked with the degree of entry 
and that this impact is stronger in industries where sunk costs are relatively high. 
Benassy-Quere et al. (2001), and Urata and Kawai (2000) confirm the negative effect of 
exchange rate volatility on FDI. While Esquivel and Larrain (2002) show for the G3 
countries that exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on FDI flows to sub-
Saharan Africa. They go on to indicate that flows to East Asia and the Pacific are not 
clearly influenced by changes in the currency volatility of the G3, and their empirical 
evidence on FDI flows to South Asia and Eastern Europe is mixed. 
Studies which demonstrate the negative impact of the volatility on FDI inflows 
include De Vita and Abbott (2007) who examine the effect of the level of real exchange 
rate volatility on UK FDI inflows from the seven major investing countries for the 
period 1975-2001. They do this by employing both fixed effects and GMM in a 
dynamic panel with manufacturing data disaggregated by high and low R&D content of 
the destination sector. Their findings show that the volatility of the exchange rate has a 
negative effect on FDI flows into the UK, irrespective of the destination sector of the 
investment. However, the real exchange rate level is found to have a statistically 
insignificant impact on FDI after controlling for the endogeneity of the regressors. 
 Regarding the effect of exchange rate volatility for countries preparing for 
accession into the European Union (EU), Brzozowski (2006) empirically investigated 
the relationship between FDI and nominal exchange rate volatility for 19 emerging 
markets and 13 transition economies during the 1990s. They empirically investigate and 
discuss theoretically the likely effect on the intensity of FDI inflow from a reduction in 
exchange rate volatility caused by accession to the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
Brzozowski employs two methods related to a data set with time-series and cross-
section dimensions through estimating models by fixed effects OLS and DPD estimator 
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of Arellano and Bond (1991). They find that exchange rate volatility and nominal 
exchange rate uncertainty in particular may negatively influence the decision of where 
to locate investment. However, they also show that adoption of the euro is likely to 
influence FDI inflows positively in accession countries. 
A further study by MacDermott (2008) used a traditional Gravity model to 
investigate the impact of changes and volatility of the real exchange rate on FDI. This 
model predicts that FDI volume between two countries is directly related to the distance 
between the two countries and their relative gross domestic product (GDP). They apply 
a fixed impacts variation of the Gravity model to a panel of 55 countries over the period 
1980-1997. The results of the model indicate that weak host currencies and greater 
volatility in the exchange rate discourage FDI flows.  
Additionally, Dhakal et al. (2010) use a panel data approach to determine the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on FDI in China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, 
South Korea and the Philippines for 1975-2005. After determining the order of 
integration of their data they employ a panel cointegration test and develop an error 
correction model using two sets of data. They find that exchange rate volatility has a 
negative impact on FDI and the likely cause of this has been the degree of exchange rate 
volatility these economies have been subject to. 
2.2.2 The likely positive relation between the exchange rate volatility and FDI 
A number of studies report a significant positive relation between exchange rate 
volatility and the volume of FDI, but these early papers used unconditional indicators of 
volatility, and this will have influenced their conclusions. For example, Cushman 
(1985) studies this association for the US, and Canada, Germany, France, Japan and the 
UK for 1963-1978, and Cushman (1988) for Canada, Germany, France, Japan and the 
United Kingdom to the US for the period 1963-1986.  
Goldberg and Kolstad (1995) use bilateral quarterly data to study the relation 
between Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom relative to the United States over the 
period 1978–1991. In this case, the volatility of the exchange rate is measured by the 
standard deviation of the real exchange rate over twelve quarters, prior to and inclusive 
of each period. They find that the capacity share abroad increases when exchange rate 
volatility rises and this becomes correlated with export demand shocks.  
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There is also research that indicates that there is no significant link between 
exchange rate volatility and FDI. For instance, Gorg and Wakelin (2002) examine the 
effect of the level of the exchange rate, volatility in the exchange rate and expectations 
of the exchange rate on outward US FDI in the direction of twelve developed countries, 
and inward FDI from those countries to the US for the period 1983-1995. In their 
empirical analysis (using measures for volatility and exchange rate expectations) they 
indicate that there is no evidence for an impact of the variation of the exchange rate on 
either US outward investment or inward investment into the US. This finding holds for 
a number of different estimation procedures. In particular, they find that the level of the 
exchange rate has a positive relation between an appreciation in the host country 
currency and US outward investment. However, there is a negative relation between an 
appreciation in the host country currency (the dollar) and US inward investment. 
In conclusion, some of the earlier literature, both theoretical and empirical, 
provides different answers regarding the effect of the exchange rate volatility on FDI. In 
most of the papers cited above, as mentioned earlier, there is near agreement as to the 
negative effects of exchange rate volatility on inflows of FDI. The literature on both the 
theoretical and empirical impacts of the volatility of the exchange rate on FDI has not 
come up with any coherent conclusions. This may be because FDI serving a host market 
may be encouraged by volatility, as it reduces uncertainty, whilst FDI that serves an 
export market may be discouraged by volatility.  
2.2.3 The effect of the other variables on the relation between exchange rate 
volatility and FDI 
Although FDI may give companies greater flexibility in production, it may be 
influenced by the exchange rate regime. To this end, Aizenman (1993) considers the 
factors determining the effect of exchange rate regimes on the behaviour of FDI and 
domestic investment, and the link between exchange rate volatility and investment. 
Aizenman indicates that the link between investment and exchange rate volatility under 
a flexible exchange rate depends on the nature of the shocks. If the dominant shocks are 
nominal, a negative correlation will be observed, However if the dominant shocks are 
real, there will be a positive correlation between the level of investment and exchange 
rate volatility. The findings for the volatility-investment relation clearly differ across 
countries, in part, because of differences in the extent to which the exchange rate 
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moves. The relatively stable exchange rates of some countries leads to them being least 
affected by a given currency fluctuation. The evidence from panel regressions supports 
the presence of disparities across countries and over different time periods. 
Cavallari and D'Addona (2012) analysed the role of country-specific sources of 
output and interest rates on the potential for exchange rate volatility to deter FDI. They 
studied bilateral FDI flows among 24 OECD countries between 1985 and 2007 to find 
that real and nominal exchange rate volatility strongly impacted FDI. Output and 
exchange rate volatility seems to matter for the decision to invest in a foreign country 
and interest rate volatility to affect the amount of foreign investment. 
In addition, Crowley and Lee (2003) investigate empirically whether the volatility 
in the foreign exchange rate hampers capital flows through uncertainty in FDI and 
increasing risk. They use a GARCH(1,1) model to describe the volatility in the foreign 
exchange rate. Despite the conventional wisdom, there is weak evidence for the adverse 
impact of exchange rate volatility on FDI, based on the analysis of data for 18 OECD 
countries for 1980–1998. Their findings seem to suggest that, while stability in foreign 
exchange markets would be conducive to capital flows and investment, some degree of 
exchange rate flexibility, which might generate risks and uncertainty, does not appear to 
be as important a determinant of foreign investment as economic stability and income 
growth. In other words, the relation between exchange rate volatility and investment is 
weak or absent if the exchange rate movements are relatively small, but strong if the 
exchange rate movements become excessively volatile. 
2.2.4 The Determinants of FDI  
The factors affecting FDI depend on the reasons for the FDI, in this section FDI 
types will be discussed, in addition to the empirical evidence of the determinates of 
FDI.  
There is some debate as to the capacity of the various theories of FDI to serve as a 
self contained general theory to explain all FDI types. The articles by Agarwal (1980), 
Parry (1985), Itaki (1991), and Herzer (2011) in particular are critical of this position. 
Taking the investment decision from the perspective of the investing company. Dunning 
(1993) has been one of the often cited authors who has attempted to describe the main 
types of FDI based on such motives. Next, a distinction is made between types of FDI:  
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Firstly, horizontal or market-seeking FDI, the aim of which is to serve foreign and 
regional markets. This FDI type involves replication of production facilities in the host 
country. It is motivated by market access and trade frictions avoidance such as transport 
costs and import protection in the host country. The studies by Markusen (1984), 
Horstmann and Markusen (1987), and Markusen and Venables (1998) were focussed on 
horizontal FDI.    
Secondly, resource-seeking FDI when companies invest in foreign countries to 
obtain resources which are not available in the home country, such as raw materials 
natural resources, or low-cost labour. In particular, in the manufacturing sector, when 
multinationals invest directly in order to export, factor-costs such as labour cost 
considerations become critical. In contrast to horizontal FDI, export-oriented or vertical 
FDI involves relocating parts of the production chain to the host country. Naturally, FDI 
in the resource sector related to the extraction of oil or natural gas, is attracted to 
countries which have plentiful natural resource endowments.   
Thirdly, strategic asset-seeking FDI, occurs when firms acquire assets which are 
not available in their home country. An example of this occurs when investors try to 
gain access internationally to recognised brand names and demotic distribution 
networks to support their international competitive position. Additionally, Strategic 
asset-seeking FDI takes place in the form of technology-sourcing FDI when companies 
try to gain access to foreign technology by purchasing foreign companies or 
establishing R&D facilities in “foreign centres of excellence”. To find models of 
technology-sourcing FDI, see, Neven and Siotis (1996), Fosfuri and Motta (1999), and 
Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006).   
Lastly, The fourth type of FDI, called efficiency-seeking, takes place when the 
company can gain from the common governance of geographically sparse activities in 
the presence of economies of scale and scope. Vertical or efficiency-seeking FDI is 
driven by differences in international factor prices (Helpman, 1984, and Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). It takes place when a company disseminates the production process 
across different economies to seek out the most efficient production methods so as to 
obtain production at the least cost. Such relocations decrease local production, at least in 
the short run (with horizontal FDI). However, in the longer run, the vertical investment 
could allow the company to import cheaper inputs from foreign affiliates and to produce 
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a greater volume of goods abroad at lower cost, therefore stimulating exports of goods 
used by foreign affiliates (see, Herzer, 2008). The new structure of the production chain 
should be linked to increased efficiency. As a result, the company could be able to 
improve its competitive position, therefore raising its local productivity over the long 
run (see, Kokko, 2006). However, if the company is not able to adjust over the longer 
term to any decrease in local production, because it is not able to increase 
competitiveness. This may be as a result of labour market rigidities. However, the 
German economy provides a counter example to this since following the war Germany 
maintained a competitive advantage that followed from a undervalued exchange rate.1 
Enhanced competition both horizontal and vertical will substitute foreign activities for 
local activities over the long run, which might lead to a long term reduction in local 
productivity (see, Bitzer and Görg, 2009).   
Together, the factors attracting each type of FDI suggest that the countries with a 
low labour cost, large market and abundant natural resources, would attract large FDI 
inflows. FDI would therefore go to countries with favourable initial conditions. 
However, this study suggests that other factors also matter. 
A question that needs to be answered is the importance for a company in investing 
in a host country? This is where location-specific advantages are in relevant as they 
relate to why the foreign country is attractive for FDI relative to other countries. For 
instance, companies may invest in production facilities in foreign countries when 
transportation costs are high as a substitute for export. This could be directly related to 
the nature of the good, either being a high bulk item or a service, which needs to be 
provided on site. While the policy position of the home country relative to the control of 
imports via tariff rates, access to markets may make the acquisition of productive 
capacity in the home advantageous. Location advantage also includes other 
characteristic (economic, political and institutional) such as large local markets, an 
educated labour force, availability of natural resources, low labour cost, political 
stability and/or corporate tax rates.  
The impact of exchange rate uncertainty on FDI depends on the nature of the 
associated investment. Vertical FDI that involves the breaking down of the processes of 
                                                            
1  The only exception relating to the attempt to revalue the Deutch Mark in the exchange rate mechanism at the 
Birmingham summit of Finance Ministers that was rejected by the UK and French Governments and thie subsequent 
breakdown in trust between the three key central banks led to Black Wednesday.  
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production across different countries may be discouraged by exchange rate volatility, 
because of the need to engage in intra-company trade. While horizontal FDI could even 
respond positively, because similar projects are undertaken in different locations 
(Aizenman and Marion, 2004). However, Crowley and Lee (2003) suggest that when 
FDI involves some form of joint enterprise, reversibility will depend on whether tacit 
knowledge has been transferred.   
The other factor considered to impact investment was R&D. The empirical 
literature has a clear conclusion that firms that undertake R&D tend to undertake more 
FDI in order to take firm specific technologies to foreign countries. These technologies 
could of course be licensed, but this gives the possibility of the knowledge leaking out 
to other producers in the host country. In much of the literature, it is acknowledged that 
the major investors in R&D, the US, Japan and Germany, are also the major sources of 
FDI for other countries (Barrell and Pain, 1997). So it would therefore be expected that 
outflows will be significantly affected by the level of R&D in the home country. 
On the other hand, there are mixed findings in the literature for R&D undertaken 
by domestic companies and FDI inflow by their multinational rivals. The empirical 
studies of Kogut and Chang (1991), and Neven and Siotis (1996) on Japanese FDI in 
the US, and the US and Japanese FDI into the European Union, found that the expected 
technological progress in the receiving country has a significant role in determining the 
inflow of FDI. This is demonstrated by the R&D effort undertaken by the domestic 
industry in the host country. On the other hand, the results in the empirical studies of 
Driffield and Munday (2000), and Love (2003) were inconclusive in terms of domestic 
R&D on the inflow of FDI. 
Moving to the unit labour cost which researchers consider it as an important 
determinant of FDI.  Baek and Okawab (2001) while focusing on the role of a variety of 
exchange rates along with labour productivity differential, wage rates and import tariffs, 
examined the factors determining Japanese FDI on manufacturing in Asia. They show 
that FDI is attracted by means of relatively cheap labour. Additionally, there is evidence 
that a higher wage rate or import tariff in the host country significantly decreases 
Japanese investment. 
Furthermore, Lansbury et al. (1996) considered investment by 14 OECD countries 
into Hungary, Poland, and the Czechoslovakia over the period 1991-1993. They show 
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that relative labour costs within these so called Visegrad economies have had a greater 
influenced on the distribution of FDI within those economies when compared with 
economies in Southern Europe. Similarly, Holland and Pain (1998a), in a panel study of 
investment in eleven transition economies over the period 1992 - 1996, indicate that 
wages relative to other transition economies have a significant effect on FDI inflows.  
Looking at the basic determinants, the level of local production cost will explain 
whether the company produces locally to sell locally or whether it supplies the host 
country by exporting its home-based production (Markusen, 2004). While according to 
Feenstra (2015), horizontal FDI requires that the returns to producing and selling locally 
should offset fixed costs. Bedi and Cieslik (2002) found that industries with higher 
levels of FDI inflow also obtain higher wages and higher wage growth. However, there 
is some debate as to the impact of FDI drivers on the vertical type. Wheeler and Mody 
(1992), and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) provide further evidence that labour cost is 
positively related to FDI. While Culem (1988) finds this impact is negative and for 
Lucas (1993) insignificant. This would suggest the importance of the investment 
objective in determining the impact of factor costs. So as expected, Lankes and 
Venables (1997) found that export-oriented companies place greater importance on 
production and skilled labour costs.  
Unit labour costs are a critical variable in FDI location decisions, especially if the 
product is mature and competition is based mostly on cost and price. Increases in unit 
labour costs are expected to affect FDI inflows inversely. Support for the significant 
effect of unit labour costs on FDI has come from Pain (1993), Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-
Rivero (1994), Janicki and Wunnava (2004), Biswas (2002), Bevan and Estrin (2004), 
Yang et al. (2000), and Carstensen and Toubal (2004). 
Another factor which the literature on FDI has considered is openness. 
Charkrabarti (2001) indicates the evidence is mixed for the significance of openness on 
FDI; where this is generally measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. The 
maintained hypothesis is that most investment projects are usually directed towards the 
tradable sector so a country’s degree of openness to international trade could be a 
relevant variable in this decision. Jordaan (2004) indicates that the impact of openness 
on FDI depends on the investment type. When FDI are market-seeking, trade 
restrictions (and hence less openness) may have a positive impact on FDI. The reason 
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stems from the hypothesis of “tariff jumping”, which suggests that foreign companies 
that seek to serve local markets could set up subsidiaries in the host country if it is 
difficult to import their products. On the other hand, multinational companies engaged 
in export-oriented investments may prefer to invest in a more open economy as greater 
imperfection in competition that accompanies trade protection imply higher transaction 
costs linked with exporting. Additionally, Singh and Jun (1995) found that export 
orientation is important in attracting FDI, because trade and FDI flows are gross 
complements. 
The empirical findings in articles by Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Culem (1988) and 
Edwards (1990) showed a strong positive link between openness and FDI. This 
compares with Schmitz and Bieri (1972) that indicated this link was weak and positive. 
Pärletun and Thede (2008) found that trade openness is a positive sign but statistically 
insignificant. However, as reported by Sun et al. (2002), the degree of openness can also 
have a negative effect on FDI due to greater competition, making the prevailing effect 
an empirical question. A lot of surveys suggest a widespread perception that “open” 
economies boost more FDI. 
2.3 Data description and sources 
The G7 countries were selected here as they have appeared over the period among 
the top 10 economies for FDI. FDI can be measured either in flow or in stock terms. 
FDI flow represents the sum invested in affiliates by foreign firms, which affiliates 
could spend to accumulate assets, to repay past borrowings, or for other objectives. On 
the other hand, the advantage of the stock variable is that it reflects the total value of 
assets related to the foreign investor. Thus, the stock is an indicator of the value of 
assets engaged in international production (Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). So we 
follow Bitzer and Görg (2009) by using stocks rather than FDI flows, because stocks, 
due to the accumulation of flows, could be more effectively capture the effects of long-
run. The balance of payments measure of direct investment in the reporting countries is 
used as the FDI stock variable.  
As mentioned at the outset of this study, the basic question this research seeks to 
address is whether exchange rate volatility has had a significant effect on FDI inflow 
and outflow for the G-7 developed countries over the period 1980 to 2011 and hence 
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avoid the fixed exchange rate Bretton Woods period. This research is conducted using 
annual data (32 observations). 
The literature has a clear consensus that the main variables to have effects on FDI 
inflow are openness, relative labour costs (RLC), the return on host country equity and 
exchange rate volatility. Outflows are thought to be affected by openness, RLC, and 
exchange rate volatility and also by the scale of R&D taking place in the home country. 
The theoretical effects of some of these variables are ambiguous so it is hoped that the 
empirical evidence from this research might establish the significance and the sign of 
prevailing effects. For instance: 
1- If FDI is defined as a capital transfer, it can be interpreted in terms of 
comparison of expected revenue on other investment decisions. Therefore, both the 
variability and the level of exchange rates can have an effect on the level of investment. 
Additionally, exchange rate volatility can complicate the investment decisions of 
international firms through making the relative profitability unpredictable in the traded, 
versus the non-traded, sector. The high degree of exchange rate volatility during recent 
decades has affected firms’ decisions as to where to locate production and has also 
affected their profits. Hence, the volatility of the exchange rate can affect the 
competitiveness of companies in different countries. In fact, it can probably have either 
a positive or a negative impact. 
The flexible exchange rate system has introduced two aspects into the cross 
border activities of firms they are uncertainty and flexibility. Although the flexible 
exchange rate is one of the most important factors to support international financial 
flows, high volatility in the exchange rate could discourage FDI, because it would be 
regarded as increasing risk (increased uncertainty) rather than potential flexibility for 
possible investors. FDI is not normally a pure financial investment and it often incurs 
large sunk costs. Given the characteristics of FDI, investors prefer low volatility of the 
exchange rate to high volatility as long as they expect to make profits that are similar 
between periods of low and high volatility. Corporations can hedge some of this risk, 
but often this is seen as a low priority activity that may also be difficult to explain to 
shareholders when the hedge reduces the expected gains when the exchange rate moves 
in the right direction.  
 
 22 
 
Any conclusion on the sign of the impact of the level of excess volatility may also 
depend on whether it is the nominal or real measure to be used. The nominal measure 
would be seen as important when the primary FDI action is seen in terms of financial 
flows. For this purpose nominal volatility is seen to capture, amongst other things, 
uncertainty in monetary policy driven by interest rate changes where the overall effect 
of a rise in interest rate volatility is in principle ambiguous and may well vary 
depending on the country where it originates.  
However, in terms of investment viewed as a real physical activity involved in the 
creation or acquisition productive capacity then real volatility can be viewed as being 
most appropriate as it can be seen to represent uncertainty over fluctuations in output or 
in real profits, amongst other things. This suggests that an increase in output volatility 
can have a positive or a negative impact on real investment decisions depending on the 
relative magnitude of their respective income and substitution effects. To see this 
consider a rise in a source country’s output volatility that might reduce FDI outflows via 
the income channel, but make foreign investments relatively more attractive via the 
substitution effect.  
2- The standard hypothesis that openness motivates FDI (Hufbauer and Elliott, 
1994). It may have a positive effect on inward FDI and the multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) are generally attracted to open economies, because of their intrinsic export 
potential and more stable economic climate. Moreover, the impact of exchange rate 
movements is restricted to exports and imports.  
In addition to this, openness of a domestic economy is impacted by direct FDI 
restrictions in addition to trade barriers. FDI restrictions obviously raise barriers to FDI 
and are possible to affect the choice MNEs make with regards to the location of 
investment. Fedderke and Romm (2006) suggest two views of the motives for FDI that 
give contradictory predictions regarding the impacts of trade. The view of trade and FDI 
being substitutes sees "tariff-jumping" as a motive for FDI, and therefore trade should 
have a negative impact. If trade is the main motive of the enterprise, then exporting 
goods is more attractive than FDI as a way to serve a local market. The alternative view 
shows the motive for FDI follows from MNEs having various affiliates specialising in 
different local markets according to the locational advantages of the specific host 
country. This applies, especially to vertical FDI where a liberal trade environment is a 
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precondition for the international division of labour at the company level.2 In the 
research, the ratio of trade to GDP is often used as a proxy of openness of a country and 
is often interpreted as a measure of restrictions of trade.  
3- Return on equity: There are currently two views on the relationship between 
FDI and equity return. The first view is that FDI has a negative relationship with the 
development of equity markets (Hausmann and Fernández-Arias, 2000). So that FDI 
increases in countries that are more risky, financially underdeveloped, and 
institutionally weak. Therefore, FDI might exist as companies attempt to find 
alternatives to poor financial markets for both debt and equity. So according to this, FDI 
should be negatively linked with the development of equity markets. The second view 
put forth by Classens et al. (2001) is that FDI is positively correlated with the 
participation of firms in equity markets. They show that FDI goes to countries with well 
defined and operationally effective institutions. This can be attributed to the idea of 
matching foreign currency assets to foreign currency liabilities to offset the risk related 
to the exchange rate. This result from foreign investors’ suggestion that they finance 
part of their investment with external capital or sell equity in capital markets. Given that 
investors partly invest via purchasing existing equity, the liquidity of the stock markets 
could rise, increasing the value traded domestically. 
4- Labour costs are generally considered to be among the key economic factors in 
the discussion of the determinants of FDI location decisions of firms (e.g. Havlik, 
2005a). The literature on the FDI determinants has been affected by theories of 
international business. For example the Ownership Location Internalization (OLI) 
paradigm of Dunning (1988), which suggests that cost-related and market-related 
factors should be included in any empirical research explaining FDI flows (Fontagn´e 
and Mayer, 2005).  
There are also factors that may mitigate the negative effects of high labour costs 
on FDI. Public expenditures for an education system or social infrastructure could 
compensate investors for high labour costs, because well trained and healthy workers 
are more productive and are seen take sick leave less often. Otherwise labour costs 
                                                            
2 Trade policies, for example, and, more broadly, trade costs (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and transportation costs) are 
generally found to have a significant impact on FDI flows, but in aggregate regressions their sign is ambiguous. This 
is probably due to the different effect the barriers to trade can be expected to have on horizontal and vertical FDI; 
they tend to attract horizontal FDI, which aims at penetrating the domestic market, but repel vertical FDI. 
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could be of minor importance for FDI in immobile services (for example, banking, 
tourism).  
Yet, they clearly play a role in mobile services, such as accounting or call centres. 
As different indicators used in the empirical research could lead to different conclusions 
about the role of labour costs as a driver of FDI. Most of the underlying studies find a 
negative effect for labour costs on FDI. However, the other studies that reveal a positive 
coefficient use disaggregated data. Boudier-Bensebaa (2005) for example, found a 
significant positive sign for the unit labour cost variable in his study on a regional FDI 
in Hungary, stating that “the variable may express not only labour cost effects but also 
skill effects.” Moreover, positive coefficients are found in the study by Benassy-Quere 
et al. (2005) who examine FDI in eleven OECD countries. They explain this by a 
similar argument: “unit labour costs are positively related to the quality of labour.” 
However, the effects of this variable depend on which countries are being analysed. For 
example, the FDI flows to transition or developing countries have been explained 
widely by the advantage represented by having lower wages, which would be translated 
into lower labour costs compared to developed countries (Leibrecht and Scharler, 2009; 
Ranjan, 2011).  
In this comparative research unit labour cost are used in both cases for FDI 
models (inflow and outflow), it is expected that the sign is negative on the coefficient 
regarding FDI inflows (e.g., countries with higher labour costs would deter FDI). In 
contrast to FDI outflow where it is expected to be positive as an increase in the labour 
cost in a specific country relative to the rest of the world would encourage the outflow 
from this country.  
5- R&D3 or the association between it and FDI is related to the beneficial effects 
on the host country that can arise from inward investment. It may facilitate the 
extraction and distribution of raw materials produced in the host nation by improving 
the network of communication and transport. R&D is widely considered as a way to 
                                                            
3  An R&D index is constructed for each of the G7 countries represented in BERD ( Research and Development 
Expenditure in Business, using the following formula from Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006):  
1& { & (1 d e p re c ia t io n  ra te )} &i t i t i tR D s to c k R D s to c k R D f lo w    
Gross R&D stock is a measure of the accumulative value of past investment still in existence and net capital stock 
equals the gross stock less the accumulated depreciation on assets in the gross stock.  
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spur economic growth. A general overview on the R&D spending in business at level 
(as % of GDP) draws a first picture of the relative intensity of R&D effort. 
The  recent theoretical research  on company  heterogeneity and FDI suggests that 
the acquisition or establishment of foreign affiliates involves additional costs of 
overcoming legal, social  and cultural barriers, so that only companies above a certain 
productivity threshold can cope with these fixed costs and therefore engage in outward 
FDI (see, Helpman et al., 2004; Aw and Lee, 2008). That is, only the most productive 
companies self-select to invest in foreign countries. 
As an increase in aggregate productivity is linked with an increase in firm 
productivity and, consequently, with an increase in the number of companies reaching 
the important productivity level for FDI, a macroeconomic conclusion of 
heterogeneous-company models is that the aggregate amount of outward FDI should 
increase as factor productivity increases. However, given that factor productivity 
growth is linked with local output growth, higher demand, and therefore better profit 
opportunities for local investment, an increase in total factor productivity may lead to a 
reallocation of funds to more profitable local investment opportunities in place of less 
profitable outflow investment. Consequently, increased factor productivity could be 
both the cause of increased and the cause of reduced outward FDI activity.  
An important component related to R&D is the measure used to compute 
depreciation. There is limited empirical evidence on depreciation rates for R&D assets. 
depreciation rates are often estimated from econometric models relating new to second-
hand asset prices (Bernstein and Mamuneas, 2006) or calculated from patent renewals 
(Pakes and Schankerman, 1979). So R&D capital growth depends on an economic 
evaluation of the useful life of the asset. If the depreciation rate increases, this means 
more resources need to be used in order to maintain a constant knowledge outcome. 
This re-allocation of resources would raise the R&D opportunity cost, and ceteris 
paribus, reduce the rate of knowledge creation.  
Bernstein and Mamuneas (2006) show that depreciation rates are simultaneously 
calculated with other parameters characterising the overall production structure. The 
econometric results from Bernstein and Maumuneas (2006) indicate measures of 
depreciation close to 15% that is the ad hoc assumption usually used as a starting point 
in empirical analysis. They used gross investment data to generate estimates of the 
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depreciation rates, in addition to consistent series for the stocks of R&D. 
Net R&D stock is based on the method in Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2004) 
to calculate the initial year.4  
The Table (2.1) below provides definitions of variables we use and categorises 
their expected sign.  
 
Table (2.1) Definition of the variables, their source and expected signs 
Explanatory variables FDI stock (inflow) 
FDI stock 
(outflow) Source 
OPEN: openness (imports & exports 
of goods and services/nominal GDP) ? ? OECD National Accounts 
RLC (relative unit labour cost) - + International Financial Statistics 
ROE (Return on Equity) ? Not included 
DataStream 
DS market 
Effective Exchange rate 
volatility(derived from real / 
nominal exchange rate data)5 
? ? 
Bank for International 
Settlements ( BIS) 
R&D (research and development) 
Stock of BERD as % of nominal 
GDP 
Not 
included + OECD 
Real FDI stock (Nominal FDI stock divided by nominal GDP) 
United Nations 
Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) 
**Annual data over the period 1980-2011 ** the RLC and R&D variables are expressed in log levels. 
 
While the volatility measures are conditional estimates derived from the 
GARCH(1,1) exchange rate variance equations.  
                                                            
4 The following formula is used to measure net R&D stock in the initial year (1980): 
     &&
(depreciation rate growth rate)
it
it
R DflowR Dstock  
   
Where the depreciation rate of R&D is set constant over time at 0.15 and the Growth rate at 0.1 as the mean annual 
rate of growth of R&D flow. 
5 The measure of real exchange rate is Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
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2.4 Methodology and the Empirical Results  
The objective of this research is to show the nature of the relation between 
exchange rate volatility and FDI inflow and outflow for the G7 countries. The 
behaviour of a time series can be broken down into long-run and short-run components. 
To determine the existence of a long-run relation it is important to know the order of 
integration of the data and to this end the series used are tested to see whether they are 
difference stationary using an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). We measure the volatility of the exchange rate using a GARCH model for each 
country in our sample. The core long run relations are initially covered using 
cointegrating regressions, and these are embedded in what have been termed by Sir 
David Hendry equilibrium correction models (EqCMs).6 Such models are then 
estimated using SUR on a balanced panel over the period 1980 to 2011. These models 
are used to investigate the impact of the volatility of the exchange rate on FDI for each 
country in the sample.7 
2.4.1 Measuring Exchange Rate Volatility  
The empirical research examining the link between investment and uncertainty 
has had some interest in decomposing uncertainty into permanent and temporary 
components. There are a range of different volatility models (Greene, 2011), but 
Carruth et al. (2000) who survey a range of different conditional volatility models 
suggest that the findings are scarcely affected by the choice of the approach. For this 
purpose it is important to find a measure that well approximates these phenomena. 
Byrne and Davis (2003) in a study of the impact of uncertainty on investment looked at 
permanent and temporary components of exchange rate volatility in the G7 by applying 
component GARCH model and they found that it is the transitory component of 
exchange rate volatility which adversely impacts investment. Byrne and Davis (2004) 
decomposed inflation uncertainty into temporary and permanent components applying 
the Markov switching model of Kim (1993). Here the approach of Byrne and Davis 
(2005) is followed so the volatility of both the real and nominal exchange rate is 
measured using a GARCH (1,1) model for each country in our sample. We use the 
conditional variance as its value changes across the sample, because it depends on the 
                                                            
6 Burke and Hunter (2005) discuss the notion of long-run equilibrium how this relates to non-stationarity and how 
this is computed in the equilibrium/error correction (EC) and cointegrating regression frameworks.  
7 All estimations were undertaken in Eviews 8.0. 
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history and any persistence in exchange rate volatility up to that point. Hence, the 
variance of the exchange rate is conditional on past information.  
   The conditional variance of the effective exchange rate is derived for each G7 
country series in turn using monthly data on the effective exchange rate in nominal and 
real terms to construct an indicator of volatility within year. The mean equation of each 
series can be specified as a first order autoregressive (AR(1))8 model and the dynamic 
measure of the volatility for country i conditioned on the regression errors (uit) is 
explained by the next equation: 
 2 2 21 1                           2.1it i i it i itu         
The monthly conditional variances are used to construct an end of year measure 
of the volatility based on monthly models of the natural logarithm of real and nominal 
exchange rate.9 The empirical results are presented for the nominal and real exchange 
rates in panel A and B of Table 2.2 below for the G-7 countries used in the sample. 
Table (2.2 Panel A) Estimation results of the GARCH(1,1) model for the 
conditional variance of the nominal exchange rate 
    Country (i)                  
*
1i         *1i  
Canada 0.028961*** 0.971171*** 
 (0.00801) (0.009736) 
France 0.016017** 0.957577*** 
 (0.006242) (0.012993) 
Germany 0.206704*** 0.830475*** 
 (0.01659) (0.011555) 
Italy 0.848862*** 0.506924*** 
 (0.050516) (0.028144) 
Japan 0.116467*** 0.884285*** 
 (0.016097) (0.010172) 
UK 0.485377*** 0.526292*** 
 (0.061866) (0.034606) 
USA 0.137219*** 0.87713*** 
 (0.022781) (0.017696) 
NOTE: * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level and standard errors 
are in parentheses. The asterisk applied as a superscript to the parameter denotes a Maximum Likelihood Estimate 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).   
                                                            
8 The autoregressive (AR) model is one of a group of linear prediction formulas that attempt to predict an output of a 
system based on the previous outputs. 
9 It is used here end year measure of the volatility because FDI end year was collected to analyse in this chapter.  
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Table (2.2 Panel B) Estimation results of GARCH(1,1) model for the 
conditional variance of the real exchange rate 
        Country (i)                      
*
1i              *1i  
Canada 0.057949*** 0.943345*** 
 
(0.016668) (0.016048) 
France 
 
0.020644** 0.948525*** 
 
(0.016679) (0.008191) 
Germany 
 
0.135709*** 0.729225*** 
 
(0.07146) (0.036552) 
Italy 
 
0.673868*** 0.419633*** 
(0.044831) (0.041301) 
Japan 0.06497*** 0.910337*** 
 (0.0126) (0.016114) 
UK 0.392687*** 0.517032*** 
 (0.057485) (0.046292) 
USA 0.101652*** 0.901197*** 
 (0.019451) (0.018515) 
NOTE:  (See Panel A).  
2.4.2 Tests of Stationarity 
The ADF test is used to determine the order of integration of the series applied in 
this study. The test explains whether a series is stationary by testing the significance of 
the coefficient on the lagged level (i) in the following AR(p) model transformed so 
under the non-stationary null the dependent variable is stationary (Chapter 2, Burke and 
Hunter, 2005): 
 p-1it 0 it-1 itj 1  =  +  +  .                                      2.2i i ij it jx x x       
If the coefficient on (i) is significantly less than zero then the variable is I(0), 
otherwise it will be of a higher order of integration, and the test has to be repeated in 
first difference (for higher order) terms.    
It can be observed from Table (2.3.a) that it is not possible to reject the null of 
non-stationarity for FDI inflow, FDI outflow, OPEN and the natural logarithm (log) 
RLC for all G7 countries, and Table (2.3.b) investigates first differences and based on 
these results they appear to be integrated of order one I(1). It is not possible to reject the 
alternative of stationarity for log R&D, ROE and real exchange rate volatility for most 
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of our sample of countries at least at the 10% level and so these series would appear 
more usually to be I(0). Given we predominantly have I(1) series it is possible to test for 
cointegration using either a cointegrating regression test or error correction model 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004).  
When series are non-stationary, then the likely outcome of any regression model 
is that the relation is spurious. However, Engle and Granger (1987) first observed that a 
regression that gives rise to a stationary residual is considered to be cointegrating. 
Cointegration arises from a regression when a linear combination of series that are I(0). 
Cointegration defines an alternative to the difference operator as a filter to render series 
stationary. The primary definition due to Engle and Granger (1987) has been extended 
to permit further variables that are stationary (Flores and Szafarz, 1996). However, the 
dependent variable of the regression needs to be I(1) and to be combined with at least 
one other I(1) series. The cointegrating relations were investigated using two 
possibilities, combined firstly with real exchange rate volatility and then with nominal 
exchange rate volatility. The cointegration tests are used sequentially to find a minimum 
set of cointegrating variables (Davidson, 1998) for each of our countries. The 
significance of these variables at this stage is not critical to the analysis as we are 
looking for the underlying structure, and estimate the final model at one pass in an EqC 
form.  
2.4.3 Tests of Cointegration 
Intuitively the residuals are taken from an OLS regression and then using the 
Dickey Fuller model without intercept, these residuals are tested to see whether they are 
I(0) or I(1) by comparing the t-value of the coefficient on  from these regressions with 
the appropriate critical values for stationarity with more than one variable (see 
Patterson, 2000). The cointegrating regression results are presented with the appropriate 
stationarity test of the residual in Table (2.4) and Table (2.5).10 In each case it is not 
possible to reject the stationary alternative and so consider these relations to cointegrate.  
 
                                                            
10 Dummy variables are used to capture outliers and breaks in order to unravel the long run and short run relation 
among the variables Juselius (2007). 
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Table (2.3.a) 
 t-statistics for ADF unit root test with all variables in levels 
Countries  FDI inflow 
FDI 
outflow Open  log(RLC) log(R&D) ROE 
Nominal 
exchange rate 
volatility  
Real 
exchange rate 
volatility  
Canada 0.04774 -0.62307 -1.43277 -1.09219 -5.92649*** -3.12206** -1.17964 -4.010748*** 
France -1.07600 -1.13849 -1.13877 -1.72252 -2.67928* -2.55869 -1.637936 -2.62892* 
Germany -0.07722 0.07479 0.77699 -1.58838 -2.62105* -4.49951*** -2.67641* -3.98025*** 
Italy -0.57957 0.56172 -0.81470 -1.16868 -2.72054* -3.17900** -3.30480** -3.38341** 
Japan 1.05624 1.66871 -1.03040 -1.81559 -2.98009** -2.39168 -2.15774 -2.37782 
UK 1.38772 -0.31582 -0.99165 -1.81559 -2.24198 -4.81580*** -4.81817*** -4.93966*** 
USA -1.25695 -1.41666 -0.07816 -2.47446 -2.97767** -4.63129*** -2.54341 -2.83503* 
NOTE: * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level.  
The lag length in the unit-root tests was determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
Table (2.3.b) 
t-statistic for ADF unit root test for the first differenced series 
Countries  FDI  Inflow 
FDI 
outflow OPEN  log(RLC) log(R&D) ROE 
Nominal 
exchange rate 
volatility  
Real 
exchange 
rate volatility  
Canada -9.48746*** -3.19236** -3.70919*** -4.935711*** -3.42853** -5.910972*** -3.138893** -4.138893*** 
France -5.66402*** -3.53793** -5.300298*** -3.214582*** -3.161954** -4.565265*** -4.197237*** -6.412655*** 
Germany -6.47400*** -4.44321*** -4.940651*** -5.175427*** -3.324699** -5.718138*** -5.959172*** -5.0387*** 
Italy -7.25493*** -4.66953*** -5.653517*** -4.584639*** -3.572354** -3.651878*** -9.47012*** -9.048355*** 
Japan -4.30367*** -3.39632** -4.941959*** -4.452176*** -3.87395*** -5.14674*** -4.915446*** -4.763798*** 
UK -6.38729*** -5.92108*** -5.905688*** -4.267049*** -3.783553*** -4.691479*** -5.287174*** -10.74555*** 
USA -4.94273*** -5.38852*** -6.137937*** -4.14608*** -3.386669** -4.710083*** -5.546924*** -6.442254*** 
NOTE: * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level.  
The lag length in the unit-root tests was determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion. 
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For inflows in Table (2.4), openness and log RLC are always required for 
cointegration, and the return on equity (ROE) is needed for cointegration in France, 
Germany and Italy. Both exchange rate volatility variables were investigated, and real 
exchange rate volatility is needed for cointegration for Canada, the US and the UK, 
whilst nominal volatility is needed for the other four countries. Series that are stationary 
have controlled variation so they correct the growth path of FDI inflow for movements 
away from the steady state path. It follows from the unit root test applied to the residual 
that in the case of Table (2.4) that it is not possible to reject the proposition that the 
series is stationary at the 5% level.   
Table (2.4) OLS results for parameter estimates and residual unit root 
test statistics for cointegrated regression models of FDI inflow 
Country OPEN Log(RLC) Log(ROE) 
Real 
exchange 
rate 
volatility 
Nominal 
exchange 
rate 
volatility 
Residual 
unit root 
tests 
Canada 0.474414*** 0.135203* -- 0.107582*** -- -4.264196** 
France 0.669059 -0.22551 -0.00305 -- -0.358416*** -5.433631** 
Germany 0.371929*** 0.12575*** -0.014819** -- -0.014819 -4.772635** 
Italy 0.221995*** 0.13438*** 0.00121 -- -0.010102 -5.908518*** 
Japan 0.131113*** 0.01707*** -- -- 0.003431*** -4.507709** 
UK 0.725907** 0.006092*** -- -0.044087** -- -4.768013*** 
USA 1.977917*** 0.19617** -- -0.02601 -- -4.553205** 
NOTE: Hannan-Quinn procedure is used for lag selection and robust standard errors use the quadratic spectral kernel 
with Andrews bandwidth selection. * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
When the long-run coefficients are considered then FDI inflow is affected 
positively for all countries by OPEN. The RLC variable has a significant positive effect 
for all the G7 countries with the exception of France where the coefficient is not 
significant at any conventional level. ROE only has a significant effect on inflow in the 
case of Germany and in that case the coefficient is negative. While the only other 
countries where it features in the long-run are France and Italy and although the 
coefficients are relatively small. Volatility is significant in the case of Canada, France, 
Japan and the UK with inflow for Canada and the UK being affected by real volatility 
and for France and Japan by volatility of the nominal exchange rate. 
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For the outflow results in Table (2.5) we found common cointegrating sets that 
included openness, log RLC, log R&D and nominal exchange rate volatility for all the 
countries. 
Table (2.5) OLS results for parameter estimates and residual unit root 
test statistics for cointegrated regression models of FDI outflow 
Country OPEN Log(RLC) Log(R&D) 
Nominal 
exchange rate 
volatility 
Residual 
unit root 
test 
Canada 0.454782*** 0.153757*** 0.13703*** 0.102529*** -4.777629** 
France 2.854192*** -0.210567 0.430422*** -0.034574 -5.088101** 
Germany 0.695169*** 0.140113 0.131827 0.01817 --5.90435*** 
Italy 0.587975*** 0.039262 0.16467*** -0.003255 -4.563804** 
Japan 0.437138*** 0.039118 0.106545*** 0.013282*** -4.954563** 
UK 2.771332*** 1.290272*** 1.301221*** 0.010355 -4.496887** 
USA 1.557377*** 0.045838 0.237897*** 0.012597 -5.011386** 
NOTE: (see note to table 2.4).  
 
For FDI outflow, the result of openness is positive and significant for all G7 
countries, while RLC has a positive effect for all except for France though this appears 
only to be significant for the UK and Canada. The R&D variable has a significant, 
positive impact on outflow for all the G-7 countries except Germany. Nominal volatility 
seems to feature in the long-run relations for outflow for Canada and Japan, but these 
coefficients are relatively small and insignificant for the other countries in the sample.  
Not all variables appear significant at this stage, but they are required to form the 
minimum cointegrating sets as defined by Davidson (1998). There is evidence in 
support of the practical benefit of the extended definition or acceptable variables due to 
Flores and Szafarz (1996) as I(0) variables are needed in these regressions. The 
presence of a cointegrating relation among the variables assures us that the long-run 
information can be extracted from the panel. Hence, regression results involving the 
levels of the variables can proceed without generating spurious results or concern over 
endogeneity when the series are I(1) as a result of super consistency (see Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 2004).   
If the dependent variable is denoted by y, then the cointegrating regression model 
that in general explains the long-run is represented below while coefficients are set to 
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zero for the variables excluded in Table (2.4) and (2.5): 
FDI inflow model: 
 1 1 11 12 13 14 1          2 .3.t t t t t ty a b O PEN b RLC b RO E b e a       
FDI outflow model: 
2 2 21 22 23 24 2&        (2 .3 . )t t t t t ty a b O P E N b R L C b R D b e b       
Here y=FDI/GDP, in the case of outflow  t = Nominal exchange rate volatility11, 
and the RLC and R&D variables are expressed in log levels.  
2.4.4 Model specification  
The method in Byrne and Davis (2003a) is adopted here by applying Arnold 
Zellner’s (1962), SUR method. This allows us to test whether common coefficients can 
be imposed across different countries within our panel. In addition, the SUR method 
should enhance the robustness of our findings. If the disturbances across countries are 
correlated so there are worthwhile efficiency gains to be made by applying SUR 
(Greene, 2011). Here, the SUR method is used to estimate the dynamic equations for 
both inflow and outflow models of FDI to show the impact of the volatility of the 
exchange rate for a panel of G7 countries in the long-run. 
The long run relations covered in the previous section are re-estimated by 
embedding the appropriate variables defined in equation (2.4) below. The long-run 
coefficient exclusions are detailed in Tables (2.4) and (2.5), while the log R&D variable 
is always absent from the inflow and the ROE variable from the outflow equation. The 
coefficient on the equilibrium correction term ( i ) helps to capture the speed of 
adjustment of the short run deviation from long run equilibrium. The process is captured 
using the EqCM. The seven FDI equations were jointly estimated under the assumptions 
of SUR model using the following stacked regression equations: 
                                                            
11 According to cointegration regression, nominal exchange rate volatility was included in all outflow equations, and 
four inflow equations. However, real exchange rate volatility was included in Canada, the UK and the USA equations 
in case of inflow model. 
1 2 1 3 1 4 1
5 1 6 1
{   &
}                                                (2.4)
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Where ∆ is the first difference operator and the size of λ determines the speed of 
adjustment. When the EqCM is appropriate, then -1 < < 0 and such findings give 
support the evidence on cointegration.  
The initial results for FDI inflow are shown in Table (2.6). When this EqCM is 
estimated for each of the G7 countries, it is found that the relevant residuals do not 
suffer from serial correlation, and hence, there is no need to include further dynamic 
terms. The coefficient on the correction term is negative as required for stability and 
based on conventional inference significant at the 5% level. As is usual we test for 
commonalities using a sequence of Wald tests.12 
Table (2.6) Results for EqCMs Estimated using SUR, for FDI inflow 
Country(i) ۽۾۳ۼ൫෡઼૛ܑ൯ Log܀ۺ۱൫෡઼૜ܑ൯ 
Log 
܀۽۳൫෡઼૞ܑ൯ ۼ۳܆܄൫
෡઼૟ܑ൯ ܀۳܆܄൫෡઼૟ܑ൯ ൫෠ૃܑ൯ 
Canada 0.640687*** 0.139042* -- -- 0.101409*** -0.43152*** 
 (0.117131) (0.074067) -- -- (0.023555) (0.113286) 
France -0.163534 -0.751987 -0.004355 -0.188461 -- -0.335392** 
 (1.296633) (0.538336) (0.007048) (0.151282) -- (0.132418) 
Germany -0.703679*** 0.149742*** -0.003265*** -0.04857* -- -0.385226** 
 (0.041867) (0.050208) (0.001236) (0.027308) -- (0.152982) 
Italy 0.194241*** 0.107218*** 0.001086 -0.015311*** -- -0.390855*** 
 (0.072093) (0.034173) (0.000745) (0.00457) -- (0.069641) 
Japan 0.077201** 0.012899** -- 0.003911*** -- -0.319576*** 
 (0.03266) (0.006245) -- (0.00142) -- (0.051789) 
UK 0.575951 0.66938*** -- -- -0.035041 -0.307218*** 
 (0.520133) (0.155197) -- -- (0.027668) (0.100728) 
USA 1.743495*** 0.01064 -- -- -0.056744 -0.255673** 
 (0.526914) (0.171409) -- -- (0.03903) (0.109057) 
NOTE: For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. The symbol ^ denotes 
the OLS estimate. 
 
 
                                                            
12 The Wald test is used to further check the model specification (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). The size of the 
Wald test can be approximated by an asymptotic value that follows a chi-squared distribution function with degrees 
of freedom (r). 
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The Wald test is also applied to measure how close the unrestricted estimates 
come to satisfying the restrictions under the null hypothesis that they have no effect on 
the long run outcome. These results are reported in Table (2.6.a), and they are based on 
the model with all valid restrictions imposed.  
 
Table (2.6.a) Wald Test for FDI inflow model 
Common 
coefficient of  Countries 
Chi-square-Test 
Statistic (r) Probability Null hypothesis 
ܱܲܧܰ൫ߜመଶ௜൯ 
all G7 Countries 46.25603***(6) 0.0000 
ሺδଶ୧ ൌ δଶ଻	for	i
ൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
Canada-USA 4.300664(2) 0.0881 ሺδଶଵ ൌ δଶ଻ሻ 
France -
Germany-Italy 
5.008958(3) 0.0817 ሺδଶଶ ൌ δଶଷ ൌ δଶସሻ 
Log ܴܮܥ൫ߜመଷ௜൯ 
all G7 Countries 33.93677***(6) 0.0000 
ሺδଷ୧ ൌ δଷ଻	for	i
ൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
Canada-USA 0.481254(2) 0.4879 ሺδଷଵ ൌ δଷ଻ሻ 
France -
Germany-Italy 
2.691431(3) 0.2604 ሺδଷଶ ൌ δଷଷ ൌ δଷସሻ 
ܴܱܧ൫ߜመହ௜൯ France -Germany-Italy 12.20572
***(3) 0.0022 ሺδହଶ ൌ δହଷ ൌ δହସሻ 
REXV൫δ෠଺୧൯ Canada-UK-USA  19.51925***(3)  0.0001 ሺδ଺ଵ ൌ 	δ଺଺ ൌ δ଺଻ሻ 
NEXV൫δ෠଺୧൯ 
France -
Germany-Italy-
japan 
 19.71901***(4) 0.0002 
ሺδ଺ଶ
ൌ 	δ଺ଷ ൌ 	δ଺ସ ൌ δ଺ହሻ 
൫ߣመ௜൯ all G7 Countries 2.045918(6) 0.9154 ሺλ୧ ൌ λ଻	for	iൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
Zero 
coefficient of  
Countries Chi-square-Test 
Statistic (r=6) Probability Null hypothesis 
ܱܲܧܰ൫ߜመଶ௜൯ all G7 Countries  99.56314*** 0.0000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
Log ܴܮܥ൫ߜመଷ௜൯ all G7 Countries 50.10120*** 0.0000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
ܴܱܧ൫ߜመହ௜൯ 
France -
Germany-Italy 
 12.35125***  0.0063 
ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	i
ൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
EXV൫δ෠଺୧൯ all G7 Countries  41.82346*** 0.0000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
* Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
As can be seen from the Table (2.6.a), it is possible to impose a common speed of 
adjustment to the long run inflow equilibrium. This is not surprising as the adjustment 
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decisions are made by essentially the same body of firms for these countries, as inflows 
for each of them are from all other countries in the world. We also find that we can 
impose common coefficients for the US and Canada and for France, Germany and Italy 
for both openness and relative costs, but neither the UK nor Japan can be included to 
complete this group. As can be seen from the tests for a zero restriction at the bottom of 
the Table (2.6.a), none of the variables can be removed from the panel.  
After the SUR estimations are based on the coefficients that satisfy the common 
restrictions related to the Wald tests reported in Table (2.6.b).  
 
Table (2.6.b) Results for EqCMs estimated using SUR, for FDI 
inflow (with common coefficients) 
Country(i) ۽۾۳ۼ൫෡઼૛ܑ൯ Log ܀ۺ۱൫෡઼૜ܑ൯ ܀۽۳൫
෡઼૞ܑ൯ ۼ۳܆܄൫෡઼૟ܑ൯ ܀۳܆܄൫෡઼૟ܑ൯ ൫ࣅ෠࢏൯ 
Canada 0.7138*** 0.069964 -- -- 0.122038*** -0.28612*** 
 (0.14777) (0.082562) -- -- (0.036657) (0.03021) 
France 0.300029*** 0.078338** -0.012208 -0.340055*** -- -0.28612*** 
 (0.042299) (0.031283) (0.007579) (0.129142) -- (0.03021) 
Germany 0.300029*** 0.078338** -0.003423** -0.060003** -- -0.28612*** 
 (0.042299) (0.031283) (0.001476) (0.026275) -- (0.03021) 
Italy 0.300029*** 0.078338** 0.000694 -0.01922*** -- -0.28612*** 
 (0.042299) (0.031283) (0.000995) (0.006045) -- (0.03021) 
Japan 0.064571* 0.012717* -- 0.003717** -- -0.28612*** 
 (0.035025) (0.007226) -- (0.001708) -- (0.03021) 
UK 0.651502 0.636098*** -- -- -0.028173 -0.28612*** 
 (0.507218) (0.139907) -- -- (0.02684) (0.03021) 
USA 0.7138*** 0.069964 -- -- -0.078786** -0.28612*** 
 (0.14777) (0.082562) -- -- (0.03183) (0.03021) 
NOTE: For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. The symbol ^ denotes 
the OLS estimate. 
 
It was then found from Table (2.6.b) that OPEN has a significant and positive 
impact on FDI inflow in all G7 countries except Japan and the UK suggesting that an 
efficient environment with more openness to trade is likely to attract FDI. This result 
was supported by the findings in Asiedu (2002) and Edwards (1990); consistent with the 
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idea that a higher degree of openness is seen to create a favourable environment for FDI 
in export–oriented industries. These results show a positive relation between relative 
costs and FDI inflow and this would appear to suggest that foreign firms are not moving 
to cheaper locations, but rather taking firm specific skills to produce, perhaps more 
cheaply, in higher cost locations, these results are consistent with Boudier-Bensebaa 
(2005) who stating that “the variable may express not only labour cost effects but also 
skill effects.” The coefficient on ROE is statistically significant and has a negative 
impact on FDI flows into Germany. This suggests that FDI flows into Germany in 
periods when equity returns are low, indicating a possibility for higher returns for the 
investing firm than for the domestic targets.  
The focus has in part been on the role of exchange rate volatility, and for inflows, 
it is not unambiguous as to the sign that might be expected, as FDI might be encouraged 
by volatility when production is for sale in the host market. However, it is discouraged 
when it is oriented to exports, or uses a large proportion of imported inputs. The 
coefficient on exchange rate volatility is negative in five countries, and significant in 
four of these cases, whilst it is significant and positive for Canada and Japan. More 
specifically, it is noted that there is a negative effect of nominal exchange rate volatility 
on FDI inflows for the core European economies in the G7. That is France, Germany 
and Italy who have had relatively (or completely) fixed exchange rates against each 
other over the sample period. This is also significant and negative for the US, and 
negative for the UK. This suggests that FDI in these countries is strongly related to 
trade, either with significant imports of components or with significant export of 
products. Real exchange rate volatility in case in Canada and Japan has a strong impact 
suggesting that production is for the home market. We can easily conclude that on 
average increases in conditional exchange rate volatility reduce the overall level of FDI. 
It is concluded that openness and RLC encourage FDI inflow while real and nominal 
exchange rate volatility does not support FDI inflow in the case of the G7 economies 
themselves. 
The results related to FDI outflow are presented in Table (2.7) below. The 
findings show some signs of a systemic pattern for G7 countries, and once again there is 
no serial correlation, and no need for further difference terms.  
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Table (2.7) Results from EqCMs, using SUR for FDI outflow 
Country(i) ۽۾۳ۼ൫෡઼૛ܑ൯ Log ܀ۺ۱൫෡઼૜ܑ൯ 
Log 
܀&ࡰ൫෡઼૝ܑ൯ ۼ۳܆܄൫
෡઼૟ܑ൯ ൫ࣅ෠࢏൯ 
Canada 0.660657*** 0.120863*** 0.077145** 0.111257*** -0.576828*** 
 (0.081257) (0.041509) (0.031097) (0.018014) (0.084222) 
France 1.094558 -0.300709 0.688978*** 0.011177 -0.443865*** 
 (0.997792) (0.489900) (0.210481) (0.104698) (0.133809) 
Germany 0.662267*** 0.242612** 0.1418380 0.030338 -0.494288*** 
 (0.088842) (0.102484) (0.116677) (0.036425) (0.165098) 
Italy 0.554212*** 0.111573* 0.229216*** 0.009331 -0.250964*** 
 (0.116313) (0.059687) (0.042707) (0.010377) (0.091670) 
Japan 0.510179*** 0.042981* 0.111906*** 0.016403*** -0.556309*** 
 (0.094757) (0.025532) (0.013911) (0.003762) (0.117450) 
UK 3.127615*** 1.490518* 2.107694*** 0.011815 -0.368539*** 
 (0.471901) (0.205356) (0.503420) (0.024209) (0.069026) 
USA 1.249763*** 0.040645 0.33325*** 0.01058 -0.910866*** 
 (0.300634) (0.055943) (0.077853) (0.011684) (0.208060) 
 
NOTE: For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. The symbol ^ denotes 
the OLS estimate. 
 
All specification, tests applied to consider possible common coefficients for the 
models of FDI outflow can be found in Table (2.7.a) below.  
It can be seen from the results presented in table (2.7.a) that it is possible to apply 
common coefficients for RLC and openness, and the results are reported in Table 
(2.7.b).13 Furthermore, as with the models of FDI inflow a Wald test is applied to see 
whether sequentially it is possible to omit one variable at a time from the model. As can 
be seen from the tests for a zero restriction at the bottom of the table (2.7.a) that all 
variables on this basis appear important in explaining FDI outflow from the G7 
countries.  
 
                                                            
13  As it was not possible to impose the common coefficient on R&D for European countries and maintain 
cointegration, this result has not been included. 
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Table (2.7.a) Wald Tests of restriction for the FDI outflow model 
Common 
coefficient of  Countries 
Chi-square-Test 
Statistic (r) Probability Null hypothesis 
ܱܲܧܰ൫ߜመଶ௜൯ 
all G7 Countries 43.231770***(6) 0.000000 ሺδଶ୧ ൌ δଶ଻	for	i ൌ1,… ,6ሻ  
Canada-USA 3.659798(2) 0.0557 ሺδଶଵ ൌ δଶ଻ሻ 
France -
Germany-Italy  0.926020(3) 0.6294 ሺδଶଶ ൌ δଶଷ ൌ δଶସሻ 
Log ܴܮܥ൫ߜመଷ௜൯ 
all G7 Countries 53.758440***(6) 0.000000 ሺδଷ୧ ൌ δଷ଻	for	iൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
Canada-USA  1.349156(2) 0.2454 ሺδଷଵ ൌ δଷ଻ሻ 
France -
Germany-Italy  1.987645(3)  0.3702 ሺδଷଶ ൌ δଷଷ ൌ δଷସሻ 
Log	R&ܦ൫δ෠ସ୧൯ 
all G7 Countries 27.856550***(6) 0.000100 ሺδସ୧ ൌ δସ଻	for	iൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
France -
Germany-Italy  5.693210(3)  0.0580 ሺδସଶ ൌ δସଷ ൌ δସସሻ 
Canada-USA 9.627438***(2)  0.0019 ሺδସଵ ൌ δସ଻ሻ 
NEXV൫δ෠଺୧൯ all G7 Countries  31.51407***(6) 0.0000 ሺδ଺୧ ൌ δ଺଻	for	iൌ 1,… ,6ሻ 
൫ߣመ௜൯ all G7 Countries  97.81136***(6) 0.000000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ ߣ଻	for	iൌ 1, … ,6ሻ 
Zero 
coefficient of  
Countries Chi-square-Test 
Statistic (r=6) Probability  Null hypothesis 
ܱܲܧܰ൫ߜመଶ௜൯ all G7 Countries  188.6582*** 0.000000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
Log ܴܮܥ൫ߜመଷ௜൯ all G7 Countries  70.52430*** 0.000000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
Log	R&ܦ൫δ෠ସ୧൯ all G7 Countries   131.1514*** 0.000000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
NEXV൫δ෠଺୧൯ all G7 Countries  69.86896*** 0.000000 ሺߣ୧ ൌ 0	for	iൌ 1,… ,7ሻ 
* Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. 
 
The results reported in Table (2.7.b) show in general openness has a significant 
positive effect on FDI outflows, as would be expected, this result in the line with Kravis 
and Lipsey (1982), Culem (1988) and Edwards (1990). The impact of relative costs is 
also positive, but not always significant, and this suggests that outflows may in part be 
driven by the need to reduce costs, but that these destinations may be outside the G7 
group of countries. Wheeler and Mody (1992), and Feenstra and Hanson (1997) provide 
further evidence that labour cost is positively related to FDI. Interestingly, R&D has a 
positive effect and is always significant, with the only exception for this being Canada, 
suggesting that firm specific technology or techniques are being exported, it can be 
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concluded from R&D results that receiving countries benefit in general or on average 
from outward FDI due to the increased productivity of the home countries (G7 in our 
sample). This consistent with the empirical literature which indicates that firms that 
undertake R&D tend to undertake more FDI in order to take firm specific technologies 
to foreign countries (Barrell and Pain, 1997). Exchange rate volatility always has a 
positive effect, with the exception of France, albeit not always significant, indicating 
that increased volatility might lead to a reduction in production at home.  
Table (2.7.b) Results from EqCMs, using SUR for FDI outflow 
(with common coefficients) 
Country(i) ۽۾۳ۼ൫෡઼૛ܑ൯ Log ܀ۺ۱൫෡઼૜ܑ൯ 
Log 
܀&ࡰ൫෡઼૝ܑ൯ ۼ۳܆܄൫
෡઼૟ܑ൯ ൫ࣅ෠࢏൯ 
Canada 0.850609*** 0.018843 -0.015904 0.145492*** -0.367893*** 
 (0.175945) (0.045932) (0.061000) (0.030316) (0.087790) 
France 1.563716** 0.178776*** 0.737971*** -0.01574 -0.483529*** 
 (0.617625) (0.060824) (0.153379) (0.087486) (0.123939) 
Germany 0.662265*** 0.178776*** 0.175593*** 0.035911 -0.627775*** 
 (0.065491) (0.060824) (0.082929) (0.026519) (0.153174) 
Italy 0.517298*** 0.178776*** 0.262608*** 0.020429 -0.152265** 
 (0.187577) (0.060824) (0.071697) (0.014700) (0.067777) 
Japan 0.452275*** 0.029333 0.117817*** 0.015818*** -0.583102*** 
 (0.087611) (0.024354) (0.013581) (0.003595) (0.118213) 
UK 3.319244*** 1.420715** 1.989182*** 0.019547 -0.38526*** 
 (0.415176) (0.182188) (0.440867) (0.020473) (0.065673) 
USA 0.850609*** 0.018843 0.416912*** 0.015445 -0.73493*** 
 (0.175945) (0.045932) (0.076699) (0.012541) (0.153229) 
 
NOTE: For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the standard error is reported in the 
parenthesis. * Significant at 10% level.  **Significant at 5% level.  ***Significant at 1% level. The symbol ^ denotes 
the OLS estimate. 
  
2.5 Concluding Remarks  
 This contribution adds to the previous literature in a number of ways. Firstly, 
included in the analysis there are what are now viewed as the most significant 
economies in the world, the G7 countries. In contrast to some of the earlier studies, the 
investigated relation between exchange rate volatility and the stock of FDI inflow and 
outflow is analysed for all the G7 countries to the rest of the world. The study analyses 
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the extent to which exchange rate volatility impacts on these developed economies over 
the period 1980-2011. In contrast to most previous research which uses firm-level, 
bilateral FDI data, or industry-level, this chapter contributes to the empirical literature 
on the FDI inflows/outflows by using aggregate country level data. Finally, the analysis 
picks out a more subtle linkage between exchange rate volatility and FDI inflow.   
A distinction is made in the models between the FDI inflow and outflow 
responses to exchange rate volatility and other factors that drive FDI inflow and outflow 
such as equity return, relative labour cost, R&D, and the openness of the economy. 
Cointegrating regressions (Engle and Granger, 1987) are adopted to derive minimal 
long-run relations. The long-run is embedded into dynamic models using a SUR 
approach. Our results support the hypothesis that exchange rate volatility is an 
important determinant of FDI for the G7 economies.  
In this chapter, it is reported that investors of these developed economies do value 
exchange rate volatility as an important factor in their decisions to engage in external 
investments in addition to the other control variables. It is generally found that 
exchange rate shocks have a stronger impact on the long run behaviour. In particular, 
we can clearly conclude that exchange rate uncertainty decreases FDI inflow, while for 
the FDI outflow it seems that it has a positive effect, and exchange rate volatility cannot 
be excluded from both model regressions. The panel-data results also showed that 
openness is positively related to FDI in the selected sample suggesting that 
liberalisation of the trade and investment environment positively affects the choice of 
forming FDI. It can be concluded that openness is a significant driver of FDI inflow in 
the G7. Outflow from G7 countries is encouraged by openness and home country R&D 
with the exception of Canada and by the common coefficients for RLC regarding 
European economies. This is in addition to the positive effect of nominal exchange rate 
volatility in the case of Canada and Japan. Moreover, the findings suggest that there is 
no systemic evidence for an FDI inflow model, because common coefficients are more 
likely in the case of FDI outflow, because they generally relate to the same group of 
countries. 
Generally, in contrast to the more common view, these results do not always 
indicate that there is a negative relation. It is the case that an increase in volatility 
normally encourages FDI outflows, and may be related to an increase in inflows in 
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some cases. Nonetheless, this result is in line with some of the earlier findings reported 
in the literature from which it is indicated that volatility in the exchange rate decreases 
inflows of FDI. However, in certain cases these effects may be reversed such as the 
cases of Canada and Japan. Our results are also robust to the presence of other 
conditioning variables often viewed as important determinants of FDI such as openness.  
The findings of this chapter contribute to the literature by emphasising the 
importance of the exchange rate volatility expectations in FDI decision making. This 
investigation can help to reduce the debates on the empirical evidence, and to reach a 
better understanding of the relationship between FDI and exchange rate volatility. 
Moreover, The findings of the study have valuable implications for policy makers 
in developed countries 1-) They suggest a positive long-run relationship between 
exchange rate volatility and FDI outflow, but this effect is not as strong for the core 
Euro zone countries that have moved relative to each other to a fixed relation over the 
sample. Implying that policy makers both within the Euro zone and outside need to pay 
attention to this in terms of policy changes intended to encourage FDI. 2-) They show 
that FDI complements openness, this suggests that it makes sense to encourage FDI as it 
encourages economic growth. 3-) They imply that policy makers should pay attention to 
potential technological advantages and focus on policies that encourage R&D which 
also encourage FDI outflow. 
  To further improve the findings of this study, further research should be 
conducted in certain areas. Additional analysis should seek to explore other FDI forms, 
as well as, including additional countries. Further insight could be gained by seeing how 
different financial crises beside those due to exchange rate volatility affect FDI stock, as 
the time frame includes the period of crises. Another future research could distinguish 
between the effect of permanent and temporary volatility on FDI. 
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3 Chapter	Three	
Exchange	 Rates	 and	 Bilateral	 FDI:	 Gravity	
models	 of	 Bilateral	 FDI	 in	 High	 Income	
Economies	
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in chapter 2, FDI has become a critical driver of the World 
Economy that refers to a type of international investment by which an investor obtains a 
significant position in the management of a project outside the investor’s home country. 
It has been reported in the 2010 World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2010) that the 
inward and outward global stocks of FDI measured as a proportion of GDP were in 
2009 valued at 32.3% and 34.5% respectively. Furthermore, government policies across 
the globe have been modified to boost FDI.  
The last two decades brought critical improvements in the investment 
environment, triggered in part by the recognition of an interest in FDI that has spread 
quickly across the globe. The financial and economic crises, such as the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis 2008, have had a large impact on the 
behaviour of bilateral foreign direct investment (BFDI) and other capital movements. 
The financial crisis has been detrimental in terms of growth slowdown, rising 
unemployment, slow export growth and a reduction in international, bilateral capital 
flows (UNCTAD 2009a).   
Mahmoud (2011) indicated that global financial crisis has been found to affect 
FDI depending on FDI motives. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are 
different motives for FDI outflow, widely termed market-seeking, efficiency-seeking 
and resource-seeking. In the first case, market-seeking, foreign investors are attracted to 
the local market of the host country. Hence, investment incentives and tariff protection 
are significant determinants, along with a set of variables such as market size and 
growth. This Investment form is expected to grow quickly even while there is a 
financial crisis, the explanation is that this investment form mainly in services which by 
definition are generally non-tradable. By contrast, efficiency-seeking investments refer 
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to those that locate in an economy owing to its effectiveness as compared to other 
locations. The factors that are important here are related to the macroeconomic 
environment and policy on trade that imply that investment is very likely to be export-
oriented. This type of FDI has been expected more recently to grow slowly as a result of 
the effects of the global financial crisis, especially when concentrated on the 
automotive, electronics and machine tools industries (Kimura, 2006). However, 
resource-seeking FDI is expected to be less affected by the global crisis.  
Global FDI flows remain a preferred component of external finance during the 
last decade, although the economic and financial crises witnessed in the global economy 
(UNCTAD, 2014). In this context, research has been strongly motivated to search for 
specific determinants to attract FDI, based on the positive impacts of FDI on certain 
determinants in the host countries (see Kambayashi and Kiyota, 2015). This concern 
regarding the FDI determinants has resulted from the increasing the FDI importance in 
the economic development of countries. However, the conclusions as to the 
fundamental drivers of FDI are no more certain, because the empirical evidence thus far 
is inconclusive. An investment theory that derives from an economic perspective may 
call into question why a company is required to operate at a multinational level simply 
to sell in overseas markets, because at the operational level the products could be 
exported. On the other hand, there are direct and indirect barriers to trade such as tariffs, 
transport costs and exchange rate risk. Using a Gravity model Jeanneret (2006) found 
when they analysed FDI data for Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries that the finding of a negative relation with exchange 
rate volatility diminishes with time calling into question the persistence of a negative 
link. While Görg and Wakelin (2002) also found that the negative impact of volatility 
on FDI fell over their sample.   
The focus of this chapter is on BFDI from 14 high income OECD countries to the 
OECD countries for a period of 1995-2012. The analysis is applied to the Gravity model 
and that determines the key factors related to that model. That is the important factors 
that drive this type of relation such as distance, exports and GDP. Our analysis is not 
limited to main economic fundamentals, but takes into account other institutional 
factors that may affect the FDI distribution stocks across the host countries. Despite 
recent attempts to look at the drivers of FDI, a lot still needs to be said about risk factors 
such as exchange rate volatility, especially after the decline in FDI. Furthermore, Single 
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equation estimation of a dynamic panel is derived using what has been called systems-
GMM as it not only exploits the time series variation in the data while accounting for 
unobserved country specific effects, but it also controls for possible correlation between 
the regressors and the error term. There are three measures of FDI used in research. For 
example, Bijsterbosch and Kolasa (2010) use gross FDI inflows as a share of value 
added, while Büthe and Milner (2008) and Singh and Jun (1995) include inward FDI 
stocks as a percentage of GDP and FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, respectively. In 
this study bilateral data on the FDI position is divided by the GDP deflator. 
Additionally, Financial crisis is often thought to affect FDI. In principle, it is 
expected that a significant financial crisis affects both the host country and foreign 
business engaged in FDI. As a result of the turmoil that is caused by the crisis, 
government policies in the host and the donor countries are directed to encourage 
investors in both economices to be more active. Thus, it is to be expected that financial 
crisis will reduce investment flows and this suggests why it is important to trace the 
impact of financial crises on FDI. Especially were this enahmce the understanding of 
the mechanism by which the financial shock influences the allocation of FDI. At the 
same time, identifying the impact of financial crises on FDI is important for 
understanding the possible reverse impact of FDI on policy makers response to the 
crises. This chapter aims to inform the debate by examining the behaviour of BFDI in 
the context of the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis, the global financial crisis of 2008, and 
systemic banking crises. Laeven and Valencia (2013) define that a systemic banking 
crisis occurs when a substantial number of borrowers default or experience repayment 
difficulties, leading to a sharp increase in non-performing loans for lenders and to an 
exhaustion of capital for the banking system as a whole.  
This chapter will also address an interrelated issue, namely whether a common 
currency via a currency union (CU) has had any effect on FDI. In addition, it can 
evidence whether the creation of a CU has created a better environment for firms to 
make long-term investment decisions. Adopting a single currency so eliminating 
exchange rate uncertainty within the union can be seen as a highly credible commitment 
to exchange rate stability. The stability that arises should also reduce transaction costs 
as in a currency union there is no reason for exchange with transactions within the 
union. The reduction in transaction costs and a more certain environment certainty 
should enhance FDI. That suggests the introduction of the Euro will bring about a 
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higher degree of integration across financial transactions. Bilateral investment constitute 
a starting point for this analysis, because they possess attributes of both commercial and 
financial transactions. The debate on the contribution of a common currency to 
economic development is vital. One main research question regarding euro and FDI is 
being asked; has the common currency supported FDI for countries that adopted the 
euro as compared with the rest of OECD countries. 
The empirical imperatives of this study can be summarised as follows [1] to 
analyse the impact of the crises on BFDI to the OECD countries. Using a panel data 
approach, a significant negative impact of the crises is found on BFDI stock, expressed 
as a percentage of GDP deflator. [2] After examining the impact of the scale of the 
recent economic crisis on FDI as compared with previous crises it is concluded that the 
crisis in 2008 had more of an effect on FDI than the Asian crisis whose primary 
manifestation was at the country level. [3] The findings indicate that exchange rate risk 
can be seen as a key factor that may impact FDI and when the data is decomposed at the 
bilateral basis there is evidence that expected long run exchange rate volatility reduces 
the BFDI stock. This may give a clear rationale as to why membership of the Euro zone 
has a reverse effect. 
 The chapter is organised as follows. First, the literature on bilateral FDI is 
focused on the Gravity model. Second, this is placed in the context of the impact 
of crises, the CU, exchange rate volatility and other factors. Thirdly, the data and 
methodology are discussed followed by the estimations and tests. Finally, conclusions 
are offered.  
3.2 The theoretical framework of the Gravity model in BFDI 
This chapter adopts the “Gravity model” for a number of reasons. This model has 
been considered of use in several areas of economics such as trade flows and FDI. 
Deardoff (1998) explains that the advantages with the Gravity model are their simple 
structure and compatibility with a wide range of theoretical frameworks to explain 
flows. Moreover, the models flexibility allows for both “push” factors originating in 
home countries and “pull” factors arising from host economies that affect bilateral trade 
or asset flows.  
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The Gravity model is derived from the Newtonian principle of gravitational pull 
applied in an economic context, and developed to explain the movement between 
countries of information, commodities and investment as a result of the distance 
between them (Erlander, 1980). The model depends on the interactions of the different 
factors that determine the extent of this force across borders.14  
3.2.1 The trade Gravity model 
Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) pioneered the application of the Gravity 
model to analyse international trade flows. Since then, the Gravity model has been 
successfully applied to FDI and migration, and more particularly to trade (Martínez-
Zarzoso et al., 2009). According to the Gravity model for international trade, the degree 
of trade between two countries is expected to increase with their size, as measured by 
their national incomes, and the decrease in transportation costs, as measured by the 
distance between their capitals or economic centres.  
However, the Gravity model has been identified as a highly flexible empirical 
approach for tackling different applied policy issues. As mentioned above, the most 
common application of this model has been in the area of international trade especially 
in terms of goods. For instance, Glick and Rose (2001) and Rose (2002) apply different 
extensions of the Gravity model to explain goods movements around the world as well 
as the effect of currency unions and trade agreements and international flows of goods. 
Head and Mayer (2013) have provided a clear explanation of estimation and the 
interpretation of gravity equations as applied in relation to bilateral trade relations. The 
gravity equation is one of the most commonly applied techniques to analyse bilateral 
trade (see Egger et al, 2012). While Brainard (1997), Braconier et al. (2002), and Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2004), apply the approach to the analysis of sales of foreign affiliates 
of multinational companies. Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) consider portfolio capital 
flows, and Anderson (2011) migration. 
The Gravity model supports both the assumption of increasing returns to scale, 
and homogenous goods production. This explains why this model has been widely 
employed to study FDI as can be seen from the empirical applications to be found in the 
articles by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), Bevan and Estrin (2004), Benassy-Quere et 
                                                            
14  The so called gravity equation has been widely used in the social sciences following William J. Reilly who 
formulated Reilly‘s Law of Retail Gravitation in 1931. 
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al. (2007), Stein and Daude (2007) and Kahouli et al. (2014).15 Similarly, affiliate sales 
were analysed by Brainard (1997) and Carr et al., (2001). The latter studies appear to 
provide support for the studies of FDI by Woodward (1992), Barrell and Pain (1999), 
and Yeaple (2001) that market size is also a critical factor. Whereas investment is 
expected to flow to countries that are nearer as transport costs decrease with geographic 
distance.16  
The choice of traditional explanatory variables to explain FDI has relied on the 
existing theoretical and empirical research. It is claimed from the nature of the gravity 
equation that BFDI between any two economies is positively related to the size of the 
two economies and negatively to distance and population. The size of markets as 
measured by (GDP, population) and the distance between home and host countries have 
widely been known to be major drivers of global trade flows. Starting from the 
international trade literature, many empirical studies have attempted to explain the 
drivers of FDI using GDP or population to proxy market size, but as is mentioned below 
different authors have extended the basic model to explain FDI empirically by further 
factors.  
In practice, the Gravity model has been specified according to the specification 
considered most appropriate to the case at hand with population sometimes excluded 
and only partner country characteristics taken into account. Not having a clear 
theoretical basis to these models that is coherent across explanatory variables or even in 
relation to an explanatory variable may pour doubt on the basis of their use as has been 
pointed out by Baldwin and Taglioni (2006).  
Recent research claims that distance between countries may be much more than a 
geographic measure. It is associated with history, culture and language, social relations 
sometimes captured by factors such as transport and transaction costs. Brainard (1997) 
suggests in the case of trade that it can be imputed that greater distance between home 
and host country relates to high trade costs, which in turn should be associated with a 
reduction in trade flow. As most research consider that FDI and trade as substitutes 
(Helpman, 2006), one would expect a positive effect of distance in FDI17 (Markusen, 
2002). For countries far apart with significant freight costs, high cost trade is expected 
                                                            
15  Other examples arise in Eaton and Tamura (1994), Graham (1997), Mátyás (1997), and Brenton et al. (1999). 
16 As measured by the distance between their capitals or economic centres. 
17 Unless this is associated with higher search and information costs. 
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to be replaced by low-cost FDI. However, as “FDI and distance are negatively 
correlated in the data” (Bergstrand and Egger, 2013), much of the empirical research 
finds a negative relationship between distance and FDI.18  
When BFDI are considered then the literature as is suggested above implies a 
Gravity model, with transactions between countries determined by their national 
incomes, market size and geographical distance and other frictional variables. In this 
chapter, a new variable that relates to the crises is included as a key component of the 
empirical model to examine such phenomena. Moreover, Blonigen and Piger (2014) 
indicate that the traditional gravity variables distance, common language and a common 
border are still considered as important determinants of FDI they are also to be included 
here. Furthermore, exchange rate volatility is included in the gravity equation as is the 
case with other studies of BFDI. For this purpose, MacDermott (2008) considered the 
impact of real exchange volatility using a fixed effects variation of the Gravity model 
for panel data on 55 countries over the period 1980 - 1997. MacDermott found that 
weak host currencies and greater exchange rate volatility discouraged FDI flows. Here 
following articles such as Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005), unit labour cost differential is 
included as a further variable in the Gravity model.  
3.2.2 FDI and Crises:    
The Asian Financial Crisis has been seen to have had a significant effect on FDI 
flows. As a result, of this crises, FDI flows dipped in late 1998 and 1999 in Eastern and 
South-Eastern Asia and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
Additionally, FDI dropped from a peak in 2000 until 2003 after the crisis related to the 
dot-com bubble (2000-2001), and then followed by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This 
resulted in a dramatic drop in global FDI; FDI inflows fell 41 percent to $576 billion 
across the world in 2001. In comparison to other regions, South-Eastern Asia, most 
OECD countries and Eastern Europe recorded the sharpest decline among regions in 
2001 (UNCTAD, 2009). 
In the period of Global Financial crisis, countries around the world witnessed 
huge declines in output, trade and employment. The financial crisis began in the USA in 
2007 and involved financial institutions across OECD economies and this automatically 
                                                            
18 Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004), using a Hausman-Taylor approach, found a positive effect of distance on FDI 
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impacted FDI flows (Dullien et al., 2010). However, in the main multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have continued to invest in host economies during the Great 
Recession that followed after the global financial crisis. While FDI flows from overseas 
parent companies fell, because reinvested earnings and intercompany debt fell (see 
Contessi and Li, 2012). 
Given that the global crisis started in western economies and economic growth is 
an important determinant of FDI, it comes as no surprise that FDI inflows and outflows 
from developed countries have thus far fallen most. The decline has had a particularly 
strong effect on banks in developed economies and their financial institutions especially 
in America and Europe. Fabuš and Kohuťár (2010) show that the turbulence in the 
global economy and the financial markets fell gradually and this influenced what 
happened to total flows of FDI in 2008 and in the first half of 2009. After an 
uninterrupted growth of FDI over the period 2003-2007, the worldwide inflow fell by 
14% in 2008 to $1.697 billion from $1.979 billion in 2007.  
According to research by UNCTAD, the fall in global FDI in 2008–2009 is the 
result of two main factors affecting domestic as well as international investment. First, 
the capability of transnational companies to invest has been reduced as access to credit 
has tightened and corporate balance sheets have deteriorated. Second, the propensity to 
invest has been negatively affected by economic prospects, especially in developed 
countries hit by the sharp recession (UNCTAD, 2011). Beyond this, FDI could cause 
social costs. For example, these investments can affect unemployment, because of 
transfers of the work force to companies under foreign ownership or by pushing out 
companies at the domestic level that are more susceptible to local economic and 
financial conditions as they have less access to global funds and markets (Grgic, 2008).  
Theoretically, systemic banking crises could affect FDI through two channels. 
Firstly, banking crises are widely accompanied by demands shocks, such as the 
downturn of world GDP, which is highly correlated with FDI. Secondly, credit supply is 
a difficult constraint on FDI. Companies purposed to prospect foreign markets face 
entry costs barriers in the fixed and information costs form. Financing these sunk costs 
for FDI is not an easy task for a number of reasons such as the lag between initial 
investments and sales, and production or the complexity to forecast foreign returns. 
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Moreover, financial constraints may impact new endeavours of transnational firms in 
addition to established subsidiaries. 
Furthermore, banking crises could impact both the amount invested and the 
number of investments across borders. As a response to the demand or credit 
shortening, companies' responses can be either through FDIs’ extensive margin, 
reducing investment abroad, or through FDIs’ intensive margin, reducing the financial 
scale of the prospective projects. For German firms, Buch et al. (2010) found that 
financial constraints seem to be decisive for the decision to engage in FDI, but less so 
for the aggregate magnitude of sales of foreign affiliates.   
3.3 Recent Literature on FDI: 
3.3.1 FDI and financial crises:  
The extent of the impact of the financial crises on FDI has been questioned in the 
literature. A few studies have analysed the relation between FDI and the recent crisis to 
global financial markets that then impacted the world economy. For example see the 
study by Mahmoud (2011) who examined the impact of financial crises on BFDI. His 
study addresses the effect of global financial crisis and Asian crisis on BFDI using a 
panel for the period 1985-2008 with the six largest countries by FDI outflow 
representing home economies relative to a further 42 host countries. The systems GMM 
estimator was applied to a Gravity model of BFDI flows, as it provides a remedy to 
endogeneity bias, simultaneity and spatial characteristics of the data (see Madariaga and 
Poncet, 2007). A key result of Mahmoud’ study is that global financial crisis has a 
negative and significant effect on BFDI, Asian crisis has a negative but not significant 
effect on BFDI. The extent of the negative shock related to the effect of financial crises 
on FDI appears to change in response to their origin and their nature.   
Additionally, Dornean and Oanea (2012) analysed the link between post crisis 
FDI and economic growth for the European Union taking into account that financial 
crisis had a strong impact on the EU countries. Using the least squares method based on 
an unbalanced panel over the period 1990-2011, the study found that the effect of the 
financial crisis has a significant negative impact on FDI.  
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The recent interest by researchers who have approached this topic has been to 
measure the effect of global financial crisis on the FDI level. More specifically, the 
empirical study conducted by Ucal et al. (2010) revealed that the financial crisis had a 
significant effect on FDI. After recording an upturn before and during the crisis, the 
level of FDI was reduced in following years. Poulsen and Hufbauer (2011) compared 
the current FDI recession with the response on FDI to past crises and found that the 
financial crisis of 2008 could be seen as the most extreme in recent memory. While, the 
global impact of the recent crisis meant that it had had a greater effect on FDI.  
Also, Sachs (2009) showed that the effect of the recent crisis was different from 
one region to another, highlighting that Asia experienced a quicker recovery, because of 
the stimulus packages. In addition to the recent global financial crisis, there were some 
articles that were interested in the Asian crisis, all these studies indicating the post-crisis 
evolution of FDI. In this sense, the empirical research done by Park et al. (2009) 
indicated that the FDI level fell in six Asian host countries for more than a decade after 
the crisis. Going deeper into the problem, Moon et al. (2011) compared the FDI 
evolution after the Asian crisis with the level recorded before the crisis. Their results 
showed that countries with a higher FDI level before the Asian crisis will experience a 
milder recession and a more gradual recovery.   
Even though there are studies that analyse the different crises, there is little 
research regarding the relation between the systemic banking crises and FDI. The 
impact of financial and banking constraints on FDI has caught the attention of a number 
of articles. Ma and Cheng (2005) found that FDI falls in response to banking crises. 
Contessi and De Pace (2012) examined the impact of the subprime crisis on the inflows 
of FDI into the USA over the period 2006-2010 and found that U.S. industries with 
more financial vulnerability experience significant variations in the debt and equity 
components of FDI inflow in response to the capital cost changes that occurred in the 
home countries during the crisis period. Similar subprime crisis in the financial channels 
on FDI have been identified in the western economies, for example Germany and 
Belgium (Düwel et al., 2011; and De Maeseneire and Claeys, 2012).  
In their recent study, Gil-Pareja et al., (2013) estimate the impact of the systemic 
banking crises on FDI using the Gravity model on a sample of 161 Countries for the 
period 2003-2010, they show that systemic banking crises may impact FDI in two ways 
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via their impact on aggregate monetary flows and individual project counts. Their 
results indicate the unprecedented number of systemic banking crises since 2007 a 
period known as the Great Recession, through credit constraints on markets, have had a 
significant negative impact on the investment decision, but not on the quantities 
invested. 
3.3.2 FDI and the introduction of the Euro  
It is generally thought that by adopting the Euro the countries in the Euro zone 
have become more highly integrated. Increased trade is without any doubt one of the 
gains from a currency union by eliminating exchange rate volatility and reducing 
transactions costs of member countries; as a result of this trade is expected to increase. 
The nature of the Euro zone trade effects has also spilt over into other EU economies 
which have not joined yet, as well as the member countries. 
Gravity models as applied in the international trade literature have been widely 
examined to investigate the effect on trade of a common currency following the seminal 
paper by Rose (2000), where currency unions were found to increase trade by more than 
200%.19 Following this there has been much debate in particular from Persson (2001), 
Barr et al. (2003), Frankel (2005, 2010), Flam and Nordström (2006, 2007), Bun and 
Klaassen (2007), Berger and Nitsch (2008), and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010). 
Herwartz and Weber (2010), and Camaero et al. (2012) proposed a Gravity model 
estimated using a panel-based cointegration approach, which allows for cross-sectional 
dependence by common factors. The literature appears to demonstrate that currency 
unions have a large positive effect on trade among within the common currency zone. 
The empirical research has grown rapidly and was constructed to some extent to 
follow the impact of the Euro on intra-Eurozone trade. In anticipation of the positive 
impacts on trade volume a common currency could bring to its members, a foreign firm 
has a stronger incentive to expand its production (or set up new facilities to start a 
production activity) in the host country in order to benefit form a boost in trade. 
Therefore, the creation of a CU tends to enhance FDI flows into the Euro zone. 
However, there has been, with some recent exceptions, a lack of attention to the CU’s 
                                                            
19 The size of the effect has had some effect on the increase in the literature as can be seen from by Glick and Rose 
(2002), Alesina et al. (2002), Micco et al. (2003), de Nardis and Vicarelli (2003), Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) 
and de Nardis et al. (2008). 
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effect on FDI flows. Theoretical research on the effect of CUs on FDI seems to be 
emerging slowly (Neary, 2007). On the other hand, empirical research has recently 
emerged and has focused mostly on the effect of the euro on FDI flows into the Euro 
zone. The Gravity model has been used the most in this literature, for example see Buch 
et al. (2003), Aristotelous (2005), de Sousa and Lochard (2006,2011), Petroulas (2007), 
Schiavo (2007), Brouwer et al. (2008) and Jienwatcharamongkhol (2010) that all show 
that there is a positive and significant effect of the Euro on FDI. This seems to be a 
plausible finding since a currency union may promote trade among members via FDI 
flows. On the other hand, Flam and Nordström (2007), Dinga and Dingová (2011), 
Folfas (2012) and Kyrkilis et al. (2013), found that the Euro zone had no significant 
impact on FDI across the EU member countries. 
However, few papers studied whether exchange rate volatility affects BFDI. In 
this context, CU has potential to affect FDI inflows through transformation of the 
volatility of the exchange rate and reduced transaction costs (Dinga and Dingová, 2011, 
2012). The impacts of exchange rate risk on FDI are mixed. Firstly, Cushman (1988) 
and then Markusen (1995) found a positive link between exchange rate volatility and 
FDI. Whereas Zis (1989), Tavlas (2004), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Wei and Choi 
(2002), Servén (2003), De Sousa and Lochard (2009), Petroulas (2007) and Schiavo 
(2007) found the link to be negative. So it is not clear as to whether reduced exchange 
rate volatility will impact FDI positively with the formation of the Euro zone. However, 
elimination of exchange rate risk and reducing the cost of the currency conversion by 
CU decreases transaction costs and leads to cost saving and this affects returns 
positively (Dinga and Dingová, 2011). So it is expected that CU affects FDI positively 
by decreasing transaction costs.   
Following, these lines of research, Schiavo (2007) uses a Gravity model on a 
sample of OECD countries to analyse the effect of EMU on FDI flows over the period 
1980-2001. Schiavo argues that the higher exchange rate volatility, the higher the 
probability that an investment opportunity be delayed. He suggests that the elimination 
of volatility stemming from a currency union “gives a non-negative impulse to cross-
border investment”. Moreover, adopting the same currency appears to do more than 
merely eliminate exchange rate volatility. Schiavo’s OLS and Tobit estimation results 
indicate that EMU has resulted in larger FDI flows with the rest of the world. However, 
some care should be taken in interpreting these results due to the very short length of 
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time (1999-2001) for which the data on EMU is part of the sample.  
Since the formation of the EMU analysis of the role of exchange rate uncertainty 
on FDI flows is supplemented by a formal CU and its effect on investment flows. The 
literature studying the link between the Euro and FDI finds a significant positive effect 
of the Euro on FDI. However, there is no agreement regarding the size of the effect. 
Therefore, the exact magnitude of the size of the impact of the Euro effect on FDI 
remains unclear. 
Altogether, it can give an indication of whether CU creates a better environment 
for companies making long-term investment. One concern against floating currencies is 
that higher exchange rate variability creates uncertainty that discourages FDI so that 
fixing the exchange rate eliminates this risk. Thus encouraging FDI, as well as making 
companies cost calculations and pricing decisions easier. In the next section the link 
between exchange rate volatility and FDI will be considered further.  
3.3.3 Financial variables and macroeconomic variables related to the FDI 
decision  
This study aims to analyse the factors which affect FDI. An empirical study on 
FDI can be divided into two approaches. When asking why countries or sectors within a 
country receive more investment from abroad than others, some economists relate FDI 
variations over time to changes in macroeconomic factors that show a high degree of 
uncertainly, in particular exchange rates (Froot and Stein, 1991; and Blonigen, 1997). 
Moreover, there is a possible connection between FDI and exchange rate volatility, 
earlier studies often use industry-level (or even country level) data to test these 
hypotheses, while more recent research has had firm- and plant-level data available to 
match more appropriately the firm-level theory. Others explain FDI by using primary 
characteristics like factor-price differences, market size, and trade costs (Eaton and 
Tamura, 1994; Graham, 1997; Brainard, 1997). They apply a cross-section approach, 
although a few studies use panel data for their estimations (see, for example, Eaton and 
Tamura, 1994; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004).  
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3.3.3.1  Exchange rate volatility and FDI 
Theoretically, the impact of exchange-rate volatility causes is ambiguous as to the 
impact on FDI. A decrease in the volatility of the exchange rate could favour vertical 
FDI insofar as companies fragment their production and locate their activities in various 
countries depending on international differences in factor prices. On the other hand, if 
foreign investment is a way to serve foreign markets, a decrease in exchange rate 
volatility could reduce horizontal FDI and increase trade as a substitute. 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter in more detail, the evidence of the link 
between exchange rate volatility and FDI is quite mixed, this lack of consensus might 
be because the data and sample periods used in these studies are not the same and also a 
reflection on the complex nature of FDI. Due to this complexity, it may be reasonable to 
suggest that exchange rate volatility will have an ambiguous impact which is reflected 
in empirical and theoretical research. Alternatively, empirical models could yield mixed 
results due to model specification and data issues.  
3.3.3.2  Other determinants of FDI   
The question of the key roles financial variables and the macro-economy play in 
the FDI decision of companies is answered in this section. There is a considerable 
literature on the determinants of FDI which include both traditional and policy factors 
as the drivers. Traditional factors include market size, distance, factor proportions and 
political and economic stability. Policy and institutional factors include openness, 
product-market regulation and labour market arrangements. Demekas et al. (2005) 
found that gravity factors explain a large part of FDI inflows in the case of transition 
economies, including South Eastern European countries, but the policy environment 
also matters. Janicki and Wunnava (2004) showed that international trade could be the 
most important factor for explaining FDI in this region. Eaton and Tamura (1994) 
explained bilateral trade and FDI flows using a simple Gravity model and their results 
suggest for both the U.S. and Japan, that there is a large positive relationship between 
outward FDI and openness alike. 
Political and economic instability are expected to drive FDI since they create 
uncertainty and Barrell et al. (2004) observe that this increases the risk related to FDI 
returns. Generally, it might be expected that FDI will possibly flow from home 
countries into host economies that are politically stable and have access to large 
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regional markets. Furthermore, the recent literature affirms that the policy environment 
does matter for FDI (Demekas et al., 2005 and 2007; Lipschitz et al., 2002; and 
Witkowska, 2007). A predictable policy environment that enhances macroeconomic 
stability, guarantees the rule of law and the enforcement of contracts, supports 
competitiveness, minimises distortions, and spurs private sector development, can be 
expected to encourage private, including foreign investment. Solomon (2011) analysed 
the impacts in attracting FDI of economic development, human capital, the quality of 
the economic and political environments and financial development in host countries. 
The system GMM method is applied to a panel of 111 countries over the period 1981- 
2005. The findings show that the level of these factors, significantly affect the 
relationship between growth and inward FDI. Pourshahabi et al. (2011) analysed the 
relationship between FDI, economic freedom and growth in OECD economies and it 
was indicated that market size, inflation and political stability positively affect FDI 
inflow while economic freedom had an insignificant positive effect on FDI inflow.  
Regarding competitiveness indicator in the FDI Gravity model, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, the relationship between labour cost and investment is clearer than other 
determinants, because this expresses a burden that investors have in terms of the legal 
obligations they have with respect to their employees. Bevan et al. (2004) and 
Agiomirgianakis et al. (2006) as has been common in the literature found a negative 
effect for labour cost on FDI. However, for example, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) 
found a positive and statistically significant impact, arguing that it may reflect the 
purchasing power of the population as measured by the wages for each country. The 
link between unit labour cost (ULC) and FDI has been explained in some detail in the 
previous chapter.  
The issue of whether labour costs affect the investment decision in relation to the 
OECD countries is seen as a critical one and the subject of some debate. Konings and 
Janssens (1996), and Savary (1997) found labour costs to be a critical factor in the 
investment location decision especially for the OECD. Labour cost advantages were 
shown to be among the most important factors determining FDI along with overall 
profitability, stability and local market access. 
Bellak et al. (2008) examine the determinants of net BFDI across selected Central 
and Eastern European Countries for the period of 1995–2003 focusing on labour costs. 
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They propose a labour cost measure, which is related to the location decisions of 
multinational firms. Using panel estimates of a Gravity model to empirically assess the 
effect of market-related and cost-related location factors, their findings suggest that 
higher ULC as well as higher total labour costs impact FDI negatively, whereas higher 
labour productivity affects FDI positively. While Mateev (2009) using panel data 
analysis have found that both gravity factors (distance, population and GDP) and non-
gravity factors (labour costs, risk and corruption) can explain the FDI flows in transition 
economies for Central and South Eastern Europe. Mateev finds that with an increase in 
overall labour cost leading to a lower incentive for FDI in the host country. 
Considerable attention has been paid to the FDI level in OECD economies, based 
on the widespread assumption that foreign investments are critical for economic 
restructuring and development of these countries. As a result, attracting FDI has become 
a prominent item on the government policy agenda, and research on the drivers of FDI 
has been expanding rapidly. This section presents a summary of the main results of this 
research.  
Blonigen and Piger (2014) used Bayesian statistical techniques to choose from a 
large set of candidates those variables likely to be FDI determinants. The variables are 
traditional gravity variables: parent-country per capita GDP, cultural distance factors, 
relative labour cost, and regional trade agreements. Variables with little support for 
inclusion are openness, costs of the host country business, recipient country 
infrastructure (including credit markets), and recipient country institutions.  
Cavallari and D’Addona (2012) analysed the role of country-specific sources of 
exchange rate or interest rate volatility in driving FDI activities. Depending on a dataset 
for BFDI flows between 24 OECD countries over the period 1985-2007, they found that 
nominal and real volatility has a significant impact on foreign investments. Output and 
volatility of the exchange rate matter in particular for the FDI decision and as to 
whether it relates to outflow in the first place. Interest rate volatility mainly affects the 
extent of foreign investment. 
Katsaitis and Doulos (2009) analysed the FDI inflow determinants in EU–15, 
using a panel analysis over the period 1970–2005. Their results indicate that market 
size, agglomeration effects, GDP growth, unit labour cost, macroeconomic stability and 
level of institutional quality appear to be the main drivers of FDI inflows.    
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Using a Gravity model, De Sousa and Lochard (2006) tested the impact of the 
common currency on FDI flows and stocks. The estimated model controls for market 
size, transactions and production costs, the exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, 
skilled-labour endowments, and merger and acquisition drivers, using data from 22 
OECD countries for the period 1982-2002. The main result is that common currency 
spurs on Euro and non-members FDI stocks inside the Euro zone. While De Sousa and 
Lochard (2011) analysed the impact of EMU on BFDI and using a Gravity model they 
found that EMU has increased BFDI stocks intra-EMU by about 30% since the launch 
of the single currency. Simiarity, Kilic et al. (2014) tested the effects of the EMU on 
inward FDI to the Euro zone from 16, G20 countries by analysing the relationship 
between real FDI inflows and real GDP growth rate, real GDP, inflation volatility, 
exchange rate volatility, distance, exchange rates of selected G20 countries in terms of 
euro over the period 1999-2012. They found that real GDP, the GDP growth rate and 
the exchange rate affected real FDI inflows positively. While FDI is negatively affected 
by inflation volatility, exchange rate volatility, distance affects real FDI inflows. So 
EMU and the EU contribute to the inflows of FDI by reducing exchange rate volatility, 
inflation volatility, distance and encouraging economic growth. 
There appears to be little research on BFDI drivers after crises especially for the 
OECD. This chapter confirms that gravity factors predominate and outlines the other 
key determinants explaining BFDI stocks into the OECD. 
3.4 Data description and sources 
3.4.1 Dependent variable 
A panel has been collected that considers BFDI from 14 high income OECD 
countries to 31 OECD countries (.see Appendix A3) with yearly data spanning the 
period 1995 to 2012.20   
The dependent variable used here is the stock of BFDI divided by the GDP 
deflator home, which is among the most used measures of FDI in the literature. Some 
articles use the outward stocks of FDI as the dependent variable (e.g. Egger and Merlo, 
                                                            
20 However, some observations are missing on the dependent and explanatory variables leaving a complete sample of 
5820 country-year observations. 
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2007; Baltagi et al., 2007 and  2008; Stein and Daude, 2007; Cardamone and Scoppola, 
2015).   
Earlier studies of FDI often used flow data. While Stein and Daude (2007) suggest 
the use of stocks rather than flows, because they are interested in the level of activity of 
multinational enterprises; capital stock being a closer proxy to multilateral activity than 
investment flows. This compares with Head and Ries (2008), and Blonigen and Piger 
(2014) who pool inward and outward stocks of FDI in their analysis.  
The FDI stock data will be the benchmark measure of FDI used in this chapter. A 
number of studies, for example, Carr et al. (2001), and Bergstrand and Egger (2007) 
have suggested the use of affiliate sales as the most suitable measure of actual 
multinational firm activity in a host country. This is due to FDI stock data being 
significantly affected by financial transactions of a firm not related to current productive 
activity. Unfortunately, affiliate sales data are not as widely available as FDI stock 
data.21  
In the FDI literature this kind of analysis is usually conducted on bilateral data, 
but here to extend the sample one-way FDI stocks will be used for each country pair in 
the empirical specification. These are defined as outflows of FDI stocks, where an 
investment from country i to country j (FDIij) is seen as an outflow from the perspective 
of country i.  
Egger (2001), Egger and Winner (2006), Baltagi et al. (2007), Egger and Merlo 
(2007), and Egger (2008) all specify the model in natural logarithms.22 For this reason, 
Rose (2000) excluded observations when the dependent variable is zero. Although a 
simple correction to the ill-defined dependent variable, may lead to a serious selection 
bias, because the zero observations may convey critical information especially were 
zeros more prevalent with countries that are far apart. 
In the trade literature, Eichengreen and Irwin (1995) deal with zero values by 
adding a unit value to the dependent variable. Adjusting the dependent variable using a 
fixed constant is a straightforward transformation to apply (McDonald, 2008 and 
                                                            
21 Braconier et al. (2005) have graciously allowed us to use their most extensive database of cross-country affiliate 
sales. 
22  The data set used here includes a number of observations where the FDI stock is zero. However, a log stock 
specification is used extensively in the empirical trade literature, reduces the weight of very large country pairs and 
simplifies the interpretation of coefficients as elasticities. 
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Osborne, 2002) and the coefficients following the log transformation are still likely to 
represent elasticities. So log(1+FDIij) well approximates log(FDIij) as the transformed 
variable passes from a linear scale at small absolute values to a logarithmic scale as the 
dependent variable increase in value. Following Dinga and Dingová (2011), the 
dependent variable applied to FDI stocks is log(1+(FDI/GDP)) in equation (3.2).  
3.4.2 Source and Measurements of Independent Variables 
The empirical results are mixed and contentious debate in the literature persists 
over the factors determining FDI. In this section both the data sources and the 
measurement of the driving variables are considered.  
Adopting Gravity models developed from the literature, the key determinants in 
the Gravity model of BFDI stock are market size, distance.  
1-) The first determinant based on the Gravity model is the market size of home 
and host countries most commonly measured by real GDP. Charkrabarti (2001) 
indicates that a large market may be needed for efficient utilization of resources and 
exploitation of economies of scale so as the market grows FDI will increase with further 
expansion. A variable representing the market size has been used in nearly all empirical 
studies of FDI. So a large home country in terms of GDP will generate large FDI and 
more FDI should be received into a large host country market as measured by GDP. 
Therefore, for both variables we expect a positively signed coefficient. Buch et al. 
(2003) and Limao and Venables (2001) indicate that FDI targeting the domestic service 
market (market-seeking FDI) would be affected positively by real GDP. 
2-) The next critical Gravity variable is bilateral distance between capital cities of 
home and host countries. This is a primary measure used by Portes and Rey (2005), 
Stone and Jeon (1999), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004a, 2004b) to help explain 
Gravity as it is seen to act as a straightforward proxy for transportation and information 
costs. 
However, the expected sign of this variable crucially hinges on the motive for FDI 
that is market or efficiency-seeking. In the former case, FDI substitutes for exports and 
so a larger bilateral distance is expected to increase FDI. In the latter case, efficiency-
seeking FDI is seen as generating exports from the host to the home country and a 
negative relationship is likely to arise.  
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The market-seeking also occurs when geographically separated countries are 
institutionally and culturally distant as this relates distance to increased investment and 
monitoring costs. For example Buch et al. (2004, 2005), and Buch and Lipponer (2004) 
suggest it discourages FDI due to the lack of market know-how, higher information and 
communication costs and differences in culture and institutions. Moreover, Kleinert and 
Toubal (2010) suggest that market-seeking foreign affiliations are frequently based on 
the import of intermediary goods by the parent company. So not only is sign of the 
coefficient on distance ambiguous a priori (Carr et al., 2001), but it may not possible to 
conclude from the sign an underlying motive for FDI.    
For this reason as a part of the Gravity specification, further dummy variables are 
applied. The first is based on language similarities between the home and host countries 
in the sample (based on the fact that two countries share a common official language). 
The other dummy variable examines the common border between both countries. 
3-) A bilateral trade proxy is included even though as Brainard (1997), and Grosse 
and Trevino (1996) suggest the effect of trade on FDI flow in the existing research is 
inconclusive. However, a number of authors, Altomonte (1998), Bevan and Estrin 
(2004), Bos and De Laar (2004), and Carstensen and Toubal (2004) have indicated that 
trade limitations have had significant effect on the size of FDI. Therefore, the bilateral 
export variable is used to capture whether trade complements FDI activity and in this 
case the coefficient on trade will be expected to be positive. However, Resmini (2000) 
has suggested trade should be expected to have a positive relation to FDI flows, as the 
greater openness of the economy provides greater support for foreign investment.  
Again the sign of the measure of trade may be ambiguous as it relates to the 
purpose. So investment for local production and exporting is expected to be positive and 
Pain (1993), Ferris and Thompson (1994), Wong (2005), Addison and Heshmati (2003), 
Janicki and Wunnava (2004) and Ramirez (2006) show that the more open the 
economy, the larger the FDI inflows. While when trade is a substitute for FDI activity, 
then the coefficient is expected to be negative.  
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4-) The investment climate is incorporated in the model by the free economics 
indexes of home and host countries. The ‘Free economics index’23 is a measure by 
which the quality of the economic environment is proxied. The index broadly captures 
the quality of the economic environment. It is derived from the six governance 
indicators that include measures of government size, taxes, trade openness, legal 
structure and protection of property rights, the growth of money supply, inflation as 
well as regulations on the credit market, labour market and business. It takes values in 
the range 0 to 100, with 100 being the highest level of economic freedom. This has been 
one of the FDI determinants identified by Beach and Kane (2008), and Beheshtitabar 
and Irgaliyev (2008). It is argued that countries that enjoy higher levels of economic 
freedom have greater factor efficiency and higher rates of growth. Moreover, free 
economies are supposed to attract more investment (Gwartney et al., 2008). As British 
Petrolium (BP) found with investing in Russia expatriation of funds can often with 
fraught with complications when the system is not transparent and prone to political 
interference. Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003), Ferragina and Pastore (2006), 
Pourshahabi et al. (2011), Pearson et al. (2012), and Ajide and Eregha (2014) have 
established a positive connection.  
5-) Global Financial Crisis and Asian Crisis are constructed here as dummy 
variables that measure the presence of the crisis at time t, when the dummy variable 
takes the value 1 for the crisis in a year t and 0 otherwise. Additionally, a systemic 
banking crisis; dummy variable that equals 1 when host country suffers from systemic 
banking crisis in a year t and 0 otherwise; is included.  
The impact of systemic failure in banking is collected using the Laeven and 
Valencia (2013) financial crises database. To test for the impact of systemic banking 
crises on cross-border FDI stocks, we use Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) identification 
of the timing and scale of systemic banking crises. Laeven and Valencia (2013) explain 
that not all banking crises are systemic to the same degree. In particular, 24 countries in 
our sample experienced borderline systemic banking crises (see Appendix B3).   
 
                                                            
23  Economic freedom has been defined as ‘the absence of government coercion or constraint on the production, 
distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary for citizens to protect and maintain 
liberty itself’. This index is an indicator of the quality of the economic environment. It not only captures the 
economic policy of the government, but also the legal soundness of the economy and macroeconomic stability. 
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6-) The single currency is measured by a dummy that takes the value zero when a 
home country or host country is not in the Euro zone and 1 when the both countries 
enter the Euro zone. It is expected that this variable has a positive effect on FDI. This 
study tries to contribute to the debate as to whether the introduction of the Euro has led 
to greater integration in terms of financial trade. Bilateral investments constitute a 
starting point for this analysis because they possess attributes of both commercial and 
financial transactions. Hence, introducing a measure of exchange rate uncertainty in the 
gravity equation may allow us to distinguish between the impacts of the common 
currency. This compares with the often stated opinion that common currency just 
captures the removal of exchange rate risk as compared with a reduction in transaction 
costs.   
7-) Nominal exchange rate volatility is computed by experimentation with 
measures of volatility based on estimation of a model of the variance. Nominal 
volatility in this case is expected to capture the role of country-specific currency risk. 
As before, exchange rate volatility can affect FDI in opposing directions depending 
whether it originates in the multinational’s native or host country. 
There is no consensus as to which measure of volatility is most appropriate. When 
the investment decision is real then it is anticipated that this ought to relate to the impact 
of the real exchange rate as nominal effects are often discounted. However, volatility 
derives from the behaviour of prices (Engle, 1982) and this suggests nominal exchange 
rate volatility may also be appropriate. It may be felt that this may follow from shocks 
or movements in monetary policy driven by interest rate changes. However, jump 
behaviour in the nominal exchange rate arises in Dornbusch (1976) as a result of price 
stickiness relative to fast moving asset prices.  
8-) A variety of location variables have been considered in empirical research 
elaborating on the drivers of FDI. To cope with the claim that our findings may be 
driven by an omitted variable bias, we include an additional variable that appears to be 
an important determinant of FDI stocks. As a measure of competition, unit labour cost 
is seen by many authors to be the most relevant measure for location related decision for 
FDI.  
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ULC is defined here as the costs of the labour input that is needed to produce one 
unit of output. They are calculated either in nominal terms or in real terms and are 
expressed either in domestic currency or in a common currency. Given this definition, 
one has to choose carefully the appropriate type of unit labour costs. For our objective, 
which is explaining the location choice of foreign investment between different host 
countries, it is demonstrated that the following criteria are critical in the choice of the 
appropriate ULC definition. First, since the location choice is international rather than 
on a national level (e.g. between regions of the same country), ULC should be 
expressed in a common currency. Here the US Dollar is the common currency. Second, 
expressing ULC in a common currency in real terms relates to the actual location choice 
of a foreign investor to compare labour costs of two locations. For real value added, the 
comparison needs to be made in a common currency, as the investor compares the 
absolute amount of employee wage costs. Hence, assuming two locations, even if 
location 1 has lower ULC than location 2, when expressed in local currencies, this could 
look different when transferred to a common currency. Currency appreciations (and vice 
versa for depreciations) may thus increase (decrease) ULC.  It is important to note that 
the decision of the foreign investor on the basis of ULC relates to both, the efficiency-
related FDI (also vertical) and the market-related FDI (also horizontal). If ULC is lower 
in a given location (country 1) where the market is, then the market will be 
predominantly supported by domestic production. When there is another location 
(country 2) with lower ULC in a common currency, country 1 is likely to receive 
exports from country 2. 
The impact of bilateral unit labour costs on BFDI is also considered by adding to 
the Gravity model. Unit labour costs are taken from the OECD, following Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2005), bilateral unit labour costs is derived as the natural logarithm 
difference between labour cost in host country and labour cost in home country. If 
foreign investors are seeking low labour costs, the availability of cheap labour will be a 
critical factor affecting FDI. Thus, it is expected to observe a negative coefficient for the 
ULC (e.g., countries with lower labour costs would attract more FDI), since an increase 
in this indicator means a decrease in profitability and hence a less attractive determinant 
for investors.    
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All of the above factors must be taken into account when investigating the BFDI 
determinants in the OECD countries. To summarise the discussion of the variables, 
Table (3.1) below displays the variables that are considered here and their definitions. 
Table (3.1) Variables definitions and data sources. 
Variables Unit Source 
, ,i j ty =Log (FDIi,j,t/  
GDP Deflatori,t) 
is the stock measure of bilateral outflow from the
home country (i) to the host country (j) in year t,
with FDI in current in US$ deflated using the home
country’s GDP deflator.  
 (OECD) 
EXVi,j,t 
A measure of exchange rate volatility predicted 
using equations (3.1) and (3.1a) below, and 
derived from daily percentage changes in the 
nominal bilateral exchange rate.    
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
EXPi,j,t 
Bilateral exports of goods are just used (As 
exports of service data are not available for most 
of the countries in the sample). 
 (OECD) 
Real GDPi,t , 
  Real GDPj.t 
At constant 2005 prices and converted to US$s.   (OECD) 
DISi,j,t 
Measure in geographical distance in kilometres to 
proxy transportation costs  www.cepii.fr 
Freei,t .  Freej,t 
An index of economic freedom that refers as to 
whether there is any restriction on trade in a 
country (Busse and Hefeker, 2007). 
Heritage Foundation 
2015 
www.heritage.org 
FC t 
Dummy variable for Global Financial Crisis 
(2008)24 and Asian crisis (1997-1998) that equals 
1 during crisis years and 0 otherwise. 
 
SYSj,t 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when host country 
suffers from systemic banking crisis in year T, 
otherwise 0 
 (see Appendix B3) 
CUi,j,t 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j 
use the same currency (euro) at time t and 0 
otherwise. 
(see Appendix C3) 
ULCj,i,t 
labour costs in the host country relative to the 
home country, Exchange Rate Adjusted ULC,  
Index OECD base year (2010=100)  
 (OECD) 
Langi,j 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when both 
countries share a common official language www.cepii.fr 
Landi,j 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when both 
countries share a common land border World Factbook 
The dependent variable, real BFDI stock, is real FDI outflows from 14 High income OECD  to 
all the OECD countries. The nominal FDI outflows to the OECD  are converted to real value by 
dividing GDP deflator. 
**Annual data over the period 1995-2012 
                                                            
24  Complex financial crises such as arose in 2008 may not be easy to capture through a single variable, but the 
financial crisis that started with the failure or Lehman Brothers in the US was amplified across the World so it had a 
powerful negative effect on the OECD countries. 
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3.5 Methodology  
An important objective of this research is to show the nature of the relation 
between exchange rate volatility and BFDI stock from 14 high income OECD countries 
to all the OECD countries. A static Gravity model is applied to a panel to show the 
impact of the volatility of the exchange rate on BFDI, based on a number of regression 
specifications. This regression is shown to have serially correlated errors, and hence, we 
would almost certainly need to include at least a lagged dependent variable in the 
regression to capture this. As there are fewer than 30 time series observations, the 
autoregressive coefficient is likely to be biased downwards when OLS is used (Nickell, 
1981). Hence, we need to use a procedure that allows us to estimate unbiased 
coefficients whilst retaining long run information. In addition to overcome possible 
endogeneity in the regressors, the model is estimated using what has been termed a 
systems GMM method (Greene, 2011). Once volatility is observed, then it makes little 
sense to assume that the variance or standard deviation remain fixed over the sample. A 
range of possible methods arise, updating a simple variance estimate on an annual basis, 
exponentially weighted moving averages (WMA) and the various models that arise 
from the ARCH family of models and is discussed for the purposes of computing time 
varying risk in Hull (2014). As the view is that volatility is time varying then the latter 
two approaches are followed in this Chapter.25 
3.5.1 Measuring Exchange Rate Volatility 
The effects of exchange rate volatility on FDI have been discussed in the literature 
for some time, but there is currently little agreement on the direction of these effects. 
The existing theoretical literature is mainly focused on the consequences of volatility in 
the exchange rate on different time horizons in relation to FDI. There are several ways 
to extract indicators of volatility, and early studies tended to use unconditional 
estimates, whilst later studies have tended to use techniques such as GARCH to 
estimate the conditional variance or unexpected component in exchange rate changes. 
The volatility measure of the nominal exchange rate is constructed by first taking the 
log difference of daily exchange rates calculated from data taken from the IFS 
                                                            
25 All estimations were undertaken in STATA 13.0 
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database.26 
Byrne and Davis (2003) model volatility by means of a GARCH model and find 
that it is the transitory rather than the permanent component of exchange rate 
uncertainty which adversely affects investment. Here the intention is to find a coherent 
measure of volatility that is intended to capture uncertainty in a similar manner for the 
different economies and to capture this key feature of the exchange rate. Carruth et al. 
(2000) survey different volatility specifications and suggest that these results are not 
greatly affected by the particular choice of the scholar. So in this study we use the same 
specification as in the previous chapter with the dynamic measure of the volatility (it) 
conditioned on the regression errors (uit) as explained by the GARCH(1,1) process: 
2 2 2
1 1.                             (3.1)it i i it i itu         
Firstly, the daily conditional variances are used to construct an indicator of annual 
volatility. A simple weighted moving average model (3.1a) is used as the variance 
estimate when it is not possible to identify the ARCH/GARCH specification: 
2 2
1
                                            (3.1a)pit it jj u    
These are based on blocks of p=20 past observations on the past errors to create a 
rolling moving average. The details as to the methods applied to estimate the volatility 
for each bilateral pair of currencies are given below in Table (3.2) for all of the bilateral 
nominal GARCH and the moving averages.  In 20 out of 420 cases the WMA process is 
used, and in a relatively small number of cases the GARCH(1,2) specification is 
applied, but when not otherwise stated the model of variance is GARCH(1,1).  
 
 
                                                            
26  Calculation of the exchange rate for Euro area countries: firstly, due to differences in national conventions 
for rounding up the data all conversions between the national currencies had to be carried out using data that 
impoeses a binding cross arbitrage condition via the Euro that implies a simple specification for the underlying 
exchange rates specifications as following random walks (Smith and Hunter, 1985). Secondly, the original conversion 
rates were determined by the Council of the European Union based on a recommendation from the European 
Commission to apply market rates as of the 31st  December 1998 (see Appendix D3). 
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Table (3.2) Measure of Bilateral Exchange rate volatility 
 
Austria Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Japan Korea, Rep. Netherlands Spain Sweden Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Australia G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Austria - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Belgium G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Canada G (1.1) G (1.1) - G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Czech Republic G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G(1.2) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Denmark G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Estonia G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) 
Finland G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
France G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Germany G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Greece G (1.1) WMA WMA WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Hungary G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Ireland G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Israel G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Italy G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Japan G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Korea, Rep. G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Mexico WMA WMA G(1.2) WMA G (1.1) G(1.2) G(1.2) G (1.1) G(1.2) WMA WMA WMA WMA G (1.1) 
Netherlands G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
New Zealand G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Norway G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Poland G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Portugal G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Slovak Republic G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Slovenia G (1.1) G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Spain G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Sweden G (1.1) WMA G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Switzerland G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G(1.2) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) G (1.1) 
Turkey G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) 
United Kingdom G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - G (1.1) 
United States G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) G (1.1) - 
NOTE : G(1.1): GARCH(1.1), G(1.2): GARCH (1.2), WMA: Weighted Moving Average
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3.5.2 The standard Gravity model on BFDI stocks 
  
We start by discussing a simple gravity equation which is an empirical model that 
originated in the trade literature. It has also been used recently to estimate the 
determinants of BFDI stocks and flows (see, for example, Stein and Daude, 2007;   
Talamo, 2007; Abbott and De Vita, 2008; Mahmoud, 2011; Paniagua, 2013; among 
others). Its main implication is that the gross flow of trade (in this chapter BFDI stocks) 
between two countries should depend inversely on the distance between both countries 
and depend positively on their economic size where the latter is generally measured by 
the two countries’ real GDP. All econometric work will follow from the following 
specification for models using data observed at the annual frequency: 
, , 1 , , 2 , 3 , 4 , , 5 , ,
6 , 7 , 8 , , , ,
 b lnEXP  +  b lnGDP  +  b lnGDP  +  b lnDIS  + b EXV
             +  b EcoFree  + b EcoFree + b ln + .                         (3.2) 
i j t i j t j t i t i j t i j t
i t j t j i t i j tU C
y a
L 
 
 
Where , ,i j ty  in logarithms is the stock measure of bilateral outflow from the home 
country (i) to the host country (j) in year t, with FDI in current dollars deflated using the 
home country’s GDP deflator (to deal with missing data we use the log of one plus the 
ratio of FDI to GDP deflator). EXVi,j,t is the measure of exchange rate volatility derived 
from a GARCH model with the exception of the 20 cases pointed out in the Table (3.2). 
GDPi,t is real GDP for the home country and GDPj,t real GDP for the host country, 
EXPi,j,t is bilateral exports from the home to host country. EcoFreei,t is free economic 
index for the home country and EcoFreej,t for the host country and DISi,j,t is the log of 
geographic distance. , ,j i tULC  is labour costs in the host country relative to the home 
country. The errors in (3.2) , .i j t  are usually assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed (IID) mean zero and constant variance 2, .i j t .  
A number of factors commonly used in the literature are used to capture aspects of 
common culture and stronger ties through language, as well as a number of other 
possible determinants of bilateral stock patterns. In order to identify the parameters 
affecting the BFDI stock over the crises, Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) is followed by adding 
dummy variables to capture the impact of financial distress: 
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, , 1 , , 2 , 3 , 4 , , 5 , ,
6 , 7 , 8 , , 9 , 10 , , 11 ,
12 13 ,
 b lnEXP  +  b lnGDP  +  b lnGDP  +  b lnDIS  + b EXV
           + b EcoFree + b EcoFree +b ln + b Lang + b CU + b land
           + b FC   + b +
i j t i j t j t i t i j t i j t
i t j t j i t i j i j t i j
t j t
y a
ULC
SYS 
 
, , .                                                                (3.3) i j t
 
The dummy variables to capture these further factors are: Langi,j defined as the 
effect of a common official language, Landi,j a common land border, CUi,j,t the country 
specific impact of the introduction of the Euro (Dummy variable that equals 1 if 
countries i and j use the Euro currency)  and SYSj,t systemic banking crisis expressed as 
a dummy variable when the  host country suffers from a systemic banking crisis in year 
T. We also introduce financial crisis dummies that distinguish between the global crisis, 
and Asian crisis (FC t).  
Acceding to the assumption that the country's specific fixed effect is a random 
variable which is not correlated with other independent variables, random effects 
estimates are consistent and effective. So in this study the gravity equation is estimated 
using panel data by estimating a "random-effects" (RE) model to capture any 
heterogeneity not captured in the specification of the model. The RE approach can also 
accommodate a country-pair of fixed effect, while also allowing for some time-invariant 
regressors. However, RE estimates are typically more efficient as they take into 
account, the cross time and the cross-transversal dimensions of the data; treating 
intercepts as random variables through common member countries. In this case, it can 
provide efficient estimates, particularly when there is little variation in the time series 
since they use information both "between" and "within" the panels. The consistency of 
the OLS estimator crucially relies on the individual random effects and any of the 
indicators and/or regressors not being correlated with the disturbances (Greene, 2011). 
On the other hand, the fixed effect (FE) model suffers from three shortcomings. 
First, it reduces the degrees of freedom, therefore, decreasing the power of statistical 
testing. Second, variables that present little or no variation, within groups cannot be 
estimated. Third, The FE approaches are not sufficient to determine invariant variables 
in time, such as distance that is a key component of the Gravity model (Cheng and 
Wall, 2005). The choice between the two formulations can be decided empirically (FE 
or RE) using the test devised by Hausman (1978), the null hypothesis for Hausman test 
is that the preferred model is the random effects formulation versus the fixed effects 
specification (see Greene, 2011, chapter 9). It tests whether the unique errors ( , .i j t ) are 
 74 
 
correlated with the regressors, the null hypothesis is they are not.27  
3.5.3 Econometric specification for the equations 
The discussion above concerns the static version of the model that is in 
widespread use, although some of the issues also apply to dynamic equations. It is 
highly probable that past bilateral stocks of FDI impact current bilateral FDI stocks. 
Therefore, a dynamic extension to equation (3.3) will be used that incorporates a lagged 
dependent variable. 
In general, there is a well known bias problem in the estimation of an AR(1) term 
from a regression estimator. This bias is removed as the sample size increases, but here 
T=18 and N=420 or there is little capacity for T to increase at the same rate as N. The 
differenced regression defines a first order approximation to a linear equation so when 
the model is well formulated and the estimates consistent the betas from this equation 
should resemble those of the form in levels. However, the differencing may remove 
some of the time invariant effects that may be considered important for the Gravity 
model.   
As the panel includes a lot of countries of varied characteristics, there is the need 
to control for the unobserved country specific terms as they could be correlated with any 
of the explanatory variables leading to biased estimates. When the instruments are well 
defined, GMM should capture the impact of the endogeneity that may arise, due to 
concerns with of country-specific characteristics, reverse causation, omitted variable 
and measurement error.  
The Systems GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) is 
particularly useful for panel data with a short time series dimension, especially when 
they are persistent as is common with many datasets used in relation to FDI data. FDI is 
primarily a financial transaction, but as is observed from the discussion of Mergers and 
Acquisitions (M&A) in the review of the literature is used to purchase physical assets. 
                                                            
27  Unfortunately, in this case, a Hausman specification test may not be particularly helpful. Many time-invariant 
factors are significant and one cannot distinguish whether the observed fixed-effects correlation with the error term of 
the within estimator is due to factors omitted in the within estimation. More specifically, distance, common official 
language, etc. This is compared with possible random-effects or other truly unobserved factors. As the study is drawn 
to explain the high income countries behaviour the sample is not drawn at random from a larger population so there 
may be a sample selection problem and this could call into question the application of the random-effects estimations. 
Alternatively, selecting such countries may form an appropriate grouping for pooling the data. For further discussion 
of these issues see Baltagi (2001) and Wooldridge (2002)  
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The irreversible form of much of this investment explains why the time series is likely 
to be persistent over time. Physical investment is best seen as a real asset and unlike 
stock prices that aggregate to the market valuation of the same investment in M&A 
form of FDI are observably a less volatile form of foreign capital flows.28 This may also 
help to explain the persistence and smooth nature of these series as significant physical 
investment in plant and machinery has a relatively high sunk cost. Kahouli and Maktouf 
(2015) suggest that customers of the home country become used to the product that 
comes from this investment generating ‘the formation of the habits’. Eichengreen and 
Irwin (1998) saw that it was very likely that the bilateral commercial flows between 
home and host countries are likely to trend upwards over time at the aggregate level and 
by the positive feedback of past FDI onto current FDI.  
As proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), the moment restrictions exploited by 
the standard linear first-differenced GMM estimator entails the use of lagged 
instruments for the equations in first-differences. This yields a consistent estimator of 
the parameters when N approaches infinity and T is fixed. However, there are 
shortcomings with the first-differenced estimator. While Blundell and Bond (1998), 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell et al. (2001) indicate that if the series 
are highly persistent or if the variance of the individual specific impact is largely 
relevant to the residual variance of the error term, then the lagged levels may make 
weak instruments for the regression equation in differences.29 Instrument weakness, in 
turn, impacts the asymptotic and small-sample performance of the first-differenced 
GMM estimator. Asymptotically, the variance of the coefficients increases while, in 
small samples, instrument weakness could produce biased estimates (Wooldridge, 
2002). To overcome the imprecision and potential bias associated with the standard 
GMM estimator, the SYS-GMM model of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) is estimated. 
The fundamental idea behind the systems GMM estimator is to simultaneously 
estimate a system of two equations: one in levels and the other one in first-differences 
(Greene, 2011). Accordingly, the lagged levels are used to instrument first-differenced 
                                                            
28 For instance, Sarno and Taylor (1999) find that FDI is less volatile than portfolio investment flows; Levchenko and 
Mauro (2007) indicate that FDI is the most stable form of cross-border finance. 
29 Weak instruments are uncorrelated with the error term but only weakly correlated with the endogenous variable. 
The weak instrument problem in the case of the first differenced GMM estimator usually occurs when time series are 
persistent so the AR(1) coefficient is close to one, and/or the relative variance of the fixed effects increases with the 
sample. 
 76 
 
equation, while the lagged first-differenced values are used to instrument the equation in 
levels. Once the instrument matrix is constructed, the two-step estimator is calculated. 
The two-step GMM estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the one-step 
estimator and relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity in the error terms (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; and Blundell and Bond, 1998). However, because of its dependence on 
the estimated residuals, the two-step GMM estimator could impose a sharp downward 
bias on the estimated standard errors, specifically in small samples (see Bond, 2002; 
Windmeijer, 2005).30  
Two conditions need to be met to ensure the validity of the SYS-GMM estimator 
(Roodman, 2009). First, based on the validity of the levels specification of the model, 
the first-differenced residuals should exhibit negative and significant first-order 
autocorrelation as this model will normally be over-differenced, but there should be no 
second order autocorrelation. So it is important to test for evidence of first and second 
order serial correlation in the error using the statistic developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) as an extension to the usual LM test. Failure to reject the null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation in the first-differenced disturbances at an order greater than one 
indicates that the disturbances are serially correlated, which renders the GMM estimator 
inconsistent (Arellano and Bond, 1991; and Roodman, 2009).  
Second, the instruments should be uncorrelated with the error term. This condition 
can be tested using the Hansen (1982) J-test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
evaluates the joint validity of the instruments. This test statistic is robust to problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation when compared with test used to determine 
instrument validity by Sargan (1964).31 Under the null hypothesis that the instruments 
and further moment conditions are valid, there is no correlation between the instruments 
and the error term. With further instruments as often occurs automatically with GMM, 
then any further instrument conditions should not inflate the test statistic and as a result, 
the additional instruments/moment conditions are valid. In terms of instrument validity 
for these extra variables, they ought not to be correlated with the error term. An issue of 
concern in the GMM literature is the extent to which instruments proliferate. 
                                                            
30  The standard errors presented are robust to heteroscedasticity and first order serial correlation. However, The 
literature on whether it is necessary in generated regressors to correct standard error biases induced by generated 
variables is not conclusive (see for example Liang and Zeger (1986); Hu and Lachin (2001); Souleles (2004) and 
Hunter and Wu (2014)). 
31  The J-statistic, which is the minimized value of the two-step GMM criterion function, has an asymptotic χ2 
distribution (Arellano and Bond, 1991; and Greene, 2011) where the number of degrees of freedom equals the 
number of over-identifying restrictions. If there as many moment conditions as endogenous variables then the 
IV/GMM criterion is zero and the coefficients of the model are exactly identified. 
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The random effects formulation is not acceptable when the specification is not 
valid as a result of serial correlation, for this reason, the test for autocorrelation in 
random-effect models derived by Wooldridge (2002)32 is applied, this test can be 
applied under general conditions and is easier to implement. Furthermore, Drukker 
(2003) based on Monte Carlo simulation finds that the Wooldridge’ test has good size 
and power properties in reasonably large samples.  
3.6 Empirical Findings 
3.6.1 The standard Gravity model 
The empirical results related to the Gravity model are summarised in Table (3.3). 
The Gravity model is viewed as an important and effective tool for explaining bivariate 
trade and FDI relations. The use of this model often involves a huge number of 
observations as even with a relatively small number of countries there may be a 
substantial number of country pairs and this is likely to imply more robust results 
(Kahouli et al., 2014). Robust inference should follow from the application of standard 
errors that arise from Huber/White variance-covariance matrix.  
The statistical results from the Gravity model are derived from the random effects 
panel data estimator to explain the behaviour of BFDI stock from 14 high income 
OECD countries to host countries drawn from all the OECD countries. To this end, 
several model specifications are developed, with and without financial crises dummies, 
capturing the impact of exchange rate volatility and the timing of the crises.  
 
The estimates of six models are summarised in Table (3.3). First of all the 
traditional Gravity model is presented in column (1), and then to that model are added 
the crises dummy variables, in column (2) for systemic banking crisis. In column (3, 4 
and 5), the dummies for the Asian and global crisis are added, and lastly both crises 
(global and Asian) dummies in column (6). As systemic banking crisis and global crisis 
are often related or overlapping, the global crisis dummy is excluded from the model in 
column (2) to show the effect of the systemic banking crisis. If these results have some 
meaning, then all the banking crisis variables have a negative impact on BFDI for the 
twenty-four countries across the panel.  
                                                            
32 The test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors of a linear panel-data model is formed under the null of no serial.  
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Table (3.3) Results for Gravity models Estimated using RE, for BFDI 
outflow. 
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
LnGDPi,t 0.8525*** 0.8532*** 0.8113*** 0.8122*** 0.8502*** 0.8069*** 
  (0.0984) (0.0984) (0.0972) (0.0971) (0.0986) (0.0971) 
LnGDPj,t 0.8407*** 0.8349*** 0.8155*** 0.8164*** 0.8343*** 0.8075*** 
  (0.0987) (0.0981) (0.0977) (0.0976) (0.0985) (0.0972) 
LnEXPi,j,t 0.5471*** 0.5524*** 0.5564*** 0.5557*** 0.5598*** 0.5690*** 
  (0.0785) (0.0776) (0.0781) (0.0781) (0.0788) (0.0784) 
EXVi,j,t -4.4018** -3.8035** -4.1928** -4.1805** -4.1955** -3.9967** 
  (1.8760) (1.9269) (1.8226) (1.8276) (1.8235) (1.7740) 
Freei,t 0.0282*** 0.0292*** 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 0.0295*** 0.0256*** 
  (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0069) 
Freej,t 0.0297*** 0.0304*** 0.0271*** 0.0272*** 0.0300*** 0.0275*** 
  (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
LnDISi,j -0.7821*** -0.7822*** -0.7590*** -0.7599*** -0.7778*** -0.7537*** 
  (0.1061) (0.1057) (0.1055) (0.1055) (0.1062) (0.1055) 
Landi,j -0.9611*** -0.9620*** -0.9420*** -0.9421*** -0.9735*** -0.9514*** 
  (0.2253) (0.2252) (0.2212) (0.2212) (0.2261) (0.2215) 
Langi,j 0.8402*** 0.8322*** 0.8709*** 0.8704*** 0.8305*** 0.8608*** 
  (0.1935) (0.1936) (0.1912) (0.1912) (0.1944) (0.1917) 
CUi,j,t 0.1707* 0.1750* 0.1321 0.1321 0.1662* 0.1284 
(0.0890) (0.0895) (0.0915) (0.0915) (0.0894) (0.0918) 
LnUCLj,i,t -0.2430* -0.2648** -0.2396* -0.2399* -0.2489* -0.2456* 
  (0.1304) (0.1293) (0.1307) (0.1307) (0.1307) (0.1310) 
SYSj,t  -0.1980***     
   (0.0373)     
FC 1997   -0.1816***   -0.1797*** 
    (0.0400)   (0.0400) 
FC 1998   -0.1202***   -0.1187*** 
    (0.0347)   (0.0347) 
FC 1997/1998    -0.1502***   
     (0.0341)   
FC 2008     -0.0965*** -0.0928*** 
    (0.0247) (0.0246) 
Constant -39.0232*** -39.1169*** -37.1166*** -37.1513*** -39.2099*** -37.2160*** 
 (3.2026) (3.2016) (3.1228) (3.1226) (3.1996) (3.1058) 
Observation Number 5671 5671 5671 5671 5671 5671 
Country pairs 397 397 397 397 397 397 
R2 0.6715 0.6726 0.6717 0.6717   0.6721 0.6725 
R2  -within 0.4903 0.4928   0.4920 0.4918 0.4913 0.4928 
R2  - between 0.6854 0.6863 0.6854 0.6854 0.6859    0.6861   
F(1, 394) 137.888 138.446 136.899 137.094 134.279 133.276 
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NOTE::For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the second row the robust standard error. 
White-type robust standard errors are given in parenthesis. F(1,394) is the Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in panel data. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
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In terms of the literature, most of the estimated parameters have their expected 
signs with a sensible economic interpretation. Assuming the standard errors are valid, 
they are also significant and do not seem to be sensitive to changes in the model 
specifications. In this chapter the interest is on the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
BFDI and this coefficient is negative and not subject to great variation. All in all, the 
results are quite consistent with the findings of the literature that market size, bilateral 
export and macroeconomic stability are important determinants of BFDI outflow.  
The Wooldridge test for first order serial correlation is significant at the 1% for all 
of the models presented in Table (3.3) implying that it is not possible to reject this 
hypothesis so serial correlation derives from the equation error or the idiosyncratic 
component and showing the error is not well behaved. This also implies that these 
results cannot be relied on to provide a short-run explanation of BFDI. The only 
possible interpretation supposing the coefficient estimates are super consistent would 
follow from cointegration. However, any conclusions must be made with care as this 
does not apply to stationary variables that are endogenous and it is usual when there is a 
considerable cross section dimension in the panel case to suggest an IV approach even 
in the context of cointegration (Greene, 2011).  
A further conclusion that might be drawn from the scale of the Wooldridge test 
statistic is that there is a lot of inertia in the stock data, and that at the very least a lagged 
dependent variable is required to correct for this. Once a lagged dependent variable is 
included, then the conventional interpretation of the OLS results is called into question. 
This emphasises the requirement to control for endogeneity in the estimation that is best 
undertaken applying GMM to a dynamic panel model as the time frame is short. 
Estimating a short-run model by random effects would produce biased estimates (see, 
for example, Nickell, 1981), because of the correlation between the autoregressive term 
and the estimated residuals.  
3.6.2 Empirical findings for models estimated by GMM 
As mentioned above, with a relatively small sample when the model is dynamic 
and there are some persistent explanatory variables, estimation is likely to be inefficient 
and biased. Since OLS and random-effects estimators yield biased and inconsistent 
estimates with a dynamic panel specification, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator 
may be employed. However, The gravity equations only employing the differenced 
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instruments (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is likely not to perform well as evidenced for 
BFDI by Egger (2001), Egger and Merlo (2012), and Egger et al. (2009) among others. 
To make equation (3.3) dynamic, we propose adding a lagged endogenous variable. The 
simplest explanation of this when the dynamic is persistent implies there is hysteresis in 
the FDI. Based on the discussion above it makes sense to estimate the dynamic model 
using the SYS-GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) and this computes 
estimates from which both the differenced and the levels variable coefficients can be 
extracted. This is appropriate when the FDI model follows from a theoretical 
explanation that is similar to that of conventional panel models of investment that derive 
from euler equations solved for expectations. Otherwise, to be used as a comparison to 
try to select empirically the most appropriate models. The Blundell and Bond method 
has been adopted previously to BFDI data by Abbott and De Vita (2011).  
, , , , 1 1 , , 2 , 3 ,
4 , , 5 , , 6 , 7 , 8 , ,
ln( ) ln( )+ ln(EXP ) +  ln(GDP ) +  ln(GDP ) 
                       +  ln(DIS ) + EXV  +  EcoFree  + EcoFree  + ln
                     
i j t i j t i j t j t i t
i j t i j t i t j t j i t
BFDI a BFDI
UCL
   
    
 
9 , 10 , , 11 , 12 13 , , ,  + Lang  + CU + land + FC  + + .           (3.4) i j i j t i j t j t i j tSYS    
 
Where λ is the adjustment coefficient in the dynamic model.  
The preferred results from the two-step system GMM estimator are presented in 
Table (3.4), The dynamic specification seems to work well based on the diagnostic tests 
for the definition of the instruments (Hansen, 1982) and the absence of up to 2nd order 
error autocorrelation. Across all specifications, the result for the serial correlation test is 
an expected. The null hypothesis of no serial correlation at order one is rejected while it 
is not possible to reject the null for the case of second order serial correlation. This 
suggests that the key criteria related to the moment conditions are met.   
The tests of autocorrelation in the residuals demonstrate that there is a negative 
and significant first order serial correlation but an insignificant second order serial in the 
first differences in the residuals in all models. These findings are coherent with the 
notion that the models do not relate to a backward-forward specification with 
expectations. The first order serial correlation relates to the expectational explanation as 
compared with models that are derived from pure costs of adjustment or hysteresis 
explanations of the data. Otherwise, the finding of serial correlation might imply that 
the models are not well formulated and there is some other specification that includes 
variables not currently included in the model. 
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Table (3.4) Results for dynamic panel-data estimation using two-step SYS-GMM 
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
LnBFDIi,j,t-1 0.2363*** 0.2351*** 0.2638*** 0.2463*** 0.2468*** 0.2602*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0364) (0.0374) (0.0375) (0.0386) (0.0374) 
LnGDPi,t 0.4159*** 0.3419** 0.3874*** 0.4170*** 0.3265** 0.3522*** 
 (0.1378) (0.1347) (0.1304) (0.1335) (0.1323) (0.1307) 
LnGDPj,t 0.7801*** 0.7013*** 0.6084*** 0.6830*** 0.7713*** 0.5414*** 
 (0.1116) (0.1085) (0.1156) (0.1199) (0.1187) (0.1174) 
LnEXPi.j.t 0.1910*** 0.2729*** 0.2759*** 0.2442*** 0.2206*** 0.3360*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0710) (0.0773) (0.0783) (0.0769) (0.0811) 
EXVi.j.t -1.8848** -1.4594** -1.5458** -1.6835** -1.6548** -1.2545** 
 (0.7408) (0.6457) (0.6625) (0.6956) (0.7065) (0.6184) 
Freei.t 0.0399*** 0.0410*** 0.0383*** 0.0387*** 0.0400*** 0.0390*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0064) (0.0059) 
Freej,t 0.0400*** 0.0390*** 0.0380*** 0.0388*** 0.0378*** 0.0381*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0063) 
LnDISi.j -0.6198*** -0.5707*** -0.5385*** -0.5732*** -0.5785*** -0.4940*** 
 (0.0929) (0.0875) (0.0940) (0.0953) (0.0912) (0.0950) 
Landi.j -0.3429* -0.3689* -0.3197* -0.3249* -0.3719* -0.3285* 
 (0.2081) (0.1980) (0.1858) (0.1938) (0.2132) (0.1841) 
Langi,j 0.5462*** 0.5770*** 0.5015*** 0.5554*** 0.5569*** 0.4776*** 
 (0.1919) (0.1910) (0.1782) (0.1853) (0.1972) (0.1775) 
CUi.j.t 0.1444 0.1364 0.0989 0.1048 0.1397 0.0992 
 (0.1121) (0.1086) (0.1068) (0.1119) (0.1137) (0.1003) 
LnUCLj.i.t -0.0415 -0.0828 -0.1557 -0.1378 0.0633 -0.1882 
 (0.1217) (0.1235) (0.1375) (0.1390) (0.1718) (0.1426) 
SYSj.t  -0.2530***     
  (0.0498)     
FC 1997   -0.1074**   -0.1094** 
    (0.0478)   (0.0478) 
FC 1998   -0.0231   -0.0246 
    (0.0414)   (0.0417) 
FC 1997/1998    -0.0725*   
     (0.0419)   
FC 2008     -0.1016*** -0.1228*** 
     (0.0216) (0.0254) 
Constant -24.3267*** -22.3003*** -21.6314*** -23.2669*** -22.6060*** -20.4966*** 
 (3.4244) (3.2141) (3.2374) (3.3605) (3.4075) (3.2406) 
Observation Number 5282 5282 5282 5282 5282 5282 
AR(1) test  -5.79*** -5.71*** -5.90*** -5.82*** -5.54*** -5.62*** 
AR(2) test  -0.55 -0.59 -0.24 -0.34 -0.57 -0.36 
J-test2(425) 377.65 375.07 378.93 376.07 372.70 377.58 
J-test: p-value 0.952 0.961 0.947 0.958 0.968 0.949 
Notes: All regressions are estimated over the period 1995–2012 using a dynamic two-step system GMM estimator proposed by 
Blundell and Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction. Huber–White robust standard errors are reported in 
the parenthesis. ***, **, and * coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The Hansen (1982),  
J-test statistic with p-values for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for 1st and 2nd order serial correlation. 
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The SYS-GMM estimations yield an adjustment coefficient that relates to the 
lagged FDI variable that is positive and statistically significant suggesting the dynamic 
model estimated through the GMM estimator can be considered appropriate. This result 
supports the studies of Kinoshita and Campus (2004), Walsh and Yu (2010), Gedik 
(2013), and Blonigen and Piger (2014), who suggest that FDI in the previous year has a 
positive impact on prospective foreign investor decisions. The result indicates that a 
lagged dependent variable impacts the behaviour of FDI. This also relates to hysteresis 
when FDI is highly persistent, but such persistence might be a number of factors. One 
explanation that is popular is costs of adjustment and as the lagged dependent variable 
is highly significant this is confirmation that the FDI Gravity model should be estimated 
using a dynamic specification (Bhavan et al., 2011; Mina, 2012). The presence of sunk 
costs incurred by investors to set up distribution networks and services in foreign 
markets generates persistent FDI to a country which invests in another country for a 
given year and tends to continue to do so the following year. According to the results, 
the coefficient of the lagged FDI δ in column 1 is about 0.24, implying a partial 
adjustment coefficient of 0.76. This means that net investment in one year is 76 percent 
of the difference between the steady-state level and the current value of FDI. If the 
steady-state level of the FDI stock does not change, it will take about 1.32 years (16 
months) for the gap between the equilibrium and the current FDI stock to close. The 
partial adjustment coefficient ranges in size from .23 to .26 in remaining columns in 
Table (3.4) which report the other GMM specifications. A slower speed of adjustment 
indicates more persistence in the pattern of FDI in these OECD economies. The 
significance of the lagged dependent variable confirms that the GMM estimator is again 
appropriate. 
The results related to the control variables in Table (3.4) are also of interest with 
real GDP of the host country and home country having a positive sign and being 
statistically significant in all the models. The results demonstrate support for the 
following hypothesis: real GDP is likely to exert a stronger effect on FDI depending on 
the form of the latter, especially when FDI outflow is seeking a domestic service market 
(market-seeking FDI). The result suggests that the income investment partners and host 
countries strongly influence FDI stocks (Hejazi, 2009; Martinez et al., 2012; Cuong, 
2013). These findings are also consistent with the standard gravity theory prediction and 
previous empirical findings (Culem, 1988; Billington, 1999; Chakrabarti, 2001). This 
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signals the importance of an expanding market for producers’ goods in the supply of 
FDI. The impacts from host country GDP are almost twice as large as for home country 
GDP, suggesting that market effects dominate the gravity part of the relationship.  
In the same way, the positive link between foreign investments and export 
performance may indicate that those foreign investments have contributed to the export 
performance, or the increasing export performance has been a good signal regarding 
competitiveness for foreign investors to favour those destinations. The coefficient of 
trade ( which is expressed as bilateral export) is positive and statistically significant 1% 
level. So this variable appears to be complementary in terms of the relation with BFDI 
stocks and this support the findings of Brenton et al. (1999), Kinoshita and Campus 
(2004), Bhavan et al. (2011) and Mina (2012).   
These findings again confirm the importance of exchange rate volatility, which is 
significant at the 5% level and still has a negative effect on outward BFDI in all the 
specifications in the Table (3.4), this result is consistent with other studies, for example 
Jeanneret (2006) found a negative and significant link on average for exchange rate 
volatility in a bilateral panel data set of 28 OECD countries by applying Gravity model. 
The results for the financial crises variables imply that the shock related to the 
crises has spread as a result of the negative coefficient, which means the risk that 
follows from a crisis reduces BFDI. The effect of financial crises for all the models is 
coherent as these coefficients are as expected negative and statistically significant. 
Specifically, the coefficients of the global crisis dummy variables were found highly 
significant, indicating the presence of an impact of the global financial crises on the 
BFDI stocks in the selected panel. The results for the estimates of the crises dummy 
coefficients reveal a significant decrease in FDI during the Asian crisis in year 1997, 
with a slightly more negative coefficient during the systemic banking crisis. The results 
of global financial crisis are in line with the UNCTAD report 2009, which state that; 
global FDI inflows fell by 39% from US$1.7 trillion in 2008 to US$1.0 trillion in 2009. 
It can be seen Table (3.4), columns (3) and (6) that the Asian crisis in 1998 has a 
negative but not significant effect. To the extent past FDI patterns can provide relevant 
insights to the current FDI slump. Interestingly, the global financial crisis has higher 
coefficient and significance comparative to Asian crisis as can be seen in column (6). 
The occurrence of this crisis causes the FDI stock from home to a host country to drop 
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by 12% in year 2008. These results are consistent with Mahmoud (2011) research on 
BFDI; his finding shows that global financial crisis has negative and significant effect 
on BFDI, in contrast to Asian crisis (1997-1998) which has negative but not significant 
effect on BFDI. 
When the host country suffers from a systemic banking crisis, BFDI to that 
country reduces and such results are consistent with Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) who found 
that systemic banking crisis has the expected sign and is statistically significant. So 
financial constraints impact on the decision to engage in new FDI, expressed through 
FDI's extensive margin.  
As for institutional variables, the economic freedom index of home country and 
host country is positive and highly significant presenting evidence that the OECD 
countries with good institutions managed to attract more FDI. This indicates that there 
is no implicit restriction on trade for these countries so this should increase BFDI. A 
system of law enforcement signals that investors’ rights will more likely be protected. 
These results are in line with Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) who suggest that the 
countries in which the institutional framework is sounder and better regulated were 
regarded as more attractive by foreign investors. 
 Turning to the estimation results for the Euro dummy variable, when both 
countries (host and donor) are in the Euro zone there is not significant effect for all the 
specifications in Table (4.3), suggesting that this is not merely capturing goods market 
integration. These results are consistent with Kreinin and Plummer (2008).  
Additionally, it is found that distance and language dummies have significantly 
negative and positive impacts, which is in the line with other studies. For example, 
Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch (2010) show distance has a significant negative effect on 
FDI, while common language exerts a positive impact. In particular, cultural proximity 
would seem to be proxied by a common language as the effect is statistically significant 
and positive. This is consistent with the notion that transaction costs as a result of a 
what may be common cultural ties or values are reduced and this encourages BFDI. 
Görg and Wakelin (2002), and De Vita and Abbott (2007) find a similar impact for a 
common language on US and UK FDI respectively. This findings confirm that home 
and host countries sharing the same language invest more with each other than a pair 
that does not use the same language as information costs are lower (see Buch et al., 
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2003; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007; Desbordes and Vicard and, 2009; and Mohan and 
Watson, 2012).   
More particularly, the distance between home and host countries has a negative 
and significant impact on BFDI. The coefficient suggests that when the distance 
increases by 1%, the bilateral stock of FDI falls by about 0.49%-0.62%. This is also 
consistent with previous studies as evidenced by Buch et al. (2004, 2005), and Buch and 
Lipponer (2004). This suggests that companies are found to prefer investing in closer 
countries rather than those farther away, while the impact of a common border is 
negative but not significant in all specifications in Table (3.4). This fits with the trade 
literature where the coefficient is positive, because proximity reduces the need for FDI 
in horizontally integrated industries. These results show that sharing the same land 
border has no impact on the stocks of the FDI (Mitze et al., 2008; Cuong, 2013).   
It appears that unit labour costs are not important as they are not significant for 
any specification of the model. The insignificance of labour cost differentials could be 
associated with the endogeneity of this variable or that it may not be well instrumented. 
This finding is consistent with Holland and Pain (1998), Devereux and Griffith (1998) 
also found unit labour costs differentials to be a non-significant driver of the location 
choices of US multinationals in the EU. They explain this result by their data not being 
disaggregated enough a measure of productivity so not reflecting the firm’s 
heterogeneity within each industry. 
The main message conveyed by Table (3.4) is not so different from that related to 
the OLS results in Table (3.3). Apart from the ULC coefficient that in some 
specifications is negative and not significant for all specifications. The currency union 
dummy is estimated at lower impact than the figures obtained from the OLS regressions 
models, it is positive but not significant in all specifications in Table (3.4), so the 
inclusion of exchange rate volatility measures seems to capture the impact of using the 
same currency.    
For SYS- GMM all coefficients across all specification are significant at the 5% 
level, except common currency, unit labour cost differentials and common land border 
which are not considered as critical variables for BFDI. As expected, higher GDPs, 
lower distance, common language, lower exchange rate volatilities all have a positive 
impact on BFDI stocks. Moreover, countries with good institutions, more trade 
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openness, and fewer restrictions on FDI are likely to receive more FDI. We consistently 
find that exchange rate volatility plays an important role in driving FDI.  
The long-run coefficients are easily computed33 and are reported in addition to the 
Wald test of these coefficients in Table (3.4a); the results suggest the use of the 
complete model represented by equation (3.4) except again for unit labour cost that it 
seems possible to exclude from the model. The test is not linear as the long-run is based 
on a ratio of the linear regression coefficient.   
Table (3.4a) SYS-GMM long-run estimates with Wald Tests of restriction 
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
LnGDPi.t  0.5446 0.4470 0.5261 0.5532 0.4334 0.4760 
Wald test 2(1)  9.21*** 6.41** 8.88*** 9.83*** 6.16** 7.34*** 
LnGDPj.t 1.0215 0.9168 0.8264 0.9061 1.0240 0.7318 
Wald test 2(1) 56.42*** 47.35*** 32.37*** 38.53*** 46.34*** 24.56*** 
LnEXPi.j.t 0.2501 0.3567 0.3747 0.3240 0.2928 0.4542 
Wald test 2(1) 7.24*** 15.67*** 12.90*** 9.80*** 8.68*** 17.18*** 
EXVi.j.t -2.4680 -1.9079 -2.0997 -2.2336  -2.1971 -1.6956 
Wald test 2(1) 6.41** 5.06** 5.43** 5.86** 5.46** 4.14** 
Freei.t 0.05221 0.0535 0.0520 0.05129 0.0531 0.0527 
Wald test 2(1) 42.99*** 46.19*** 45.62*** 45.04*** 41.89*** 47.19*** 
Freej.t 0.05232 0.0509 0.05166 0.0515 0.0501 0.0514 
Wald test 2(1) 41.16*** 40.86*** 38.77*** 38.19*** 37.37*** 39.24*** 
LnDISi.j -0.8115 -0.7461 -0.7315 -0.7604 -0.7681 -0.6676 
Wald test 2(1) 50.00*** 47.08*** 37.87*** 41.6*** 44.02*** 31.14*** 
Landi.j -0.4490 -0.4822 -0.4342 -0.4311 -0.4938 -0.4440 
Wald test 2(1) 2.77* 3.54* 3.06* 2.90* 3.09* 3.28* 
Langi.j 0.7151 0.7543 0.6812 0.7369 0.7394 0.6456 
Wald test 2(1) 8.39*** 9.62*** 8.36*** 9.50*** 8.22*** 7.59*** 
CUi.j 0.1891 0.1783 0.1343 0.139 0.1854 0.1341 
Wald test 2(1) 1.68 1.59 0.87 0.89 1.52 0.99 
LnUCLj.i.t -0.0543 -0.1082 -0.2114 -0.1828 0.084 -0.2543 
Wald test 2(1) 0.12 0.45 1.26 0.97 0.14 1.7 
Note: the table shows the long-run estimates derived from an underlying short-run dynamic model using the two step 
systems GMM. A Wald test is reported in the second row for each coefficient. Denoted ***, **, and * then the coefficients 
are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
A further question is as to whether exchange rate volatility enhances the 
explanatory power of the regression equation. As can be seen from Table (3.4a), the 
exchange rate volatility parameter confirms its importance in the long-run as it has 
                                                            
33 If the AR(1) parameter is termed  and the ith coefficient relates to the ith non deterministic regressor, the long-run 
multiplier i=i /(1-i). The more general case of this type of dynamic model appears in Gregoriou et al. (2009) and 
the article includes some discussion of the application of the same type of Wald test constructed from the unrestricted 
parameters.  
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increased for all specifications, and it is also significant based on a Wald test of the 
coefficients. FDI reacts more strongly to exchange rate volatility in the long run. These 
findings reflect an easier and less expensive possibility for companies to insure against 
the risk of short term volatility by foreign exchange market instruments. Meanwhile, the 
long run exchange rate misalignment are costly and unavoidable unless as part of an 
exchange rate union. Therefore, they deter FDI. As can be noticed from Table (3.4a) the 
variables of interest are important in the long run with the exception of the labour cost 
and euro dummy variables, which are also not critical in the short run as reported in 
Table (3.4). These results are consistent with Dinga and Dingová (2011) who test the 
effect of the transition to the Euro on international FDI with a panel of 35 OECD 
countries for the period 1997-2008. Their finding indicates that the Euro currency does 
not have a significant effect on FDI, while long-term exchange rate volatility hinders 
FDI. The results reported in Table (3.4a) suggest that variables not significant in the 
short run may also be insignificant in the long run. Moreover, the significance level of 
the variables appears stable, but the long-run effect by the dynamic adjustment that 
follows from the impact of the partial adjustment to the steady state in the long run.   
Moreover, Table (3.4b) below shows the elasticity which provides information on 
the % contribution of each variable to BFDI 
Table (3.4b) SYS-GMM elasticity of the independent variables  
Independent 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
LnBFDIi,j,t-1  0.2348692    0.2335282 0.2622296   0.2447229 0.2453328 0.2586377 
LnGDPi.t  0.6733037   0.553378 0.6272196   0.6749451 0.5285817 0.5703377 
LnGDPj.t 1.218261     1.094821 0.9503241 1.066331 1.204592 0.8457247 
LnEXPi.j.t 0.2433762    0.347461 0.3515399   0.3110351 0.2810226 0.4281954   
EXVi.j.t -0.0008341   -0.0006456 -0.0006842   -0.0007449 -0.0007324   -0.0005553 
Freei.t 0.164733 0.1692073 0.1584514 0.1596669 0.1652877 0.1611388 
Freej.t 0.1611982 0.1571285 0.1534559 0.1565535 0.1524394 0.153592   
LnDISi.j -0.2823703 -0.2599219  -0.2453919 -0.2610749 -0.2636154 -0.2250985 
Landi.j -0.0021564   -0.0023189 -0.0020105   -0.0020428 -0.0023391 -0.0020663 
Langi.j 0.0034405 0.0036334 0.0031598 0.0034979 0.0035086   0.0030094 
CUi.j 0.0013328 0.0012583 0.0009127   0.0009667 0.0012891  0 .0009161 
LnUCLj.i.t -0.0000914  -0.0001824   -0.000343 -0.0003035  0.0001395 -0.0004146   
SYSj.t  -0.0006545     
FC 1997   -0.0003157     -0.0003219 
FC 1998   -0.0000691   -0.0000735 
FC 1997/1998    -0.0004292   
FC 2008     -0.0003915 -0.0004733   
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3.7 Concluding Remarks  
One aim was to establish the impact of the volatility of the exchange rate on 
bilateral FDI stock outflow from 14 high income OECD countries to all other OECD 
countries over the period 1995 to 2012. In addition to the volatility of the exchange rate 
the Gravity model controls for several FDI determinants including traditional factors 
and institutional factors such as bilateral exports, real GDP, distance, unit labour cost 
differentials, the free economic index, and other common instructional characteristics, 
in addition to the effect on BFDI of financial crises.  
A static gravity equation is estimated using a "random-effects" panel data model 
based on a number of regression specifications. However, estimating a short-run model 
by random effects would produce biased estimates (Nickell, 1981), because of the 
correlation between the autoregressive term and the estimated residuals.  
Given the nature of the data, there is very likely significant serial correlation and 
this may further be compounded by the series being non-stationary. In time series the 
relations may be cointegrating, but this is more complicated to deal with here than was 
the case in the previous chapter.  
Given the time series dimension and the further complications that may arise as a 
result of the impact of the large cross section dimension it is felt best to tackle the issue 
of serial correlation directly by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. However, 
the estimations may not consistent (Greene, 2011) when there is serial correlation so 
there needs to be some consideration of endogeneity as a result of likely heterogeneity 
and the likely interaction with the lagged dependent variable. So SYS-GMM is applied 
to a Gravity model of BFDI stocks.    
The results obtained in this chapter confirm that a dynamic model is more 
appropriate to explain the stocks of high income countries outward BFDI. As for the 
control variables, our results are generally in line with previous studies and confirm that 
Gravity models are critical in explaining BFDI. Based on a panel data analysis it was 
found here that BFDI stocks are significantly influenced by both gravity factors 
(distance, gross domestic product (GDP)) and non-gravity factors (risk as measured by 
exchange rate volatility and the economic freedom index). While high GDP, distance 
between the countries, positively affects BFDI, and long term exchange rate volatility 
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hinders BFDI stocks. The results also support the hypothesis that exchange rate 
volatility is a determinant of BFDI decisions and this appears to confirm the relatively 
common view that this relation is negative. Whereas, the Euro does not have a 
significant effect on BFDI, but it is observed that BFDI increases. 
Examining patterns of global economic crises, the study of how BFDI stocks 
responded to the different types of crises across the period. The bottom line is that 
financial shocks reduce bilateral FDI. These results show that past FDI patterns can 
provide relevant insights into the current FDI slump. Interestingly, the global financial 
crisis has had a larger effect than the Asian crisis that is also significant. The findings 
enhance the previous literature by examining the behaviour of FDI outflow from high 
income countries during the 1997–1998 East Asian crisis, the financial markets crisis of 
2008, and systemic banking crises. 
The findings of this chapter have serious implications for International business. 
1-) Identifying the financial crises impact on FDI is crucial for understanding the 
possible reverse effect of FDI on the government’s response. 2-) This chapter was 
aimed at identifying and filling the gaps in the literature on this topic by analysing the 
impact of Long run exchange rate volatility on FDI with panel data. 
 Furthermore, the results provide some useful policy implications for policy-
makers as the finding accords with the theoretical predictions of models stressing sunk 
costs relevance in the decision as to whether to invest abroad. Moreover, countries with 
better institutions, more trade openness, and fewer restrictions on FDI are likely to 
receive more FDI. It is consistently found that exchange rate volatility plays an 
important role in driving FDI. Furthermore, the past level of outward FDI stock 
provides incentives for domestic companies to invest abroad.  
Finally, It may help to confirm this analysis using different samples to determine 
whether there are some special characteristics of selected countries (the OECD in this 
study), which could affect these findings on the impact of the financial crises on BFDI. 
So the direction for further study could be to replicate the analysis to determine how 
financial crises affects BFDI by region (for example, Euro zone), sector, in addition to 
the link between exchange rate volatility and FDI.    
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Appendix (A3) Table offers a list of the countries included in the sample.34 
Home countries (14) Host Countries-OECD Countries (31)  
Austria Australia 
Belgium Austria 
Canada Belgium 
France Canada 
Germany Czech Republic 
Italy Denmark 
Japan Estonia 
Korea, Rep. Finland 
Netherlands France 
Spain Germany 
Sweden Greece 
Switzerland Hungary 
United Kingdom Ireland 
United States Israel 
 Italy 
 Japan 
 Korea, Rep. 
 Mexico 
 Netherlands 
 New Zealand 
 Norway 
 Poland 
 Portugal 
 Slovak Republic 
 Slovenia 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 Switzerland 
 Turkey 
 United Kingdom 
 United States 
 
 
 
                                                            
34 As classified by the World Bank 
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Appendix (B3) Countries in the sample experienced borderline systemic 
banking crises.35 
 
Host Country Year 
Australia - 
Austria 2008 
Belgium 2008 
Canada - 
Czech Republic 1996 
Denmark 2008 
Estonia - 
Finland 1999 
France 2008 
Germany 2008 
Greece 2008 
Hungary 2008 
Ireland 2008 
Israel - 
Italy 2008 
Japan 1997 
Korea, Rep. 1997 
Mexico 1995 
Netherlands 2008 
New Zealand - 
Norway - 
Poland - 
Portugal 2008 
Slovak Republic 1998 
Slovenia 2008 
Spain 2008 
Sweden 2008 
Switzerland 2008 
Turkey 2000 
United Kingdom 2007 
United States 2007 
 
                                                            
35 Laeven and Valencia (2013) 
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Appendix (C3) Accession into the Euro zone 
 
Euro zone countries Adopted in year  
Austria 1999 
Belgium 1999 
Estonia 2011 
Finland 1999 
France 1999 
Germany 1999 
Greece 2001 
Ireland 1999 
Italy 1999 
Netherlands 1999 
Portugal 1999 
Slovak Republic 2009 
Slovenia 2007 
Spain 1999 
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Appendix (D3) Conversion rates of exchange rates for entry into the Euro36 
 
Country Currency Code Fixed rate Fixed on Yielded 
Austria Austrian schilling ATS 13.7603 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Belgium Belgian franc BEF 40.3399 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Estonia Estonian kroon EEK 15.6466 13/07/2010 01/01/2011 
Finland Finnish markka FIM 5.94573 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
France French franc FRF 6.55957 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Germany German mark DEM 1.95583 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Greece Greek drachma GRD 340.75 19/06/2000 01/01/2001 
Ireland Irish pound IEP 0.78756 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Italy Italian lira ITL 1,936.27 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Netherlands Dutch guilder NLG 2.20371 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Portugal Portuguese escudo PTE 200.482 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Slovak Republic Slovak koruna SKK 30.126 08/07/2008 01/01/2009 
Slovenia Slovenian tolar SIT 239.64 11/07/2006 01/01/2007 
Spain Spanish peseta ESP 166.386 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
36 Preceding national currencies of the Euro zone   http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/ 
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4 Chapter	Four	
EU	 Cross‐Border	 Banking	 and	 Financial	 Crises:	
Empirical	Evidence	using	the	Gravity	model	
4.1 Introduction 
Understanding the drivers of cross-border asset movements has become an 
important topic of research in financial and international economics. Previously the 
focus has been more on foreign direct investment (FDI), but more recently attention has 
been centred on cross-border international bank lending. Some consensus has emerged 
that portfolio flows are most volatile (Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Calvo and Mendoza, 
2000). However, FDI is the most stable form of cross-border finance (Levchenko and 
Mauro, 2007).  
It has been indicated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) that in the 
last decade cross-border banking has increased significantly. In particular, this has 
occurred between international banks and their non-bank customers. More specifically, 
it was reported in BIS (2011) that in the expansionary phase of the global economy, 
“cross-border lending to the cross-border and nonbanks components classified by 
residential banks” had tended to rise at a faster rate than the equivalent flow of credit. 
International banks that move abroad have been one of the main sources of 
finance in recent years. It is thus that financial linkages and more specifically bank 
lending ties have been seen as one of the major channels of transmission of the financial 
crisis from advanced countries (IMF, 2009a). Thus, the determinants of cross-border 
banking should be considered when analysing how the crisis was transmitted and why 
most markets were differently impacted. Understanding the major variables driving 
cross-border banking is also necessary for financial stability in advanced countries, due 
to the negative way in which financial crisis has affected the banks in advanced 
economies. This has been the case in the Euro area, where banks have built up core 
exposure to cross-border activities especially in Eastern and Central Europe.  
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Shin (2012) has shown that cross-border banking has had a critical role in the 
build-up of the global crisis, with European banks operating as a major financial 
intermediary for the US, competing in terms of size with the local financial sector. 
While, in the Euro Area, cross-border banking has been a leading factor in the build-up 
of the housing bubbles and credit booms in countries such as Ireland and Spain (BIS, 
2011). To understand better the Financial crisis, there has been a recent focus on cross-
border banking at a gross and not a net level (Shin, 2012; Borio and Disyatat, 2011). 
This has arisen as a result of the increase in cross-border lending over the past 18 years 
with differential effects on the global economy and financial sector. Navaretti et al. 
(2010) over the period 2007 to 2009 indicated that retail and corporate bank lending of 
foreign affiliates has risen across Europe. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) found at a 
global level that that foreign multinational banks, in contrast to domestic banks, may not 
have to cut lending, because they have access to the international capital markets. 
The financial crisis has evidenced some challenges specific to cross-border 
banking. Facilities are often exposed to legislation and regulation both in the lender and 
borrower countries. This increases the complexity and operations costs. Furthermore, 
this introduces the possibility for conflicts between the lender and borrower countries in 
areas such as maximising the banking organizations efficiency and resolving liquidity or 
solvency problems.  
4.2 Cross-border banking in the European Union (EU) 
In the case of the European Union, the market trend towards cross-border banking 
has been enhanced by a number of EU policies trying to reduce legal barriers to 
achieving a single market for financial services.  
Generally, market integration was one of the primary purposes for the foundation 
of the EU. From the inception of the EU the idea of joining the internal markets ties in 
with economic and political integration. The EU single market for financial services has 
progressed at a slower pace when compared with other markets. This was a reason for 
the pursuit of an EU policy action to foster financial market integration in the last 
decade. This policy has translated into a number of regulatory initiatives aiming at 
overcoming legal barriers to cross-border banking activity among EU financial 
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institutions. Furthermore, market integration should enhance competition, which should 
improve the terms and conditions for corporate and consumer credit. 
 The achievement of a functioning single financial market would facilitate the full 
exploitation of the EU market, a better allocation of resources and a better response to 
the needs of what is still a heterogeneous market in terms of size and structure. More 
competition should reduce costs and increase market choice. One can distinguish the 
effects of further development and efficiency of the local financial system, on the access 
to financial services by firms and households, and on the stability of the local financial 
system and the overall economy. Studies on the effect of cross-border banking on 
efficiency and development, access to financial services and stability find effects that 
are largely beneficial, although there are some question marks over financial stability. 
4.2.1 Cross-Border Banking and Financial Stability 
The formation of a single banking market and the enhancement of competition in 
the EU may necessitate a high degree of cross-border activity. The European Central 
Bank (ECB) has commented on financial integration in Europe as follows: ‘Cross-
border banks play an important role in the process of banking integration. They enhance 
competition in the Euro area banking markets. In this fashion, they promote 
convergence towards more efficient, lower-cost banking practices.’ (ECB, 2007, p. 33). 
To understand the overall effect of cross‐border banking on financial stability, it is 
useful to disentangle the costs and benefits of cross‐border banking. Theoretical 
research into modelling different aspects of the costs and benefits of cross-border 
banking (see Dasgupta, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004; Wagner, 2010) indicates 
that some degree of integration is beneficial, but an extreme degree may not be.  
4.2.2 Benefits of Cross-Border Banking 
An advantage of cross-border banking is due to the potential for risk 
diversification (Markowitz, 1952), because cross-border banks assets will be less 
sensitive to country-specific shocks and, in theory, the probability of collapse. By 
spreading its activities across different countries, banks are less exposed to a domestic 
or foreign shock; this could reduce lending volatility. Widely speaking, cross‐border 
banking facilitates international risk sharing (e.g. van Wincoop, 1999). The existence of 
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cross‐border banking can also increase competition for domestic banks, and an 
important strand of the literature has shown that more competition is beneficial to 
stability (e.g. Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005). 
As well as diversification gains that arise because cross-border banking reduces 
the bank risk and stabilises lending, cross-border banking could contribute to sharing an 
economy’s risks with other countries. The cross-border banking repercussions for the 
synchronisation of real economic variables, such as investment, consumption and 
national income can be shown theoretically using the international version of real 
business cycle model (see Baxter and Crucini, 1994; Neumeyer and Perri, 2005).  
4.2.3 Costs of Cross-Border Banking 
It has been suggested that cross-border banking may bring various important 
benefits to financial stability. On the other hand, as can be observed from the impact of 
the crisis on the UK there are potential dangers for financial stability that can arise from 
the extent to which the home economy is open to cross-border banking. 
When international financial markets are highly volatile, then economies that are 
open to cross-border banking will be sensitive to foreign capital flows. Foreign capital 
is likely to be more mobile than domestic capital. Hence, in a crisis, foreign banks could 
decide to ‘pull back and run’. Domestic banks may be constrained in their capacity to 
redeploy capital quickly outside the country. The extent to which foreign capital is more 
sensitive than domestic capital crucially depends on which form cross-border banking 
takes. Specifically, foreign banks are less likely to cut and run when their investment is 
significant as a result of sunk costs. This is indicated by studies showing that lending by 
subsidiaries is more stable than direct cross-border lending (see Peek and Rosengren, 
2000; de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006; McCauley et al., 2010; Schnabl, 2012). 
Another factor that affects financial stability is contagion37 that may have a 
similar effect on cross-border banking by limiting the exposure of the local financial 
system to local shocks. Even so, the creation of cross-border banking will induce 
increases in complexity and size of financial institutions. Thus, cross-border banks are 
relevant to systemic risk. Their collapse could impose a larger cost on economies than 
the meltdown of a purely local bank. Moreover, substantial international diversification 
                                                            
37 The survey by Babus et al. (2009) explains the various channels that relate to what may be called contagion. 
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by local banks will make them more sensitive to the global market for funds. Hence, in 
terms of operations and culture, it may be difficult to distinguish the behaviour of local 
and international banks. This may increase the systemic component of any crisis even 
were such diversification to reduce the likelihood of isolated bank meltdowns. Another 
important cost comes in the form of contagion; cross‐border banking may transmit 
shocks among countries. A credit shock to one country, for example, can be propagated 
easily to the other country when both are financially integrated, as shown again by the 
international version of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBC) literature (see Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2013).  
The paradigm of “cross-border banking” is used with both banks and banking 
customers. While several studies on cross-border banking focus either on banks 
customers (international) or interbank relations, here the focus is on the large customer 
countries side and their capacity to borrow abroad during the financial crises. This 
chapter examines bilateral country-level data available from the BIS on cross-border 
lending. Here the lending from 19 advanced countries38 as directed towards European 
countries is investigated using quarterly data for the period 1999-2014. The extent of 
this data gives us the capacity to analyse how the geography of cross-border banking is 
impacted by the financial crises in terms of the systemic component, the global financial 
crisis, the Euro debt crisis and the Lehman Brothers’ crisis. Additionally, the application 
of the Gravity model enhances the capacity to consider whether EU has resulted in 
significantly more cross border banking with the countries that are party to the EU. 
Additionally, the effect of monetary integration on cross-border banking is studied as 
increasing monetary integration leading to a common currency could influence cross-
border lending positively through a number of channels. Finally, given the importance 
of financial crises on cross border banking this chapter considers their role in the euro 
area following the spread of crises. During the introduction of the Euro, banks from 
Euro area countries set strong financial linkages with the circumferential banks by 
providing them with large amounts of funding.   
 A broad range of determinants of cross border lending were considered in order 
to be able to isolate the behaviour of cross-border lending stocks by taking account of 
the recent financial crises and its aftermath on international lending. This in particular is 
                                                            
38 The only available countries in the database. 
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associated with the global financial crisis, the Lehman Brothers collapse and the Euro 
crisis starting in 2011, and that is in addition to any borrower country specific systemic 
banking crises. A larger set of observable macroeconomic indicators are adopted than in 
the earlier literature, and the distinction is made between expected and unexpected 
macroeconomic developments. Iacoviello and Minetti (2006) studied cross-border 
lending, but focused on productivity. Goldberg (2002, 2007) used interest rates and 
GDP growth as explanatory variables. This work is developed in the context of the 
Gravity model approach discussed below. To the best knowledge, one study examined 
the effect of bilateral exchange rate volatility on cross border banking. Herrmann and 
Mihaljek (2013) examined cross border banking from OECD countries to emerging 
countries over the period (1993-2008). Here, the effect of exchange rate volatility has 
been studied on cross border lending to the European market.   
The following key findings emerged. 1) The empirical "gravity" model is the 
benchmark in explaining the volume of international lending activities. 2) Conditioned 
on standard gravity variables (distance, GDP), well-functioning institutions is a key 
driving force for cross border lending stocks. 3) Furthermore, our results suggest that 
European Market Integration has a large effect on cross border lending. 4) There is 
strong evidence indicating that financial crises have a significant effect on cross border 
lending from more developed markets to European Markets. Specifically, the Euro debt 
crisis has had a strong long negative impact on cross border lending. 5) Furthermore, 
these results confirm that EU integration has the required effect regarding our sample by 
offsetting the benefit from the single currency among Euro zone countries and 
eliminating bilateral exchange rate volatility.  
4.3 Cross-border banking and the Gravity model  
As mentioned in the introduction, cross-border banking is likely to be affected by 
some measure of economic and financial distance. Proximity, especially within Europe 
may facilitate lending and borrowing activities. This may also be a function of the order 
of the activities decreasing as the network expands. For this reason, the study turns to 
the Gravity model. 
Empirical Gravity models have already been employed in the international 
banking literature. However, there has been limited theoretical motivation for why 
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international banking should depend on a Gravity model. More recently, such models 
have considered financial frictions, asset types and the asset studied.  
4.3.1 Gravity models for International Bank Assets 
Based on different panel methodologies the findings of such models indicate that 
geography, institutions and politics are core drivers of international banking activities. 
The success of the “gravity” equation in the empirical trade literature in modelling asset 
flows as a function of the distance between the source and recipient countries and their 
"size" appears to be a powerful benchmark for analysing cross-border banking flows.  
In the international trade literature, distance is seen to be a proxy for 
transportation costs. While for international banking; geographic distance between two 
countries can be used to proxy informational frictions and/or monitoring costs 
(Brüggemann et al., 2012; Okawa and van Wincoop, 2012). 
As such, it can be shown that the Newtonian inspiration for the gravity variables, 
economic size and distance can be used to explain cross-border banking and finance 
(Berger et al., 2004; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005; Portes and Rey, 2005; Buch, 2005; 
Buch and Lipponer, 2007; Claessens and van Horen, 2013; and Aviat and Coeurdacier, 
2007). To this end, it seems that distance and size also matter for financial markets. As 
distance is expected to reflect higher cost for cross-border asset trades negative findings 
may be explained by transactional and informational frictions.  
Brüggemann et al. (2012) provide a theoretical motivation for an empirical 
Gravity model of bank international assets. They develop a model in which they 
consider a company (g) located in country (i), looking for a bank loan with specific 
maturity, volume, interest rates, or other contractual features. This search is undertaken 
in a number of countries (n), including the home country. The company selects a bank 
(k) in a specific country (j). The bank is seeking to obtain the best rate of return relative 
to risk on its loans subject to cost and the extent to which the loan offer is attractive to 
the customer. The following equation (4.1) is used to explain the lowest cost at which a 
bank can supply a loan:  
, , , 1 2 , 3 , , , .                                               (4.1)i g j k j i j j i g j kC r a         
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Where this cost depends on factors such as geographic distance, which affects the 
cost of monitoring (ߨ௜௝). As Banks differ total costs are measured by the average 
interest rate in a specific country (ݎ௝), average bank characteristics (aj) and a residual 
term capturing any unobservable cost and bank-company-specific traits (ߝ௜,௚,௝,௞). The 
company compares the offers of banks located in different countries and chooses a 
specific bank that depends on the characteristics of the country pair. It is to be expected 
that other elements in the trade/FDI Gravity model literature also matter. For a given 
distance, we would expect that larger lender countries would offer more bank loans and 
larger borrower countries would require more loans, and hence both countries should 
have influence based on the size of their economies in the model. 
Brüggemann et al. (2012) use their model to test aggregate credit relations 
between banks and firms which are located in countries i and j. This is a function of the 
average interest rate in the host country, the number of banks active in the foreign 
market, any observable bilateral monitoring costs such as geographic distance, and the 
size of the foreign banking market. Additionally, they include time-varying measures of 
multilateral resistance. The multilateral resistance measure indicates the average 
financial barriers for any country vis-à-vis other countries (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003; Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). 
The empirical literature related to the Gravity model of cross border banking has 
used two types of factors to control for transaction costs. Firstly, the geographical 
characteristics of country pairs, such as distance, remoteness and adjacency used to 
capture transportation costs. Secondly, related to cultural and historical ties between the 
countries, such as common language and past colonial links. Cultural similarities are 
frequently used in order to account for other factors that could affect the cost of cross-
border banking. However, these variables do not capture the transaction costs that are 
related to the need for frequent interaction in real time between the parties, because 
physical distance does not always fully capture this. Therefore, the time zone can have 
an impact, because agents may not be able to function fully when their markets and 
support services are not operating even given easy to use and low-cost communications; 
in this way the effective may not be the same for East-West as compared with North-
South transactions. The transactions cost associated to the time zone difference should 
be important in activities that require an interaction deal in real time. This is why it is 
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believed that cross border banking offers a perfect setting in which to show the effect of 
differences in time zones.  
There are a number of recent findings on the determinants of cross-border banking 
based on a Gravity model for example Buch (2005) analysis of banks’ foreign asset 
holdings. While Buch and Lipponer (2007) examine German banks and their 
international strategies via foreign direct investment (FDI) and a cross-border condition 
term for banking services. Other articles show the core role of distance in explaining 
global banking. Heuchemer et al. (2009) examine cross-border retail lending for the 
Euro zone using a Gravity model. They also suggest that physical distance may have an 
effect because of cultural distance. 
4.3.2 Crises, International Bank Assets and Gravity models   
The theoretical rationale for the Gravity model especially the formulation 
associated with equation (4.1) would appear to be well adapted to investigate the effect 
of crises on cross border banking. Due to its relative success in explaining goods flows, 
recent applications of these models have also been used to analyse asset flows. Portes 
and Rey (2002 and 2005), Razin (2002) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) are seminal 
papers that make use of Gravity models to analyse cross-border equity flows and FDI, 
respectively. While Martin and Rey (2004), and Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) use 
the Gravity model to analyse portfolio capital flows.39  
4.4 Cross-border banking and financial crises    
We focus mainly here on the role of cross-border banking in the propagation of 
the credit crisis from the US. We will first make some general points, then discuss how 
cross-border institutions responded during the global financial crisis, Lehman Brothers’ 
crisis, Euro debt crisis and systemic banking crises.  
The crisis was intensified on market liquidity failures which are comparable to a 
bank run on a liquid market that changes liquid securities to illiquid loans, following a 
shock that makes traders and asset holders uncertain regarding the underlying assets 
value (Davis, 2008). Furthermore, Adrian and Shin (2008) indicate that market liquidity 
                                                            
39 Coeurdacier and Rey (2011) provide an extensive survey of literature on international asset portfolios. 
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failure reflects contagion through market price changes, so financial institutions 
managed balance sheets in response to measured risk and price changes.  
Barrell and Davis (2008) indicate that when balance sheets are strong, banks see 
leverage as low and seek to extend balance sheets through increased lending and short-
term liabilities incurrence. This is seen as an enhance  liquidity across the whole, as was 
available to lend to sub-prime borrowers in the run-up to 2007. Then, when there is a 
market prices shock, financial institutions that mark to market find their leverage high 
and seek to reduce their balance sheets which required ceasing to lend in the interbank 
market. 
 One important source of financial instability has resulted from exposure to bad 
financial debt that has arisen from real estate bubbles. It is argued that the global crisis 
arose from the bubble in real estate prices in the US. Financial fragility led to what 
became an over-expansion in housebuilding in other countries, such as Spain and 
Ireland. The subsequent impact on the banks in these countries had further implications 
for their capacity to respond to the crisis in the Euro zone. The over valuation of house 
prices and subsequent fall impacted financial institutions leading to bank failure in the 
US, UK and Ireland that then affected the real economy, and both the retail and then the 
commercial construction industries. In the US, this was compounded by failure in the 
securitised mortgage markets and markets for assets such as mortgaged backed 
securities (MBS). Such securities were then held by European banks either by purchase 
of the derivative assets or of financial institutions that held them and this meant that the 
crisis spread quickly from the US to Europe. Honohan (2008) indicates that half of the 
assets backed by sub-prime loans had been offloaded, especially on European banks. 
Greenlaw et al. (2008) demonstrate that there had also been a big amount of 
recapitalisation from sovereign wealth funds in the early months of the crisis. 
The way the dynamics of the global crisis of 2008-2009 worked out has been 
greatly affected by cross-border banking. European banks were exposed to US securities 
such as mortgage backed securities (MBS) and credit default swaps  (CDSs) as a result 
of global banks operating on either the selling or buying side. Furthermore, the nature of 
this failure in credit and collapse in asset markets was fully global, feeding across 
borders as a result of complex linkages through the global ownership of financial assets. 
Further compounded, because the system was not transparent due to feed through with 
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cross-border counterparties and ownership not helped by the failure of central banks and 
regulatory authorities to get to grips with the complexity of the problem.While, the 
nature of the crisis caused a severe short-fall in liquidity so European banks were short 
of US dollars. This situation had to be resolved so a solution was finally found for the 
shortage through a currency swap initiative by the major central banks.  
Banks were affected by the market liquidity failure for securitised loans because 
of mark-to-market pricing, so price decrease impacted solvency. This was different 
banking crises in the past where loans have been held at known cost with no specific 
price. Finally, although the fiscal easing operating in the US and to a lesser extent in the 
UK did manage to restrict the crisis as it was not supported by other European 
economies, fiscal policy was not a solution to distressed banks in terms of their cross-
border activities. So the european economy did not recover in the same way as the US, 
rather fiscal consolidation on the content may well have helped counteract these policies 
especially in the case of the UK. These set of features led on to the emergence of 
historically large premia in the local interbank markets in the UK, US and EU. Banks 
attempted to reduce balance sheet lending, at the same time that borrowers were made 
cautious by house price falls, leading to unprecedented falls in mortgage lending. 
Central banks offered huge volumes of liquidity to supply banks and seek to restart the 
interbank funding markets (Barrell and Davis, 2008). 
The effect of financial crisis on cross-border banking can occur in the lender 
country, in the borrower country or both countries at the same time. This depends on the 
nature of the crisis. The existing studies have mainly emphasised the importance of 
banks that directly experience a crisis in the lending country. It is documented in the 
literature that banks decrease their local lending (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) and 
their cross-border lending (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 
2011; Takats, 2010, and Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2010). This also occurs with local 
lending by foreign offices (Peek and Rosengren, 2000; Popov and Udell, 2010; Cetorelli 
and Goldberg, 2011). However, the reduction in cross-border lending is limited to banks 
which are geographically closer to the borrower and that have a domestic office or 
strong historical ties to the domestic banks (De Haas et al., 2011).  
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Regarding the overall impact of cuts to foreign and domestic lending by banks’ 
loan portfolios, Giannetti and Laeven (2012) argue that there is a ‘flight home effect’. 
This means that during the global financial crisis there may have been an increased 
propensity for banks to display lending bias in the disposition of their loan portfolios in 
the corporate syndicated loan market (Degryse et al., 2015). This is consistent with 
much of the research that suggests that the financial crisis limited international banking 
and cross-country flow of funds (i.e., Milne, 2009).  
4.4.1 Episodes of Financial Crises   
Crises can be categorised into distinct phases. 
Firstly, the Global crisis arose as the second phase of what starts with the US 
housing market collapse as core banks faced the consequences of the crisis and as a 
result, local authorities forcefully intervened. The associated global recession led to co-
ordinated monetary and fiscal efforts primarily in the US and the UK. EU governments 
and the ECB that has only lately engaged in Quantitative Easing (QE) were reticent to 
support fiscal expansions in EU countries or engage in what were viewed as lax 
monetary policies. However, many countries and their national banks did commit 
financial support directly in their local economies to overcome the effects of the 
financial crisis on banks, financial institutions and corporations. 
Secondly, the Lehman Brothers Crisis occurred with the failure of a single 
institution on the 15th of September 2008. The extent to which financial markets not just 
in the US, but also across the globe were impacted by this failure caught the authorities 
unprepared.40 In addition, the US Government not only had to intervene over American 
International Group (AIG), but also had to extend asset purchase from credit easing of 
March 2008 into what became the programme of QE in November 2008. Monetary 
policy had also eased in the US as the Federal Reserve reduced interest rates and the US 
Government instituted a fiscal expansion. The collapse in stock prices especially for 
financial assets affected the credit position of financial institutions influencing gearing 
and their capacity to lend even with unprecedentedly low interest rates.  
                                                            
40  It would seem unlikely that neither the US or UK governments were not aware that Lehman Brothers was in 
trouble during 2008. In particular, there had been rumours of a cross border acquisition earlier in the year and 
eventually Barclays acquired the trading arm of Lehman Brothers seemingly with the tacit approval of the US 
authorities and presumably based on due diligence undertaken some time in advance. It has also been documented 
that prior to failure, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling had pleaded with the US Treasury to 
intervene. 
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After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, cross-border lending reduced deeply 
as banks were obliged to reduce their exposure to risk. According to Dealogic Loan 
Analytics syndicated cross-border lending fell by 58% in the year following the Lehman 
Brothers meltdown in 2008, this reduction varied noticeably between recipient 
countries, because the direct impact in the economic activity and liquidity was initially 
felt most heavily in the UK and the US. However, the supply of cross-border lending 
was caused and may well have been a contributing cause of this. While international 
banks needed to cut their lending abroad, they were required to increase new credit to 
customers in the home market (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012) to reduce the impact of the 
crisis on domestic borrowers.  
The equity market, which had been affected by the crisis, started to fall sharply. 
This reflected low confidence in banks that were dependent on wholesale funding, 
because markets for these funds proved to be totally closed to such institutions after 
Lehman’s failure. Cross-border lending was more sharply reduced than local, showing 
the known instability of the international interbank market (as indicated earlier by 
Bernard and Bisignano (2000)). Money market funds underwent losses when Lehman’s 
meltdown, and this led to breaking the dollar and need support from the Federal 
Reserve. 
Thirdly, banking crises will lead to more loans when credit reduction at home is 
more intensive than the impact of informational asymmetries. However, once cross-
border lending increases, it is possible that the impact is reduced when customers and 
banks have invested in overcoming informational inequity. If we take the market 
discipline argument, then crises periods provide a special time to study this (see 
Martinez Peria and Schmuckler, 2001), especially when considering where investors put 
their funds. Therefore, depositors are able to withdraw their deposits from their local 
banks and move them abroad. In particular, it is expected at the beginning and early on 
in the process that banking crises will have a powerful effect on cross-border lending. 
Whether banking crises have an influence on cross-border banking before and after the 
crisis depends on the nature of the crisis.  
Fourthly, the Euro crisis is viewed as starting with the Greek debt scandal and a 
shift in economic policy from fiscal support to consolidation. With the introduction of 
the Euro, cross-border banking for the Euro area countries (core banks) provided 
countries on the periphery and their banking systems (circumferential banks) with 
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increasing amounts of funding. The peripheral countries absorbed huge amounts of net 
liabilities from the existing member states banks, because this was expected to be 
transitory. The peripheral countries banks’ net foreign asset position vis-a-vis the core 
became increasingly negative between 2001 and 2008. Furthermore, there became a 
significant imbalance with the rest of the world. Although the crisis is often seen to be 
the preserve of countries such as Greece who were required to reschedule their debt, the 
Euro zone crisis may also reside in what seemed quite a relaxed attitude by the ECB and 
some of the leading Euro zone economies as the Lehman Brothers crisis developed. 
Financial institutions in Ireland, Portugal and Spain already in trouble from the over 
expansion of their property markets, when policy in countries such as the UK shifted 
gear were in further trouble.  
It is also important to realise that there has been and still is a risk of a sovereign 
debt crisis related to the Euro. As documented by Cecchetti et al. (2012), with the effect 
of the crisis late in the last decade, the intra-EA financial linkages were quickly undone, 
because of the smooth structure of the Euro system. The policy actions by the public 
sector at large (ECB, Country Government’s and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)) in addition to supporting neighbour banks, sovereign bonds also led core banks 
to completely unravel positions. 
Although it may be useful to break down the crises into events related to banking, 
economy and financial system it is also important to consider that these are not 
completely separable. Between the great moderation and the failure of Lehman Brothers 
the incapacity to find returns or the reversal of fortunes in serene times especially in the 
housing markets in the US and the EU were heralded the first complete crisis since the 
inter war years. What links property values to liquidity is the failure of and the difficulty 
with the valuation of risk along with the incapacity to compute this for what are highly 
complex assets in less moderate times. To this may be added the problem of what is an 
appropriate monetary policy in terms of interest rate setting, open market operations and 
macroeconomic policy co-ordination. To this might be added the extent and impact of 
contagion and to this the spatial dimension of banking flows. 
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4.5 Further Literature 
This chapter is related to previous comprehensive empirical studies on 
determinants of cross border lending. Though some similarity to research on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) does exist, the number of significant research explicitly 
focusing on cross-border lending (and its uncertainty due to episodes of Crises) is still 
small. 
Further to the earlier discussion of the Gravity model, the work presented here 
draws on to two main strands of research. The first considers the determinants of cross-
border/the classical push and pull factors, which affect cross border banking. The 
second links International Bank Activity to the crises. 
Jeanneau and Micu (2002) were first to analyse the determinants of cross-border 
bank lending. Focusing on the macroeconomic endowment over the period 1985-2000, 
their panel data analysis includes seven OECD lending countries and large markets and 
shows that economic cycles in lending countries have a pro-cyclical effect on 
international bank lending. Additionally, they find that fixed and intermediate exchange 
rate arrangements could enhance foreign bank lending flows while floating rate 
agreements inhibit them. 
Papaioannou (2009) employed data on 40 lending countries and 140 recipient 
countries for the period 1984-2002 to investigate further the nexus between businesses 
in borrowing countries and capital inflows. The search shows that under-performing 
businesses in customer countries could be a major obstacle to foreign bank lending to 
emerging markets as a result of legal inefficiencies, weak property rights or a high risk 
of expropriation. In contrast to this, the author advises that political liberalisation, 
privatisation, and other structural policies could enable local economies to support 
considerably more foreign bank capital. Similarly, focusing on international bank flows 
from 26 lending countries to 120 borrowing countries for the period 1996 -2007, 
Houston et al. (2011) provided evidence that the ability of banks to avoid regulations by 
shifting some of their business to less regulated markets could positively impact 
international bank flows between developed and developing countries. Moreover, the 
study indicated that recipient countries may encourage the inflow of capital by imposing 
stronger property and lender rights. 
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Uhde and Mueller (2013) analysed data on foreign bank claims for thirteen OECD 
countries on fifty-one markets over the period 1993 and 2007. They consider the 
characteristics of the banking markets in the OECD and view lending banks as key 
drivers of cross-border lending. Using a number of specifications of the Gravity model, 
they define the attributes that may describe further important determinants of cross-
border lending.  
The second strand relates to studies that examine the interplay of financial crises 
and international bank lending based on data provided by the BIS over periods of 
financial stress to show how international bank shocks feed across borders using either 
bilateral country-level or bank-level data. Research that uses bilateral country-level data 
includes the studies by McGuire and Tarashev (2008), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), 
Buch et al. (2010), and Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010). While the impact of crisis has 
been analysed by Popov and Udell (2010), de Haas and van Horen (2012) and Schnabl 
(2012) using bank-level data. 
To the best knowledge, the first paper to combine pull and push factors with 
financial stress indicators was Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003). It was reported by 
the World Bank (2008) that during the global crisis that bank loans had grown less as a 
result of tensions in the global interbank market. While McGuire and Tarashev (2008) 
confirmed that cross-border loans were related to measures of bank health in borrower 
countries. Buch et al. (2009) found in their investigation of the relation between 
macroeconomic shocks and international banks’ foreign assets that bank responses were 
linked to overshooting followed by readjustment over the following quarters.  
The key research here is in Kleimeier et al. (2013) who analysed how financial 
crises impact cross-border banking stock. They did this by considering cross-border 
lending and depositing, separately from the borrower side and found that cross-border 
deposits and loans respond differently to different financial crises types. Their results 
show that financial crises before 2007/08 have had a significant positive and long-
lasting impact on cross-border banking, because crisis-affected borrowers shift their 
business to foreign banking markets. Overall, their findings confirm that in a truly 
global crisis, what they call a globalisation enhancing impact driven by non-affected 
borrowers can counteract the globalisation-reducing impacts driven by crisis-affected 
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banks, and this should be taken into account when assessing the overall impact of crises 
on international banking.   
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) indicated that banks reduced their international 
activities in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 as a result of a short 
fall in international liquidity. In addition to the decline in the flows of funds across the 
global economy, a significant amount of derivative trades had been unwound and many 
banks capacity to lend in many of the world' developed economies was significantly 
constrained. The study found that banking sectors that relied more on short-term US 
dollar funding experienced a larger decline in cross-border lending. More specifically, 
McGuire and von Peter (2012) examined the extent to which dollar funding shortages 
have explained the decline in cross-border banking flows over the financial crisis 
period. 
Much of the recent literature appears to show a general ‘pull back’ over this 
period. However the banking system and bank’s behaviours varied noticeably and this 
appears to relate to the behaviour of foreign subsidiaries, the health in funding of local 
subsidiaries, and the distance between the lender and the borrower countries. Cull and 
Peria (2013) argue that in Eastern Europe, growth of loans by foreign banks contracted 
more than that of local private banks over the crisis period, but, in Latin America 
foreign banks did not reduce their loans at least in the early stage of the crisis. 
Moreover, Claessens and van Horen (2013) show that foreign banks cut credit by a 
greater extent than local banks in countries which were less important, but this was not 
true when the funds were locally sourced. 
Other studies have also used Gravity models for international bank lending. Buch 
et al. (2010) have shown that the growth rate of world energy prices has had a 
significant impact on banks' foreign assets. Meanwhile, Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010) 
examined the drivers of cross-border ending based on panel data from seventeen 
advanced and twenty-eight less developed economies over the period 1993 to 2008. 
Using a Gravity model of financial flows, they found that the decline in cross-border 
lending during the global crisis period was mostly due to global rather than country-
specific risk factors. While eastern and central Europe were less heavily impacted by 
this fall than other emerging market regions, because of the strength of the financial and 
monetary ties with lender countries and a relatively sound banking systems. Their 
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results show that cross-border bank flows are impacted by country specific risk factors, 
and they detect that the increases in expected global financial market volatility, fiscal 
deficits and a deterioration in bank sector performance reduce cross-border banking 
flows in emerging markets. This is further effect when financial and monetary linkages 
are not well defined between lender and borrower countries.  
Finally, Düwel et al. (2011) focus on the German banking sector, employing data 
on long-terms loans issued by 69 German banking groups towards 66 countries between 
2002 and 2010. They provide evidence that risk characteristics may become more 
relevant when loans are distributed by banks’ affiliates located abroad. Moreover, they 
provide evidence that rising risk aversion among banks may have restricted cross-border 
lending during the subprime mortgage crisis that was further compounded by the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
In comparison with the studies considered above that look at more highly 
aggregated flow data some micro information has been collected by the BIS on loans 
raised among international banking syndications. When it is possible to obtain such 
proprietary data, it is possible to control for individual customer and bank 
characteristics. 
Regarding the Euro zone, Erce (2014) examined the linkages between cross-
border banks and sovereigns over the different crises. After discussing the evidence 
from previous crises, they focused on the Euro zone and found that banks from the core 
Euro zone economies played an important role in transferring the US mortgage crisis to 
the Euro zone. Cerutti and Claessens (2013) have argued that in recent years, 
international banks have sharply reduced direct foreign lending to domestic affiliated 
subsidiaries. This was especially important over the period when Lehman Brothers 
failed (2008Q2-2009Q2) and during the early part of the Euro crisis (2011Q3-2011Q4). 
Using a large panel of bilateral bank flow data, Papaioannou (2005) evaluated 
how institutions and the political environment might have affected international bank 
flows from banks in 19 developed countries to 51 recipient economies. They exploit an 
empirical Gravity model including factors such as distance, GDP and population as a 
benchmark to explain the volume of international banking activity. They find that the 
European integration process has encouraged cross-border banking activity between 
member states. While EU membership has increased cross-border banking among 
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member-states and they suggest that the likely conduit for this has been changes in 
banking law and the elimination of exchange rate risk.  
Existing empirical research findings suggested the source of bank lending, and 
recipient countries’ macroeconomic and institutional (regulatory) determinants could be 
considered as  major push and pull factors of cross-border bank lending (e.g. Ferrucci et 
al., 2004; Kim, 2000; Bohn and Tesar, 1996; Fernandez- Arias, 1996; Hernandez and 
Rudolph, 1997). Prior to 2008–2009 a strand of the literature found that international 
banks have a stabilising impact on aggregate lending during periods of financial turmoil 
for the host country as can be seen for the case of Eastern Europe (de Haas and van 
Lelyveld, 2006) and a broader set countries (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010).  
In this Chapter, European markets are studied following recently undertaken 
empirical studies on international bank lending. This has developed on growing 
research showing that foreign banks were affected by the global propagation of the 
recent crises and especially as to how the crises affected cross-border bank lending. 
Next, the nature of the data is considered along with the modelling strategy.  
4.6 Empirical design and the Data 
4.6.1 Defining cross border lending 
The dependent variable used for estimation was a bilateral loan by each lender 
country to each of the borrower countries. This measure is retrieved for 19 advanced 
economies banking market lending to European recipient countries from the 
Consolidated Banking Statistics provided by the BIS. 
Cross-border banking occurs in a specific country when a loan is made to a 
borrower in another country. The dependent variable is consolidated international bank 
claims of BIS reporting countries. The BIS’s, International Banking Statistics are 
divided into the Consolidated and the Locational accounts.41 Consolidated banking 
statistics are appropriate to an investigation of country lending determinants since they 
allow us to look at the exposure pattern by lenders and borrowers nationality (Herrmann 
                                                            
41  The BIS Locational Banking Statistics benefit from their long time horizon, broad country coverage, and dis-
aggregation into assets (i.e. loans) and liabilities (i.e. deposits) vis-à-vis different customer groups. However, the 
Locational Banking Statistics are either disaggregated by reporting unit (bank) or country customer. 
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and Mihaljek, 2013). This information is not available from other databases such as the 
IMF or the World Bank. Interestingly, consolidated statistics are based on the 
nationality and not residence. The “foreign claims” data are drawn from the 
consolidated banking statistics.42 The consolidated cross-border claims are available on 
either an immediate borrower, or an ultimate risk basis. Like other research in the 
literature, the data on an immediate risk basis is used as they cover a longer time 
horizon that enables data collection for each country pair.43  
For example, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011), Cerutti and Claessens (2013) and 
Uhde and Mueller (2013) use the Consolidated International Banking Statistics database 
to examine bilateral lending between advanced and emerging economies over the period 
of the financial crisis. However, Bruno and Shin (2014) use the Locational International 
Banking Statistics data to analysis aggregate banking to emerging and advanced 
economies. The data collected here measure on a quarterly basis, bilateral cross-border 
lending stock over the period 1999 Q1 to 2014 Q4 for European countries. The sample 
covers a large geographic range, which extends to 19 individual countries and 29 
individual borrower countries, see Appendix A4.  
Here Consolidated Banking Loans data collected by the BIS are used as compared 
with the studies by McGuire and Tarashev (2008), Herrmann and Mihaljeck (2010), and 
Cetorelli and Golberg (2011) who have all used the BIS, aggregate country-level data 
on foreign bank and cross-border bank Claims. While De Haas and van Horen (2012, 
2013), and Giannetti and Laeven (2012) have obtained syndicated loan market data to 
show how cross-border lending was impacted by the crisis.44  
 Following Cerutti (2013) and Kleimeier et al. (2013), the analysis takes into 
account exchange rate variations. These corrections are critical to achieve a 
representation of the evolution of banks claims. This type of correction is important for 
appropriate analysis and interpretation, because they can make larger difference 
comparisons to the original series. The large impacts of the sharp change in the 
                                                            
42 Foreign claims comprise cross-border claims of domestic banks and their foreign offices (in domestic and foreign 
currency), as well as local claims of reporting banks’ foreign offices in domestic and foreign currency (BIS, 2003). 
43  One disadvantage of the consolidated BIS data is that they also contain local claims that are denominated in a 
foreign currency. However, at least for the larger countries in the EU, this issue should be less important.  
44 For other papers analysing the determinants of aggregate cross-border banking using the BIS: see Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2003), Herrmann and Mihaljek (2013), Cerutti and Claessens (2013), Cerutti et al. (2014), and Bruno and 
Shin (2014). 
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dollar/euro exchange rate over the period 2008-09 was an important source of stock 
variation during the period under study, but it comes from exchange rate movements 
and not from bank caused underlying position changes. To eliminate the impact of 
exchange rate valuation, quarterly exchange rate-adjusted stocks are calculated. Firstly, 
the original nominal stock is taken for the second quarter of 1999 and successively the 
BIS quarterly exchange rate adjusted changes are added. The BIS reports all stocks and 
flows in the US$ independent of the currency in which the initial cross-border loan 
transactions are denominated. To calculate exchange rate adjusted changes (changes in 
stocks that are free of exchange rate valuation effects), the stocks are converted at both 
the previous quarter (T0) and the current quarter (T1) into their local currency by 
applying the US$ exchange rates. Next to reconvert their changes from their local 
currency terms into the US$ using period average exchange rates (see BIS, 2003).45 
4.6.2 Explanatory variables 
The analysis depends on a set of variables from those described in the previous 
empirical research consulted, to show the relationship between cross-border banking 
and other ‘push and pull’ factors,46 which have been assembled theoretically to drive 
cross-border banking. 
There are three primary factors that relate to the size dimension or the mass of the 
relative economies, then exports and finally distance; these all relate to the Gravity 
model. 
Firstly, economic size is measured by the product of the GDPs of lender countries 
and borrower countries. Generally, Gravity models stipulate that a positive coefficient 
for the size of both lender and borrower countries. This variable can be considered to be 
an important factor determining the amount of loans demanded by the trading nations of 
the European market. However, banks in a lender country with a larger lender market 
                                                            
45 Some recent papers created flow data from the BIS original stock data by taking first differences; this could be very 
misleading, since devaluation at the “lender” or at the “borrower” country might cause either a sharp increase or 
decrease in total assets, even if no capital movements have taken place. Not all countries receive foreign bank credit 
in all quarters, and so the BIS dataset includes some zeros. As discussed in the previous Chapter, when the log 
transformation has been applied the data has one added to it prior to the log transformation (1 plus the amount of 
cross-border lending to borrower countries). 
46 Following Lee (1966) “push factors are not preferable aspects of the area that one lives in, however pull factors are 
elements which attract one to another area”. For the purpose of this chapter, push factors refer to home (lender) and 
pull factors to host (borrower) country conditions, and these push or pull country factor that then increase or reduce 
the cross-border activity. 
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are less dependent on business in foreign markets. Therefore home GDP could reduce 
cross border activity. Similarly, smaller borrower markets could attract more cross-
border loans than larger ones, so the size of borrower GDP could be negative. The sign 
of GDP coefficients thus has to be empirically determined. 
Secondly, bilateral exports, based on Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) who provide 
both theoretical and empirical evidence to show that information gathered from trading 
across goods markets should encourage transactions in financial assets. Rose and 
Spiegel (2004) indicates that an increase in the expected bilateral trade volume with a 
given country is associated with an increase in borrowing in that country. If these 
arguments are valid, then higher bilateral exports encourage financial inflows into the 
borrower countries.  
 Thirdly, bilateral geographical distance can also be seen as a proxy for 
informational asymmetries and transaction costs between lender and borrower countries 
(de Haas and Van Horen, 2013). They show the greater the distance between the lender 
and borrower countries, the larger the cut in bank claims, and that distance is 
statistically significant. While, Mian (2006) shows that lending over larger distances 
could increase, but this is limited as a result of transaction and enforcement costs. Banks 
find it is difficult to recover debts when a defaulting borrower is further away. 
Suggesting why banks could cut lending more to firms in more distant countries when 
they make these allocation decisions across countries in more challenging times. 
Additionally, cross-border lending is expected to be negatively related to information 
asymmetries, transaction costs and investment risk (Ahearne et al., 2004).  
Buch (2004) and Buch et al. (2010) indicate the cross-country differences that 
could play a role in determining banks’ cross-border activity are differences in 
language, culture and legal system. So in addition, to more direct calculation of distance 
in terms of other forms of proximity in a more generic sense may also be accounted for 
by a common official language, a common land border and in part by a dummy that 
accounts for membership of the Euro zone. In terms of potential misspecification these 
variables are useful to reduce variable omission as they are proxies for both financial, 
informational and other frictions between lender country and the borrower. Linguistic 
ties could diminish informational frictions for two reasons; the existence of a common 
language may reduce costs of communication during credit negotiations and language 
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may serve as a proxy for cultural proximity as sharing a common language often 
coincides with common historical and cultural influences. This is consistent with the 
notion that transaction costs with a local presence are less, and cross border lending 
from the lender may be more feasible with the borrower from abroad who shares a 
language. The extent of trading activity and implicit historical linkages may also be 
observed relative to quarterly bilateral exports for lending and borrowing countries. 
There is evidence here that distance adversely affects cross-border lending stability. 
However, cross-border lending could also be impaired by a cultural or a land border. To 
control for the fact that during a crisis banks are more likely to continue lending to a 
country that is “close” (De Haas and Van Horen, 2012), a bilateral variable for 
proximity is included.  
However, none of these variables captures the transaction costs related to the need 
for frequent interaction in real time between the parties. In particular, distance does not 
fully capture this effect as telephone, e-mail and teleconference communication are 
close substitutes for face-to-face interaction. So lateral distance is more disruptive of 
trade and as a result the time zone differential between the capital cities of the lender 
and borrower countries is used as a variable in this research using a variable that varies 
from zero to 12.47 According to the best knowledge, this study is the first to include this 
variable to the research in cross banking.  
Fourthly, as a measure of the efficiency of the banking sector, the rate of return is 
measured using the differential in lending rates between the lender and the borrower 
countries. These are available as quarter averages of monthly data on three-month 
nominal interest rates in each lender country and borrower country. The nominal 
interest rate is used as banks compute all expected profit and loss using nominal rates 
and relative to the lender country this is not affected by deducting a single country 
inflation rate from both terms implying that the institution either considers the return 
relative to the local cost of borrowing at an internal rate or relative to the lender rate. 
This variable is predicted to be positively related to cross-border banking, as an increase 
in a country's interest rate increases its income from lending. The higher interest rates in 
the borrower country or, conversely, lower interest rates in the lender countries should 
lead to an increase in lending in the borrower economies. Furthermore, the aim to 
                                                            
47 The variable is constructed based on standard time zones, abstracting from the issue of daylight savings. 
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include this variable is to control for the presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy, as low interest rates over an extended period of time may push banks to take on 
more risk and increase the supply of lending.  
Fifthly, the Financial Freedom Index48 is another risk factor to determine whether 
the extent to which relative country risk affects the lenders viewpoint. This is a measure 
in the range 0-100 and used in relation to the lender country and borrower country. How 
this affects cross border lending would appear to be an empirical question with an index 
for the lender economies that is likely to be less important as they are more homogenous 
than the borrowers.  
Sixthly, a variable to control for the various forms of crisis as this has been found 
to be important in affecting cross border banking. That is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for specific quarters, to capture possible economic and financial changes that 
are common across our sample and zero otherwise. A dummy is included for quarter 4 
in 2008 and first three quarters in 2009 to pick up the effect of the global financial crisis 
and the Lehman Brothers collapse. A dummy variable to capture the effect of the 
systemic crisis, and five dummy variables starting from 2011q4 till 2012q4 to capture 
Euro debt crisis. It is important to differentiate between the effects of the global crisis, 
systemic banking crises, the Lehman Brothers crisis and euro debt crisis on cross-border 
banking. To do so, the borrower countries are classified as having suffered a systemic 
banking crisis. In particular, 17 countries in our sample experienced systemic banking 
crises (see Appendix B4). 
Finally, another indicator is developed to consider the lending stock for a member 
of EU. This can be viewed as an indirect test of ‘deep integration’ as sharing the same 
legal tender not only eliminates exchange rate volatility, but constitutes a cut of the 
transactional and informational barriers that apparently play a major role in shaping 
international banking decisions.49 A major concern regarding most empirical analyses 
on institutions is if the estimated effect is driven by the substantial variability between 
countries. This also enables us to assess the effect of the ongoing European integration 
                                                            
48 Financial freedom is a measure of banking efficiency and the independence from government control and 
interference in the financial sector. This indicator is considered to assess an economy’s total level of financial 
freedom that guarantees easy and effective access to financing opportunities for businesses in the country. An overall 
score on a scale of 0 to 100 is given to a country’s financial freedom through deductions from the ideal score of 100. 
49 Micco et al. (2003) use the variable EU to test for trade diversion that implies that it is possible an increase in trade 
among EU members comes at the expense of a deterioration of commercial links with non-member countries. The 
same reasoning applies here with respect to bank funds.  
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in cross-border banking activities. The EU Single Market Act and the subsequent 
Financial Service Action Plan purposed to remove both barriers in cross-border 
movements of capital by harmonising banking law and financial services’ regulation.  
Data definitions and sources can be found in Table (4.1) below.  
Table (4.1)  
The variables and their sources are summarised as following 
Variable Variable description Data sources 
Li,j,t 
the log of the quarter, the exchange-rate adjusted 
stocks of cross-border loans in millions of US 
dollar from the lender to the borrower country.  
BIS 
 
GDPi,t , GDPj,t 
 
Millions of US dollars, volume estimates, fixed 
purchasing power parities, OECD reference year 
2005, quarterly levels, seasonally adjusted. 
 OECD 
 
BEXPi,j,t 
 
bilateral quarter exports from the lender to 
borrower country. 
DataStream (Thomson-
Reuters) 
 
DISi,j 
 
The geographical distance measured in 
kilometres. 
CEPII Distance 
Database 
(www.cepii.fr) 
TimDiffi,j,t 
Variable accounting for the time differential in 
between the capital cities of the lender and 
borrower countries. 
Britanica atlas, 
Encycopedia Britanica 
Inc. 1994 
RateDiffj,I,t 
 
The spread of lending interest rates between the 
borrower and the lender country, available as 
quarter averages of monthly data on three-month 
nominal interest rates in each lender country and 
borrower country. 
International Financial 
Statistics 
 
FinFreedomi,t , 
FinFreedomj,t 
 
 
An index of financial freedom.  Heritage Foundation 2015 
       www.heritage.org 
Borderi,j 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when both 
countries share a common land border World Factbook 
Langi,j 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when both 
countries share a common official language www.cepii.fr 
SYSj,t 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 when borrower 
country experiences a systemic banking crisis in 
quarter  T, otherwise 0 
 (see Appendix B4) 
FCt 
 
Dummy variable equal to one in the quarter 4 in 
year 2008 and first three quarters in year 2009 
otherwise 0, to pick up the effect of the global 
financial crisis and the Lehman Brothers 
collapse.  
And equal to one in the quarter 4 in year 2011 
and all quarters in year 2012, to capture the 
effect Euro debt crisis, otherwise 0. 
 
EUi,j,t  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j 
are EU members at time t and 0 otherwise. (see Appendix A4) 
**Quarterly data over the period 1999 Q1 to 2014 Q4 
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4.7 Econometric methodology 
Here the intention is to clarify the determinants of cross-border lending by the 
application of a Gravity model to which have been added further factors including 
variables to capture the spread of crises from the advanced economies to the European 
market economies. In addition to the push and pull factors considered in the previous 
literature, indicators to capture country specific financial efficiency are important 
determinants of cross-border lending. This chapter develops further a recent literature 
linking the determinants of cross-border banking and financial stress indicators (see 
Buch et al., 2010; McGuire and Tarashev, 2008; and World Bank, 2008). 
4.7.1 Applying the gravity approach  
Building on the existing empirical literature, our analysis depends on a Gravity 
model to study cross border lending stock determinants, especially in periods of 
financial crises. These are issues not yet studied in the literature in detail.  
Underlying the model there is a set of country specific variables that capture the 
gravitational effects related to equation (4.1). Several of the variables are dummies that 
operate like classic fixed effects when the data are pooled across country transactions. A 
single model specification with the addition of such variables would capture country 
specific heterogeneity in this way, but were this not to be complete then the model 
would be misspecified and estimation would be biased or inconsistent. An alternative to 
the fixed effects specification is the random effects estimator that captures heterogenity 
in the structure of the error.  
The modelling strategy is to adopt the static Gravity model without financial 
crises dummies. The second step to consider the impact of a set of crises variable on 
cross-border lending. The estimation of the Gravity model is undertaken using a random 
effects panel data model. We then show that the results are robust to alternative panel 
methodologies. This is a benchmark relative to the existing literature. The primary 
Gravity model specification is presented in equation (4.2.) below. 
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LogሺLሻ୧,୨,୲ ൌ a୧,୨ ൅ bଵLogGDP୧.୲ ൅ bଶLogGDP୨.୲ ൅ bଷLogBEXP୧,୨.୲ ൅ bସLogDIS୧,୨
൅ bହRateDiff୨.୧.୲ ൅ b଺finfreedom୧.୲ ൅ b଻finfreedom୨.୲ ൅ b଼border୧,୨
൅ bଽLang୧,୨ ൅ bଵ଴EU୧,୨.୲ ൅ bଵଵTimDiff୧,୨.୲
൅  ୧,୨,୲	.																																																																																																			ሺ4.2ሻ 
In terms of right-hand side variables in equation (4.2), the fundamental drivers of 
cross border lending are accounted by the lender (push) and borrower (pull) factors that 
figure in the previous section. Where (i) and (j) indicate the "lender" and "borrower" 
country respectively and t denotes the time dimension of the sample in quarters. The log 
denotes the natural logarithm and the dependent variable Li,j,t is the exchange rate-
adjusted stocks of cross-border loans in quarter t from banks in lender country (i) to the 
borrower country (j); that is bank and non-bank sectors of borrower EU markets, 
respectively. GDP appears in equation (4.2) separately for country (i) and (j) to 
determine the relative effect of the size of a country market. The variable, BEXPi,j.t 
measures bilateral exports from the lender to borrower country and DISi,j is the 
geographic distance. The following dummy variables take values 0 or 1: Langi,j captures 
whether both countries have a common official language, borderi,j a common land 
border and EUi,j,t for membership of the EU. The variable RateDiffj,i.t is the spread 
between the lending interest rate in the borrower country relative to the lender country. 
While TimDiffi,j captures time zone differential between the countries and finfreedom is 
the Financial Freedom Index entered as a variable for lender country (i) and for 
borrower country (j). The errors i.j.t are assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed (IID) random error terms that are mean zero with variance 2, .i j t .  
The Gravity model can be extended to incorporate variables that may better 
capture cross-border lending stocks. In particular, by considering the mechanism via 
which financial crises have affected lending stocks, equation (4.3) is developed to 
include additional sets of variables that represent possible channels of crisis movement. 
As we are interested in the impact of financial crises, we introduce financial crisis 
dummies that distinguish between global crisis, Euro crisis and Lehman Brothers crises 
denoted by the variable FCt and investigate the impacts for several quarters during and 
after the beginning of the crises. 
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LogሺLሻ୧,୨,୲ ൌ a୧,୨ ൅ bଵLogGDP୧,୲ ൅ bଶLogGDP୨,୲ ൅ bଷLogBEXP୧,୨,୲ ൅ bସLogDIS୧,୨
൅ bହRateDiff୨.୧.୲ ൅ b଺finfreedom௜.௧ ൅ b଻finfreedom୨,୲ ൅ b଼border୧,୨
൅ bଽLang୧,୨ ൅ bଵ଴EU୧,୨,୲ ൅ bଵଵTimDiff୧,୨.୲ ൅ bଵଶܨܥ௧ ൅	bଵଷSYS୨,୲
൅  ୧,୨,୲	.																																																																																								ሺ4.3ሻ 
Where SYS୨,୲	is a systemic banking crisis, dummy variable related to borrower 
country experiencing a crisis in quarter t. 
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are estimated by applying the “random effects” model to 
the panel of cross-country lending data. The random effects panel data specification 
captures heterogeneity not explained by the specification of the model. The model 
specifications (4.2) and (4.3) already incorporate fixed effects in terms of the dummy 
variables that capture aspects of the latent gravity relation and in the case of (4.3) the 
crises effects. The models not incorporating fixed and/or random effects are likely to be 
misspecified as they exclude lending country specific characteristics that underline any 
heterogeneity. This implies that these panel estimators ought to generate better 
predictions, and may generate micro-foundations that may help in any aggregate data 
analysis. The random-effects estimators are typically more efficient, since they use 
information both "between" and "within" the panel. Their consistency, however, 
crucially relies on individual effects not being correlated with the disturbances.50 
As is mentioned by Wooldridge (2002) and Egger (2000, 2002), estimating the 
model with random effects is a logical strategy when the unit being pooled is relevant. 
This having been considered valid, then what is observed may be viewed as a sample as 
compared with a population. 
In this light, the fixed effects models are often seen as more appropriate when the 
data is not sampled, but is seen to cover the population. While random effects models 
are more suitable when the purpose of inference relates to (an estimate of the) 
                                                            
50  As has been mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Hausman test may not be so helpful in comparing 
specifications. Baltagi (2001), Wooldridge (2002) and Greene (2011) consider the specification issues related to 
different forms of panel estimation. In this chapter the time series dimension is relatively large leading to the use of 
more usual panel procedures. However, there are still a number of time-invariant factors that appear to be significant 
and this means that one cannot distinguish whether any potential correlation of fixed-effects with the error term of the 
within estimator is due to omitted factors in the within estimation (distance, common official language , etc), but that 
may be included in the random-effects. As may occur in all estimations there may other truly unobserved factors. A 
further issue is sample selection bias. It may be that the estimation would be improved were the countries selected are 
at random. However, given that for the countries used there are already some zero observations, then it may be that 
the data used is relatively complete. While the lenders represent the largest economies that cover most of the loan 
market. 
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population mean so that units are viewed as sampled from a total population. Subject to 
the comment above the latter may be seen as the case for a sample of lender and 
borrower country-pairs. Thus, the interest is in inference on typical financial stocks 
between a randomly drawn sample of countries rather than between a predetermined 
selection of nations. Moreover, employing the random-effects model is a reasonable 
strategy for our study since most of the variation should be observed over time while the 
random effects estimator still allows for the inclusion of a number of time-invariant 
variables among the regressors especially those important to the specification of the 
gravity model.  
While from an econometric point of view for consistency of the estimator, the 
errors need to be independent of the regressors. This is a critical factor to distinguish 
between random and fixed effects methods. As the fixed effects approach is only 
impacted by correlation between the exogenous measures and the individual effect 
through collinearity that only affects efficiency of the estimator. However, random 
effects estimation assumes that the individual specific effect is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. 
Finally, consideration in computing the standard errors is given to controlling for 
clustering51 and thus account for cross-sectional dependence. Even were random effects 
estimation adequate to control for clustering at the country-pair level, Wooldridge 
(2013) and Arellano (2003) discuss robust and cluster–robust VCE estimators for the 
random-effects estimations. When borrower-country clustering is controlled for, in most 
cases higher standard errors are obtained. In some cases, this leads to insignificance in 
the size and currency union proxies. This occurs as there is a trade-off with calculation 
of more robust standard errors to reduce bias with a loss of precision and as they tend to 
be larger, then it is decided to adjust the error at the country-pair level. Reporting such 
statistics is common in the recent empirical research using panel data on Banks.52 
Furthermore, according to (Nickell, 1981) there is no problem with biases in the 
                                                            
51 Clustering, in the context of panel data involves computing standard errors and test statistics that are robust to any 
form of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge.2012). Additionally, Arellano (1987) proposed that 
clustering with a panel country pair produces an estimator that is robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and 
within-panel (serial) correlation. 
52 The following authors amongst others have investigated this: Blank et al.(2009),Victoria and Scharfstein (2010), 
Acharya et al. (2010), Düwel et al.(2011), Kleimeier et al. (2013), Cerutti and Claessens (2013), De Hass and Van 
Horen (2013), Buch et al.(2014), Uhde and Mueller (2013), Bologna and Caccavaio (2014), Cerutti (2013), Reinhardt 
and Riddiough (2015), Degryse et al. (2015), Papi et al. (2015) and Acharya et al. (2015).  
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estimates, as this study includes more than 30 time series observations (T=64). In the 
contrast to the previous chapter, so there is no need to add lagged dependent variables. 
Furthermore, the lagrange multiplier (LM) test due to Breusch and Pagan (1980) 
is employed to test for the appropriateness of our model specification to compare 
between a random effect specification and OLS. In pooling the model both intercept and 
the coefficients on the explanatory variables are seen to be the same for each of the 
cross-sectional units. The null hypothesis of the LM test is that there is zero co-variation 
across the cross sectional entities. When the null is accepted, then there is no significant 
behaviour in any of the error components across such units.  
The Breusch and Pagan LM test for random coefficient variation was first 
developed by Breusch and Pagan (1980) and modified by Baltagi and Li (1990). In this 
study, the test can be used to determine whether individual (or time) specific variance 
components are significant. An LM statistic is under the null of correct specification of 
the model and follows a chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom when the 
simple form of the test is conducted. If the null hypothesis cannot be accepted, then it is 
possible to conclude that random effects are appropriate in the panel specification.  
4.8 Empirical Findings 
First the results are presented for the full sample of European countries. A range 
of different panel estimation procedures will be reported using random effects 
specifications. Moreover, our primary focus is on the direct effect of the factors 
affecting the stocks of cross border lending to European Markets from advanced 
economies.53 
The results summarised in Table (4.2) initially relate to the conventional Gravity 
model (4.2) above and these regression results are presented in columns 1, 2 and 3. The 
next regressions relate to equation (4.3) and these are estimated including a set of 
dummy variables to explain the crises: global financial crisis, systemic banking crisis, 
Lehman Brothers collapse and Euro Debt Crisis (column: 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). In columns 9 
and 10 are added dummy variables for the Euro debt crisis as a permanent effect.  
According to the LM results presented here, the null hypothesis cannot be 
                                                            
53 All estimations were undertaken in STATA 13.0 
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accepted and the random effects model yields a superior specification. This implies 
evidence of significant differences across countries. 
Altogether, most of the estimated parameters have the expected signs, are 
statistically highly significant and the results are robust with respect to different model 
specifications. The gravity equations show that both push and pull factors had an impact 
on cross border lending during the period of study. For all the regressions, the size 
variable for both the lender and borrower is a positive and significant determinant of 
cross-border lending indicating that economies that have prospered in both sides of the 
bilateral trade benefit. This is coherent with the previous empirical studies by 
Papaioannou (2009), Alfaro et al. (2008) and Tornell and Velasco (1992). It is 
noticeable that economic size for the lender country is more important than that of the 
borrower country for cross-border lending for all the empirical results in Table (4.2). 
This suggests that the market size of the lender countries may be a stronger determinant 
in explaining cross-border lending from advanced economies to European markets.  
The results for the lending interest rate differential variable in the case of cross-
border lending was positive, but not significant. The insignificant interest rate 
differential on cross-border lending indicates that changes in the monetary policy 
stances in the lender and borrower countries do not appear to affect cross-border lending 
by these countries. It is also likely that this effect has been impacted by official interest 
rates during and after the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 almost falling to zero. 
Our result supports a common finding in empirical studies that showed that interest 
rates and interest rate differentials do not play as important a role as economic theory 
suggests in terms of cross border lending. For instance, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) 
found that international lending in the case of global US banks was insulated from 
monetary policy changes in the US. Kleimeier et al. (2013) found that interest rate 
differentials are not important when they studied cross border lending from 23 countries 
to 165 countries. Pontines and Siregar (2014) found similar results when lending from 
European countries to six Asian countries is considered. 
With respect to the other factors, the regression results show bilateral exports have 
a positive and statistically significant effect on cross-border banking between lending 
and borrowing countries. The positive correlation between exports and lending can be 
explained, as exports have traditionally been a key avenue for the international 
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expansion of bank lending. Further, a strong export relationship between two economies 
may help enhance information flow between lenders and borrowers, which should 
enhance lending (see Rose and Spiegel, 2004).  
Financial freedom, seen as a proxy for banking efficiency in lender and borrower 
financial systems was positively related to cross border lending; this could operate 
through stimulating consumption, investment and trade. The positive coefficients for 
lending countries suggest that banks in these countries place great importance on overall 
financial freedom (governance quality) and they are better disposed to increase their 
lending to better governed European markets.  
The measures that capture proximity are commonly used to explain bilateral 
patterns in cross-border lending. This bilateral distance coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 1% level across all regressions indicating a decrease in the volume of 
lending with geographical distance between lender and borrower countries. This is 
consistent with the cross-border financial flow research as can be observed from the 
findings in Portes and Rey (2005), and Buch (2005). While similar findings arose with 
the empirical results in Degryse and Ongena (2005) suggesting distance makes it more 
difficult to monitor lenders increasing transaction costs.  
In the second column of Table (4.2), the time zone differential is included in the 
regression from which it can be concluded that increases in the differential cause 
bilateral lending stocks to decline by 19 percent for each extra hour of time difference. 
This impact is both statistically significant and economically important. Moreover, after 
controlling for the time zone differential, the coefficient on distance is reduced. This 
reveals that in the case of international lending an important component of distance is 
the relative time zone over which transactions occur, there being an impact from the 
real-time interaction. Portes and Rey (2005) show that when other factors that more 
directly capture information costs, here the time zone differential variable, that the 
coefficient of distance decreases substantially. It must be said that here the distance 
effect is still negative and significant.54      
Moving to the Friction variables, in all the regression in Table (4.2) except for 
column (1) and (2), an alternative distance measures (culture proxy and land border) are 
                                                            
54 The time zone differential is not added to the other regressions in table (4.2) as it is expected that the other variable 
coefficients will not change in response to this inclusion as they are orthogonal.  
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added to the gravity specification. It seems clear that geographical distance is a very 
robust determinant of lending activity as the culture proxy and land border measures 
leave this measure strongly related to lending stability. However, the coefficient 
becomes less important. Culture as measured by the common language has the expected 
positive effect and is significant at the 1% level. So that a common language encourages 
cross border lending from advanced countries to the European markets, this result is in 
line with the previous empirical studies of Buch (2005), Papaioannou (2009), Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), and Herrero and Pería (2007).  
However, the conventional gravity variable that does not enter with a positive 
coefficient relates to a common border. The insignificant effect of a common border 
may not be a surprise since adjacency might be seen as more important for trade in 
goods (Papaioannou, 2005). This suggests that cross border banking may depend more 
significantly on the other more usual determinants of the Gravity model especially such 
as culture, time zone and distance. When a similar analysis is applied to foreign direct 
investment (FDI), these findings are almost identical to the coefficients presented in 
Table (4.2). However, the negative effect of a common land border in relation to 
bilateral bank lending would appear to be insignificant as it may not be relevant to loans 
that are not related to these borders. Additionally, the insignificance and negative 
coefficient of the common border may relate to the common language variable, which is 
statistically significant and has a positive impact on for foreign loans. Thus, these 
effects may in the main just cancel out.  
 Corresponding to the results on geographical distance it suggests that banks seek 
external outlets of lending which are either culturally or geographically closer to their 
home markets.  
Regarding EU membership, the estimated regressions including the dummy for 
EU membership in Columns (3) to (10), it is found that joint EU membership has a 
large impact. The EU coefficient estimate is economically and statistically highly 
significant; this implies that cross border banking between member states increases. It 
has been suggested that there is substantial integration in terms of equity and debt 
markets would seem to also be true for the banking sector. Thus, integration in the 
banking sector would appear to have taken the form of increased cross-border lending 
and borrowing rather than through acquisitions and mergers as in the USA.   
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Table (4.2) Determinants of cross border lending stocks from advanced to EU countries  
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
LogGDPi,t 1.3748*** 1.4284*** 1.4830*** 1.4690*** 1.4475*** 1.5069*** 1.4912*** 1.4591*** 1.6420*** 1.6211*** 
(0.1625) (0.1721) (0.1774) (0.1757) (0.1780) (0.1731) (0.1710) (0.1722) (0.1734) (0.1707) 
LogGDPj,t 1.3227*** 1.3206*** 1.3208*** 1.3183*** 1.2583*** 1.3327*** 1.3290*** 1.2650*** 1.3747*** 1.3695*** 
(0.1270) (0.1270) (0.1271) (0.1264) (0.1274) (0.1263) (0.1255) (0.1262) (0.1282) (0.1272) 
LogBEXPi,j,t 0.2243*** 0.2219*** 0.2190*** 0.2183*** 0.2306*** 0.2217*** 0.2210*** 0.2329*** 0.2295*** 0.2290*** 
(0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0529) (0.0543) (0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0544) (0.0542) (0.0541) 
LogDISi.j -1.2928*** -0.8526*** -0.5960*** -0.6006*** -0.6096*** -0.5839*** -0.5888*** -0.6010*** -0.5407** -0.5464** 
(0.1328) (0.1924) (0.2061) (0.2053) (0.2009) (0.2076) (0.2067) (0.2014) (0.2161) (0.2148) 
RateDiffj,j,t 0.0087 0.0088 0.0089 0.0087 0.0061 0.0089 0.0086 0.0060 0.0082 0.0080 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
FinFreedomi,t 0.0103*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0102*** 0.0090*** 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.0091*** 0.0107*** 0.0106*** 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
FinFreedomj,t 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0011** 0.0005** 0.0010** 0.0009** 0.0004** 0.0002** 0.0001** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Borderi,j   -0.6103* -0.6043* -0.5740 -0.6330* -0.6250* -0.5859* -0.7376* -0.7259* 
   (0.3614) (0.3599) (0.3510) (0.3650) (0.3631) (0.3525) (0.3848) (0.3821) 
Langi,j   1.5795*** 1.5755*** 1.5493*** 1.5864*** 1.5818*** 1.5527*** 1.6246*** 1.6183*** 
   (0.3862) (0.3854) (0.3729) (0.3894) (0.3884) (0.3747) (0.4026) (0.4009) 
EUi,j,t   2.2128*** 2.1808*** 2.1081*** 2.2752*** 2.2391*** 2.1424*** 2.5806*** 2.5343*** 
  (0.5768) (0.5738) (0.5705) (0.5740) (0.5703) (0.5641) (0.5903) (0.5853) 
TimDiffi,j,t  -0.1929**         
 (0.0789)         
SYSj.t    0.3277***   0.3166***   0.2742*** 
   (0.0416)   (0.0405)   (0.0397) 
FC2008,q4     0.2941***   0.2852***   
    (0.0358)   (0.0341)   
FC2009,q1     0.3961***   0.3882***   
    (0.0349)   (0.0341)   
FC2009,q2     0.4387***   0.4307***   
    (0.0340)   (0.0333)   
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Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
FC2009,q3     0.4471***   0.4391***   
    (0.0339)   (0.0331)   
FC2011,q4      -0.1508*** -0.1459*** -0.1134***   
     (0.0395) (0.0394) (0.0392)   
FC2012,q1      -0.0812** -0.0764* -0.0448   
     (0.0405) (0.0405) (0.0403)   
FC2012,q2      -0.1060*** -0.1013** -0.0698*   
     (0.0410) (0.0409) (0.0404)   
FC2012,q3      -0.1071** -0.1025** -0.0700*   
     (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0415)   
FC2012,q4      -0.0943** -0.0897** -0.0584   
     (0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0420)   
FC2011,q4,long         -0.2003*** -0.1946*** 
         (0.0465) (0.0465) 
Constant -22.9251*** -26.5157*** -31.3085*** -31.0009*** -29.9874*** -31.9556*** -31.6057*** -30.3558*** -34.9162*** -34.4734*** 
(1.9131) (2.6535) (3.3063) (3.2866) (3.2809) (3.2429) (3.2184) (3.1903) (3.3146) (3.2810) 
Observations Number 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 
Cluster country pairs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country pairs  513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 
R2 0.5142   0.5160 0.5132 0.5137 0.5182 0.5125   0.5131 0.5178 0.5089 0.5097 
R2  -within 0.2244   0.2257 0.2246 0.2258 0.2351   0.2261   0.2271 0.2358 0.2332 0.2339 
R2  - between 0.5555 0.5563 0.5654 0.5658 0.5696 0.5649    0.5653 0.5693 0.5621 0.5627 
LM test 2(1) 4500*** 4500*** 4400*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the quarter, the exchange-rate adjusted volume of cross-border loans in millions of US dollar between the lender - borrower country. For each independent variable, 
the first row shows the coefficient and the second row shows the standard error, which is heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by pair country. LM test for random effect. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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Moving to the main variables of interest and beginning with the crises dummies. 
The results on systemic banking crises are shown in Table (4.2) - column 4, 7 and 10. 
The measures of systemic banking crisis are statistically significant with positive sign. 
The presence of systemic crises in the borrower country seems to lead to an increase in 
cross border lending. As systemic banking crisis and financial crisis are often related or 
overlapping, the global crisis dummy is excluded to focus on the effect of systemic 
banking crisis. The same also applies to the regressions in column (5) and column (8) to 
support the view that the global crisis was different. During other systemic banking 
crises, lenders look for safe havens abroad only after the crisis becomes obvious. An 
increase in cross-border loans during crisis times suggests that borrower demand 
outweighs the effect of informational asymmetry on bank loans. Specifically, borrowers 
whose banking systems respond to the direct effect of a crisis may feel the impact of 
overall credit restrictions early (Kleimeier et al., 2013). From the results in column 5 
that include the quarterly dummy variables, it is seen that this pattern is largely affected 
by the global crisis and Lehman brothers crisis. Financial crises provide a particularly 
strong push towards cross-border loans stocks. While in the quarter after the global 
crisis started, cross-border loans stock remained high. 
 Further as the global financial crisis, systemic crises, and Lehman crisis, hit 
Europe in 2008-2009, according to Dornean and Sandu (2012), the global financial 
crisis had a strong effect on the EU countries. Almost all countries started to feel the 
impacts of the financial crisis in September 2008 mainly following the filing for 
bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers, but for the EU countries the peak impact was recorded 
in 2009, when they experienced dramatic falls in the GDP.55 At the same time, further 
turmoil arises through a large increase in public debt and budget deficits. Overall, all 
EU member states were faced with the economic crises.  In a crisis period  GDP can fall 
in both lender and borrower countries, and this will cause a fall in cross border banking 
that is larger than the fall in GDP according to our these coefficients in Table (4.2) for 
which 1.4% is the average response for the lender country and 1.3% on average for the 
borrower countries in response to a 1% fall. Hence, the results are consistent with the 
widespread belief that cross border banking falls in crises.  
                                                            
55  Dornean and Oanea (2012) explain that in 2009, the level of average GDP growth at EU level reached the 
minimum of -5.77%, compared to the level in 2008 of 1.32%. 
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It is also important to reconcile these results with those of Cetorelli and Goldberg 
(2011), and Navaretti et al. (2010), who find that total outstanding loans by foreign 
affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe did not decrease in the early stages of the crisis. 
Given that these studies look at total loans outstanding (stock), the evidence presented 
here would seem to accept the results regarding the Global and Lehman Brothers crisis. 
The two sets of findings can be reconciled by the different nature of stocks and flows as 
a decline in new loans does not necessarily imply a decline in total loans outstanding 
when the unused component of credit lines and overdraft facilities are used. The 
evidence indicates that this occurred in the early stages of the crisis in the U.S., as has 
been argued by Cohen-Cole et al. (2008) in response to Chari et al. (2008), while new 
bank credit declined dramatically after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was little 
change in total credit outstanding, because firms had to draw on their existing lines of 
credit lines.   
Regarding the Euro debt crisis, what can be noticed from results in columns 6,7 
and 8 in Table (4.2) is that the effect of this crisis, which started in quarter 4 in 2011 had 
a strong adverse effect on cross border banking in European markets, but this then 
became less significant from the first quarter of 2012. The Euro Crisis had much more 
impact on cross border banking than previous crises as it brought to the fore the 
necessity for the lender country specific regulation of banks, and therefore reduced the 
incentive to undertake foreign banking. Finally, in column (8) when the dummy 
variables for the period of Lehman Brothers crisis and global financial crisis are 
included with the Euro debt crisis, then the initial Euro crisis effect is robust to this. 
However, the extent of the impact of the Euro debt crisis is reduced as the dummies that 
relate to 2012 are no longer significant when the Lehman Brothers and global financial 
crises variables are introduced.  
However, it can be seen that the Euro debt crisis may have a more permanent 
effect by including a further dummy variable that captures this, as can be noticed by the 
significance of this composite variable in columns (9 and 10) in Table (4.2). These 
findings indicate that the Euro debt crisis has a longer term effect over the time horizon 
since the crisis starts in q4 2011. Though this effect is reduced when the effect of the 
systemic banking crisis variable is included in column 10.  
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To conclude, during the financial crises international banks did not reduce their 
cross-border lending stocks in an indiscriminate manner; there was no run for the exit. 
Instead, the proximity of bank-borrowers was strongly related to the flexibility of cross-
border credit. While banks continued to lend more to borrower countries that are 
geographically close, especially where they were integrated into a network of local co-
lenders, and where they had more lending experience. These results indicate that deep 
financial integration is associated with stable cross-border credit during a crisis. The 
findings suggest that this pattern largely driven by financial crises depends on the nature 
of the crisis. 
4.9 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section some robustness checks are considered to check for potential 
omitted variables and sub-samples. 
4.9.1 Adding control variables:  
In addition to the variables in equation (4.3) the time-invariant factors related to 
the geographic component in Gravity model are included. In particular, by the addition 
of a new variable to literature related to European markets a control is made for other 
factors that are simultaneously influencing cross border banking, including exchange 
rate volatility and currency union controls (Butler and Fauver, 2006).  
Although the dependent variable is adjusted for exchange rate valuations, the 
adjustment in the published series does not control totally for the valuation effect. 
Therefore, a bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility variable (EXVi.j,t )56 is added as an 
additional control variable in the new estimations. Volatility in bilateral exchange rates 
affects all capital movements and vice versa. An appreciating currency increases the 
expected rate of return measured in the lender’s currency and this makes it easier for 
borrowers to repay their external loans, and this should induce additional inflows. So 
exchange rate volatility is included as a robustness check. 
However, as cross-border lending is only one part of total capital movements, and 
this is only one of many factors impacting exchange rates. In terms of the measures 
used to capture volatility, potential endogeneity between cross-border banking and 
                                                            
56 As the exchange rates expected return is calculated according to nominal interest rate and nominal values.  
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nominal exchange rates should not be a problem (see Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2013). 
The volatility in the bilateral exchange rate is an indicator of financial instability and 
exchange rate risk and this has been represented in the estimation work by an average 
of the end of quarter variance of daily bilateral exchange rates.   
4.9.1.2 Measuring Exchange Rate Volatility 
The effect of exchange rate volatility on cross border banking has been discussed 
in the literature for emerging countries, but there is currently little agreement on the 
direction of these effects regarding developed economies. In this chapter as in Chapter 3 
the GARCH(1,1) method is predominantly used to construct a measure of volatility. 
The volatility measure of the nominal exchange rate is constructed by first taking the 
log difference of daily exchange rates calculated from data taken from the IFS 
database.57 The dynamic measure of the volatility (it) conditioned on the regression 
errors (uit) explained by the GARCH(1,1) process is:  
2 2 2
1 1.                             (4.4)it i i it i itu         
Daily conditional variances are used to construct an indicator of quarterly 
volatility. A simple weighted moving average model (4.4a) is used as the variance 
estimate when it is not possible to identify the ARCH/GARCH specification:  
2 2
1
                                            (4.4a)pit it jj u    
These are based on blocks of p=20 past observations on the past errors to create a 
rolling moving average. The details as to the methods applied to estimate the volatility 
for each bilateral pair of currencies are given in Table (4.3) for all of the bilateral 
nominal GARCH and the moving average models. In 20 out of 536 cases the WMA 
process is used, and in one case the GARCH(1,2) specification is applied, but otherwise 
the model of variance is the GARCH(1,1) model. 
                                                            
57  Calculation of the exchange rate for euro area countries depends on differences in national conventions 
for rounding up the data, then all conversions between the national currencies had to be carried out using cross 
arbitrage via the Euro. See Smith and Hunter (1985) for a discussion of the impact of cross arbitrage on exchange rate 
specification. Secondly, the original conversion rates were determined by the Council of the European Union based 
on a recommendation from the European Commission using market rates as of the 31st  December 1998 (see 
Appendix D4). 
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Table (4.3) Measure of Bilateral Exchange rate volatility 
 AU AT BE CA CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT JP NL PT SE US 
AT G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
BE WMA WMA - WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA G(1.1) WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA WMA 
BG G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
HR G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
CY G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
CZ G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
DK G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
EE G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
FI G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
FR G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
DE G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
GR G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
HU G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
IE G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - WMA G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
IT G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
LV G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
LT G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) WMA G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
LU G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.2) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
MT G(1.1) WMA G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
NL G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
PL G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
PT G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) 
RO G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
SK G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
SI G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
ES G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
SE G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) 
CH G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
GB G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) - G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) G(1.1) 
Note: G(1.1): GARCH(1.1), G(1.2): GARCH (1.2), WMA: Weighted Moving Average - for the countries and currencies code (see Appendix D4).
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Additionally, this study contributes to the research by examining the effect of 
currency union CUi,j,t 58 (the group of countries that adopt the Euro currency as their 
national currency) on cross border banking in the context of the EU. Moreover, the 
single currency has eliminated exchange rate risk for transactions within the Euro zone. 
It is possible that the Euro area will attract extra-EU lending since a single currency 
allows for complete penetration by multinational corporations into the most important 
part of the central European market.59  
The results in Table (4.4) indicate that exchange rate volatility has not had a 
significant effect on cross border lending to European countries. This may occur as 
most of the sample is in the Euro zone that is 18 out of 29 countries and the results 
suggest that there is no risk associated with exchange rate volatility. These results are in 
the line with Düwel and Lipponer (2011) who study German bank foreign lending. This 
chapter noted that the extent to which EU favours lower exchange rate volatility, it is 
beneficial to cross border lending. 
However, the Euro dummy variable is statistically positive, but not significant 
across all the results in Table (4.4). This suggests that currency union in these groups 
did not significantly affect the stock of cross border lending. In contrast, the EU dummy 
is positive and statistically significant suggesting that regional integration may have 
removed key barriers to cross border lending among European countries. This suggests 
that the EU offsets or causes the insignificant finding on the Euro currency zone. They 
are both positive though the EU dummy coefficient becomes less important with the 
currency union dummy variable.  
Altogether, this finding squares with the fact that the EU dummy captures not just 
the elimination of exchange rate volatility, but also the additional benefits of a single 
currency outlined earlier. Aristotelous and Fountas (2012) found similar results when 
they studied the effect of exchange rate volatility on FDI inflow into the Euro zone. The 
coefficients of all the variables across the regressions in Table (4.4) appear stable in 
terms of sign and significance. 
 
                                                            
58 Dummy variable that equals 1 if countries i and j use the same currency at time t and 0 otherwise, see Appendix C4 
59 The idea is that a single currency would boost trade along the lines of Rose (2000). Hence, locating in one member 
country will grant access to the market of all other participants to the currency union. This in turn increases the extent 
of the market served by the foreign affiliate and makes cross border lending potentially more profitable.  
 135 
 
Table (4.4) Determinants of cross border lending stocks from advanced to EU countries -including exchange rate volatility and Euro dummy  
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
LogGDPi,t 1.3802*** 1.4309*** 1.4848*** 1.4708*** 1.4490*** 1.5098*** 1.4941*** 1.4612*** 1.6511*** 1.6303*** 
(0.1626) (0.1722) (0.1776) (0.1758) (0.1781) (0.1730) (0.1710) (0.1719) (0.1729) (0.1703) 
LogGDPj,t 1.3085*** 1.3071*** 1.3077*** 1.3053*** 1.2478*** 1.3186*** 1.3151*** 1.2538*** 1.3562*** 1.3514*** 
(0.1295) (0.1294) (0.1296) (0.1289) (0.1297) (0.1288) (0.1279) (0.1284) (0.1304) (0.1295) 
LogBEXPi.j,t 0.2196*** 0.2176*** 0.2149*** 0.2142*** 0.2274*** 0.2172*** 0.2165*** 0.2293*** 0.2234*** 0.2229*** 
(0.0523) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0520) (0.0535) (0.0522) (0.0521) (0.0536) (0.0531) (0.0530) 
LogDISi.j -1.2896*** -0.8707*** -0.6160*** -0.6205*** -0.6251*** -0.6060*** -0.6108*** -0.6181*** -0.5704*** -0.5758*** 
(0.1327) (0.1934) (0.2078) (0.2070) (0.2029) (0.2092) (0.2083) (0.2034) (0.2174) (0.2161) 
RateDiffj.i,t 0.0089 0.0089 0.0091 0.0088 0.0062 0.0090 0.0087 0.0061 0.0084 0.0081 
(0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
FinFreedomi,t 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0101*** 0.0100*** 0.0088*** 0.0102*** 0.0101*** 0.0089*** 0.0103*** 0.0101*** 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) 
FinFreedomj,t 0.0015** 0.0015** 0.0014** 0.0013** 0.0006** 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0006** 0.0005** 0.0005** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
CUi,j,t 0.1110 0.1054 0.1023 0.1021 0.0788 0.1160 0.1153 0.0889 0.1647 0.1631 
 (0.1499) (0.1506) (0.1508) (0.1505) (0.1489) (0.1503) (0.1499) (0.1484) (0.1504) (0.1500) 
EXVi.j,t -0.1761 -0.1764 -0.1743 -0.1858 -0.2422* -0.1766 -0.1876 -0.2423* -0.1972 -0.2063 
 (0.1286) (0.1290) (0.1296) (0.1285) (0.1194) (0.1298) (0.1288) (0.1200) (0.1282) (0.1278) 
Borderi,j   -0.6276* -0.6213* -0.5858* -0.6537* -0.6456* -0.6002* -0.7713** -0.7594** 
   (0.3609) (0.3594) (0.3511) (0.3644) (0.3626) (0.3524) (0.3844) (0.3817) 
Langi,j   1.5739*** 1.5699*** 1.5444*** 1.5806*** 1.5759*** 1.5474*** 1.6179*** 1.6118*** 
   (0.3838) (0.3831) (0.3713) (0.3868) (0.3858) (0.3729) (0.3992) (0.3975) 
EUi,j,t   2.1459*** 2.1139*** 2.0564*** 2.2017*** 2.1662*** 2.0856*** 2.4876*** 2.4426*** 
  (0.5901) (0.5871) (0.5837) (0.5875) (0.5840) (0.5775) (0.6031) (0.5982) 
TimDiffi,j,t  -0.1836**         
 (0.0807)         
SYSj.t    0.3279***   0.3164***   0.2720*** 
   (0.0416)   (0.0405)   (0.0396) 
FC2008,q4     0.2955***   0.2862***   
    (0.0358)   (0.0341)   
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Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
FC2009,q1     0.3948***   0.3862***   
    (0.0350)   (0.0341)   
FC2009,q2     0.4367***   0.4280***   
    (0.0340)   (0.0332)   
FC2009,q3     0.4456***   0.4368***   
    (0.0339)   (0.0330)   
FC2011,q4      -0.1548*** -0.1499*** -0.1167***   
     (0.0390) (0.0390) (0.0387)   
FC2012,q1      -0.0854** -0.0806** -0.0482   
     (0.0401) (0.0400) (0.0398)   
FC2012,q2      -0.1103*** -0.1056*** -0.0733*   
     (0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0398)   
FC2012,q3      -0.1112*** -0.1065** -0.0731*   
     (0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0409)   
FC2012,q4      -0.0985** -0.0939** -0.0617   
     (0.0422) (0.0420) (0.0415)   
FC2011,q4,long         -0.2082*** -0.2026*** 
         (0.0463) (0.0463) 
Constant -22.7885*** -26.2114*** -30.9161*** -30.6087*** -29.6784*** -31.5373*** -31.1914*** -30.0259*** -34.4322*** -34.0001*** 
(1.9155) (2.6887) (3.3641) (3.3444) (3.3382) (3.3043) (3.2803) (3.2507) (3.3679) (3.3352) 
Observations Number 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 27406 
Cluster country pairs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country pairs  513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 
R2 0.5154   0.5168   0.5144 0.5149 0.5190 0.5137 0.5144   0.5187 0.5103   0.5111   
R2  -within 0.2246 0.2257   0.2248 0.2260 0.2352 0.2263 0.2273 0.2360 0.2338 0.2344 
R2  - between 0.5569 0.5572 0.5665   0.5669 0.5704 0.5660   0.5665   0.5702 0.5634 0.5640   
LM test 2(1) 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 4500*** 
NOTE: This table provides robustness checks for Table (4.2), by including bilateral exchange rate volatility and common currency dummy variables. 
The dependent variable is the log of the quarter, the exchange-rate adjusted volume of cross-border loans in millions of US dollar between the lender - borrower country. For each independent variable, the first 
row shows the coefficient and the second row shows the standard error, which is heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by pair country. LM test for random effect. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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4.9.2 Financial Centre effects    
For the financial services sector, internationalisation played a critical role in the 
recent crises, increasing challenges for firms, regulators and investors. International 
financial centres are increasingly discussed (see Park and Essayyad, 1989). As these 
centres must have unique features, which benefit international banking in general and 
the borrower country in particular. For instance, financial centres develop the 
international allocation of financial resources by enhancing the local capital markets 
integration with global markets. They spur the multinational banks growth by providing 
a preferable fiscal and regulatory climate. Therefore, increasing financial globalisation 
is possible to continue sustaining growth in financial centres.  
From the point of view of multinational banks, establishing a presence in financial 
centres is “going where the business is” (Tschoegl, 2000) to meet other banks through 
subsidiaries and/or branches to develop specific business lines and that is inter-bank 
activities or trading in the wholesale financial market. Furthermore, financial centres 
provide agglomeration economies, which benefit banks’ revenues, reduce their costs 
and encourage innovation. 
In the banking research literature, there are just two papers, which focus on bank 
efficiency in financial centres; Kwan (2006) and Rime et al. (2003). The first analyses 
cost efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong by applying a standard multiproduct 
translog cost function and their results indicate that banks move closer to the frontier 
over time. Moreover, large banks were less efficient, but the size effect seems to be 
related to portfolios differences. Rime et al. (2003) analyse the performance of Swiss 
banks applying a distribution-free approach.  
As financial centres provide a platform where international banks meet via their 
subsidiaries and/or branches, the likely favourable nature of the organisational form 
needs to be tested. Additionally, the difference between lending and borrowing country 
characteristics needs to be taken into account to measure performance properly. 
As here consolidated banking statistics (which are based on the nationality) are 
applied to a Gravity model, this avoids problems caused when some exposure is related 
to financial centres as some account is made for locational banking (see Herrmann and 
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Mihaljek, 2010).60 Even given the special nature of the dataset used, the robustness of 
these results is checked by including a dummy variable for countries hosting a financial 
centre (see Table 4.5). In the first instance include variables among the country 
dummies in equation (4.3) are variables meant to account for countries classified as 
international financial centres by IMF such as the United Kingdom, Luxemburg and 
Switzerland.  
The results including the financial centres dummy are shown in Table (4.5). As is 
seen from the regressions in Table (4.5), the UK and Switzerland dummies have no 
impact on cross border lending, while the Luxemburg dummy has a significant positive 
effect. This can be interpreted as evidence that lower regulatory barriers or lower 
information costs increase the volume of international bank activity. Recently, 
Luxembourg developed as a centre for private banking and currently it is the largest 
European centre for the domicile of investment funds (IMF, 2009). Growth may have 
been enhanced by tax and regulatory advantages in addition to Luxembourg’s swift 
implementation of EU directives (OECD, 2008, 2010). 
Additionally, estimates of other parameters in Table (4.5) across all regressions 
are comparable with the results presented in Table (4.2). This confirms that the 
inclusion of country specific dummy variables to capture financial centres does not 
impact the results. Financial friction is less important across all our specifications, and 
the time zone differential has a higher coefficient, whilst the coefficient for the distance 
variable in the same regression in column (2) is lower than the coefficient in Table (4.2) 
further confirming that results that include time zone differential will reduce the 
distance coefficient. 
In addition, with the introduction of financial centres, the EU coefficients have 
increased and so this may provide a further indication that integration across EU 
countries has increased as can be viewed from the results in Table (4.5). This might 
suggest that financial centres may help to reduce the barriers between lenders and 
borrowers countries. 
 
 
                                                            
60  The use of the locational banking statistics in a Gravity model might pose a problem when some exposure is 
booked to financial centres. 
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Table (4.5) Determinants of cross border lending stocks from advanced to EU countries - adding host financial centres effect 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
LogGDPi,t 1.3451*** 1.4107*** 1.4669*** 1.4553*** 1.4330*** 1.4894*** 1.4764*** 1.4433*** 1.6205*** 1.6038*** 
(0.1583) (0.1682) (0.1740) (0.1733) (0.1746) (0.1696) (0.1686) (0.1686) (0.1700) (0.1685) 
LogGDPj,t 1.3315*** 1.3281*** 1.3296*** 1.3284*** 1.2661*** 1.3420*** 1.3397*** 1.2732*** 1.3856*** 1.3821*** 
(0.1291) (0.1292) (0.1295) (0.1291) (0.1298) (0.1287) (0.1283) (0.1286) (0.1307) (0.1301) 
LogBEXPi.j,t 0.2269*** 0.2241*** 0.2211*** 0.2201*** 0.2327*** 0.2239*** 0.2230*** 0.2351*** 0.2318*** 0.2309*** 
(0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0529) (0.0543) (0.0531) (0.0530) (0.0544) (0.0541) (0.0540) 
LogDISi.j -1.2347*** -0.7124*** -0.4917** -0.4965** -0.5047** -0.4792** -0.4843** -0.4959** -0.4347** -0.4404** 
(0.1303) (0.1937) (0.2067) (0.2062) (0.2016) (0.2082) (0.2076) (0.2021) (0.2167) (0.2157) 
RateDiffj.i,t 0.0091 0.0091 0.0093 0.0090 0.0064 0.0092 0.0089 0.0064 0.0086 0.0084 
(0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
FinFreedomi,t 0.0103*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0102*** 0.0090*** 0.0105*** 0.0104*** 0.0091*** 0.0107*** 0.0105*** 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
FinFreedomj,t 0.0011** 0.0011** 0.0011** 0.0010** 0.0004** 0.0009** 0.0008** 0.0003** 0.0001** 0.0000** 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Borderi,j   -0.4403 -0.4365 -0.4001 -0.4630 -0.4576 -0.4120 -0.5666 -0.5583 
   (0.3610) (0.3599) (0.3509) (0.3645) (0.3632) (0.3524) (0.3840) (0.3820) 
Langi,j   1.2403*** 1.2383*** 1.2104*** 1.2452*** 1.2427*** 1.2124*** 1.2744*** 1.2708*** 
   (0.4010) (0.4007) (0.3887) (0.4036) (0.4031) (0.3902) (0.4140) (0.4131) 
EUi,j,t   2.3672*** 2.3392*** 2.2659*** 2.4277*** 2.3965*** 2.2985*** 2.7288*** 2.6901*** 
   (0.5710) (0.5695) (0.5647) (0.5680) (0.5659) (0.5580) (0.5842) (0.5811) 
Luxemburg 2.5149*** 2.6808*** 2.5395*** 2.5318*** 2.4538*** 2.5719*** 2.5623*** 2.4739*** 2.6894*** 2.6775*** 
 (0.8018) (0.8101) (0.8234) (0.8217) (0.8199) (0.8255) (0.8237) (0.8204) (0.8423) (0.8399) 
Switzerland  0.2140 0.2784 0.0951 0.0942 0.1222 0.0904 0.0898 0.1187 0.0824 0.0820 
 (0.2595) (0.2748) (0.3071) (0.3058) (0.3038) (0.3090) (0.3075) (0.3045) (0.3229) (0.3208) 
UK  0.1054 0.3751 0.1787 0.1806 0.3097 0.1472 0.1513 0.2896 0.0521 0.0585 
(0.4137) (0.4400) (0.4325) (0.4307) (0.4274) (0.4332) (0.4310) (0.4257) (0.4519) (0.4489) 
SYSj.t    0.3273***   0.3162***   0.2736*** 
   (0.0415)   (0.0405)   (0.0396) 
TimDiffi,j,t  -0.2272***         
  (0.0782)         
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Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) Column (7) Column (8) Column (9) Column (10) 
FC2008,q4     0.2934***   0.2844***   
    (0.0358)   (0.0341)   
FC2009,q1     0.3958***   0.3878***   
    (0.0349)   (0.0340)   
FC2009,q2     0.4383***   0.4303***   
    (0.0340)   (0.0333)   
FC2009,q3     0.4467***   0.4385***   
    (0.0339)   (0.0331)   
FC2011,q4      -0.1517*** -0.1471*** -0.1143***   
     (0.0395) (0.0394) (0.0392)   
FC2012,q1      -0.0818** -0.0772* -0.0454   
     (0.0405) (0.0404) (0.0402)   
FC2012,q2      -0.1067*** -0.1022** -0.0704*   
     (0.0410) (0.0408) (0.0404)   
FC2012,q3      -0.1077** -0.1032** -0.0705*   
     (0.0421) (0.0420) (0.0415)   
FC2012,q4      -0.0949** -0.0905** -0.0590   
     (0.0426) (0.0425) (0.0420)   
FC2011,q4,long         -0.2009*** -0.1956*** 
         (0.0465) (0.0465) 
Constant -23.2143*** -27.5094*** -32.2277*** -31.9625*** -30.9249*** -32.8643*** -32.5646*** -31.2831*** -35.7975*** -35.4299*** 
(1.8902) (2.6109) (3.2679) (3.2592) (3.2420) (3.2036) (3.1904) (3.1501) (3.2739) (3.2532) 
Observations Number 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 27407 
Cluster country pairs Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country pairs  513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 513 
R2 0.5234 0.5273   0.5212 0.5216 0.5268 0.5203 0.5208 0.5264 0.5163 0.5170   
R2  -within 0.2244 0.2257 0.2246 0.2258 0.2351 0.2260   0.2271 0.2358 0.2331 0.2338   
R2  - between 0.5686   0.5716   0.5773   0.5775 0.5822 0.5766   0.5769   0.5818   0.5733   0.5739 
LM test 2(1) 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 4400*** 
NOTE: This table provides robustness checks for Table (4.2), by including host financial centres dummy variables. 
The dependent variable is the log of the quarter, the exchange-rate adjusted volume of cross-border loans in millions of US dollar between the lender - borrower country. For each independent variable, the first 
row shows the coefficient and the second row shows the standard error, which is heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by pair country. LM test for random effect. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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4.9.3 Euro zone sample  
Does the financial crises effect vary across Euro Area (EA) members? To address 
this question and to assess regional differences in the determinants of cross-border 
lending stocks, the sample was restricted. Then regressions for six models were 
estimated for the Euro zone; both lender and borrower countries in the Euro Area. To 
study the effect of financial crises on the Euro zone, an analysis was undertaken using 
the random effects estimator on the same set of variables including a dummy for the 
countries, which participated in the Euro zone after 1999 (see Appendix C4). 
The results of the sub- sample are presented in Table (4.6). They are similar in that 
in the first set of regressions this relates negatively to the cutbacks in cross-border loans, 
but it is not statistically significant for all specifications. This pattern likely reflects in 
part the fact that the crises were now centred on the Euro zone, It is of note that the 
coefficient on GDP for lender and borrower countries (these push and pull factors) and 
bilateral exports has remained significant and positive. However, in the case of GDP it 
is less important for the Euro zone whereas exports are important for this sub-sample. 
First, both coefficient values of the lender and borrower country’s GDP turn out to be 
less in regressions on Euro zone as compared to the primary regression for the whole 
sample in table (4.2)  Second, our results reveal that coefficient values of the borrower 
country’s GDP are systematically higher in the subsample for the Euro zone regressions 
as compared to the lender country’s GDP. Whereas the opposite is true for all 
regressions within the original sample suggesting that wealthier borrowing countries 
may find it easier to attract foreign bank lending from lending countries. These findings 
suggest that bank lending to the Euro zone is more highly dependent on the level of 
national incomes in the borrower Euro countries (pull factor) while an increase in the 
basic markets’ GDPs more strongly fosters the provision of loans from the lender euro 
countries (push factor). 
The effect of bilateral exports on cross border lending is also positive and 
significant; the estimated coefficient is on average 0.45, with a robust standard error of 
0.09, implying a t-statistic in excess of 5. This means that an increase in bilateral 
exports leads to rise in cross border loans on average for our sub-sample, a comparable 
impact to that found by Rose and Spiegel (2004) for developing and developed 
countries. 
 142 
 
Regarding, the bilateral friction variables (the language and border dummies) it 
was found that they are now less important determinants of cross border lending within 
the Euro zone, as they have led to a consolidated market with one currency, The 
language dummy which is thought to proxy the culture tie exhibits lower values in 
regressions for the Euro area market. The language variable does not appear to have 
high impact on cross border lending, at least not when the full sample of countries is 
considered. Furthermore, most countries in the Euro zone do not have one official 
language. While the negative coefficient on distance turns out to be higher across the 
regressions in Table (4.6). A negative and significant coefficient estimate of −0.6 for the 
distance variable implies that financial institutions among Euro zone economies have 
tended to favour lending to countries, which are located closer to each other as in the 
Euro zone. It is also interesting to note that the range of the distance coefficient [−0.7, 
−0.6] is very close to the range [−0.8, −0.6] reported in Papaioannou (2005).  
The lending rate differential and common border variable estimates remain 
statistically and economically insignificant for the sub- sample. Interestingly, it was 
noticed from Table (4.6) that there is no effect linked to the participation of countries, in 
the Euro zone after the launch on cross border lending among Euro zone.  
Regarding the banking efficiency of the lender and the borrower Euro zone 
countries, proxied by the financial freedom index, have a significant and positive effect 
on cross border lending across this subsample. Its positive coefficient indicates that 
countries with effective governments attract more bank lending.  
It is seen when accounting for the different measures of the Euro debt crisis 
quarter dummies presented in column (2) and (6) of Table (4.6) have a statistically 
significant effect in explaining cross-border loans. For Q4-2011 till Q2-2012, the 
coefficients are negative, which could reflect the idea that the systems that had 
expanded fast before the crisis, had over-reported their profits and capital adequacy. It 
can be noticed from column (3), that the Euro debt crisis continues to have a negative 
and significant impact regarding loans across the Euro zone in quarter 3 and quarter 4 of 
2012.  These results confirm that the debt crisis has a persistent effect that is also highly 
significant as can be observed from the coefficients in column (4) and column (5) for 
the Euro debt crisis that starts in quarter 4 in 2011.  
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Table (4.6) Determinants of cross border lending stocks among Euro zone- 
Random effects estimator 
Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
LogGDPi,t 0.9481*** 0.9539*** 0.9535*** 0.9186*** 0.9070*** 0.9369*** 
(0.2446) (0.2387) (0.2385) (0.2451) (0.2375) (0.2307) 
LogGDPj,t 0.9787*** 0.9715*** 0.9809*** 1.0212*** 0.9971*** 0.9471*** 
(0.1603) (0.1573) (0.1575) (0.1639) (0.1595) (0.1525) 
LogBEXPi.j,t 0.4561*** 0.4645*** 0.4660*** 0.5207*** 0.5228*** 0.4674*** 
(0.0919) (0.0915) (0.0914) (0.0925) (0.0923) (0.0914) 
LogDISi.j -0.6767*** -0.6653*** -0.6632*** -0.6072** -0.6036** -0.6611*** 
(0.2498) (0.2490) (0.2503) (0.2605) (0.2565) (0.2452) 
RateDiffj.i,t 0.0086 0.0078 0.0067 0.0019 0.0018 0.0075 
 (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0182) 
FinFreedomi,t 0.0149*** 0.0156*** 0.0160*** 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
FinFreedomj,t 0.0053** 0.0052** 0.0051** 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0052** 
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Borderi,j -0.8319* -0.8421* -0.8598* -1.0266** -0.9858** -0.7998* 
(0.4551) (0.4503) (0.4517) (0.4735) (0.4646) (0.4413) 
Langi,j 1.0672** 1.0687** 1.0725** 1.1079* 1.0945* 1.0539** 
(0.5275) (0.5275) (0.5318) (0.5719) (0.5627) (0.5189) 
Greece2001 -0.0298 -0.0258 -0.0253 0.0028 0.0020 -0.0261 
(0.2400) (0.2403) (0.2406) (0.2437) (0.2432) (0.2397) 
Slovenia2007 0.5755 0.5875 0.5950 0.6628* 0.6577* 0.5800 
(0.3791) (0.3794) (0.3791) (0.3778) (0.3776) (0.3790) 
Cyprs2008 0.7165 0.7031 0.6870 0.5003 0.5128 0.7146 
(0.4717) (0.4725) (0.4731) (0.4792) (0.4786) (0.4717) 
Malta2008 -0.2633 -0.2343 -0.2191 -0.1680 -0.1548 -0.2197 
(0.2462) (0.2457) (0.2462) (0.2472) (0.2460) (0.2444) 
Slovakia2009 0.4361 0.4563 0.4689 0.5670 0.5694 0.4597 
(0.3717) (0.3715) (0.3712) (0.3711) (0.3710) (0.3713) 
Estonia2011 -0.6007 -0.5609 -0.5306 -0.2991 -0.2999 -0.5594 
(0.3683) (0.3692) (0.3699) (0.3751) (0.3747) (0.3685) 
Latavia2014 -0.3658 -0.3870 -0.4055 -0.0846 -0.0838 -0.3826 
(0.3457) (0.3459) (0.3467) (0.3475) (0.3471) (0.3455) 
FC2011,q4  -0.2384*** -0.2536***   -0.2326*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0627)   (0.0602) 
FC2012,q1  -0.1799*** -0.1953***   -0.1744*** 
 (0.0629) (0.0661)   (0.0630) 
FC2012,q2  -0.2397*** -0.2550***   -0.2343*** 
 (0.0621) (0.0659)   (0.0618) 
FC2012,q3   -0.2220***    
  (0.0707)    
FC2012,q4   -0.2605***    
  (0.0730)    
FC2011,q4,long    -0.4424*** -0.4373***  
   (0.0774) (0.0775)  
SYSj.t     0.2029*** 0.3116*** 
    (0.0648) (0.0667) 
Constant -22.36587*** -22.6274*** -22.79318*** -24.22527*** -23.85783*** -22.19728*** 
 (3.6985) (3.6194) (3.6215) (3.7424) (3.6366)   (3.5079) 
Observations 10101 10101 10101 10101 10101 10101 
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Variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) Column (5) Column (6) 
Cluster country Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Country pairs 186 186 186 186 186 186 
R2 0.5574 0.5586 0.5582 0.5560 0.5583   0.5610 
R2  -within 0.2357 0.2385 0.2408 0.2683 0.2684 0.2392 
R2  - between 0.5842   0.5856   0.5849 0.5797   0.5822   0.5881 
LM test 2(1) 1400*** 1400*** 1400*** 1400*** 1400*** 1400*** 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of the quarter, the exchange-rate adjusted volume of cross-border loans in millions of US 
dollar between the lender - borrower country. For each independent variable, the first row shows the coefficient and the second row 
shows the standard error, which is heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by pair country.  LM test for random effect. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
By extending the time horizon for the post-crisis quarters, it was found here that 
the Euro debt crisis had a longer-term effect. Across all the results, it seems clear that 
the start of the crisis has an effect and this would seem to support the idea that 
borrowers in 2011 felt credit constrained early in the crisis. While difficulties in 
obtaining domestic credit only appeared to manifest itself later in other crises. 
The systemic crisis variable remains statistically significant, but becomes less 
important when compared with the findings for the original sample, as can be seen from 
the findings in column (5) that include the dummy that captures the long term effect of 
the debt crisis. By comparison with the regression in column (4), the effect of the 
systemic banking crisis in column (5) has a reduced effect of the Euro debt crisis for the 
Euro zone countries in terms of cross border lending. On the other hand, as can be seen 
from Table (4.6), the effect of the Euro debt crisis is higher now than that found for the 
larger sample used in Table (4.2).  
4.10 Conclusion      
Given the importance, there is a lack of studies on the effect of cross-border 
activity on the EU banking markets. Especially after financial crises, and none has 
investigated the impact of exchange rate volatility and the impact of the spread of crises 
on cross border banking in the EU markets which is a fundamental issue, as cross-
border activity is expected to exert an impact on efficiency via competition. 
In addition to the push and pull factors considered in the literature, this chapter 
looks at the financial crises – differentiated by type: systemic banking, the global 
financial crisis, the Euro debt crisis and the Lehman Brothers’ crisis. The geography of 
cross-border lending stock is also considered. This study is motivated by recent 
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theoretical work justifying a gravity model in banking, which proposed taking into 
account variables to proxy for informational asymmetries in gravity models for 
international asset holdings as a measure of financial frictions. Work by Brüggemann et 
al. (2012) and Niepmann (2013) shows a direct motivation for international bank loans, 
while most other models concentrate on international equity investments. In addition to 
the gravity factors (country size and distance), this study includes several additional 
explanatory variables that are expected to have a significant impact on cross border 
lending such as bilateral exports, the free financial index and time zone differential to 
capture country differences from both the perspective of the lender and the borrower 
country. Such transactions also have a geographical dimension that is well suited to 
handle information required to explain the mechanism by which the global and then the 
Euro zone crises have developed and spread. In addition to the investigation of the 
impact of crisis, further comparison arises from investigating the impact of European 
integration on cross-border banking activities between member states. The Gravity 
model was estimated using a random effects panel data model. It was then shown that 
the results were robust to alternative panel methods. 
The specific transaction data used is on an immediate risk basis to study bilateral 
foreign asset transactions of reporting countries vis-a-vis borrowers in foreign countries 
over the period 1999-Q1 to 2014-Q4. The analysis relates to lending across Europe 
from 19 lenders to 29 borrower countries and such “foreign claims” data readily permits 
the investigation of lending at the country level. Quarterly exchange rate-adjusted stocks 
are used to help capture a crucial correction for exchange rate variations especially the 
sharp change in the dollar/euro exchange rate over the period 2008-09. 
 Following such correction, cross border lending stocks clearly depend on 
standard gravity variables, with the exception of the common border variable. The 
impact of market size as represented by GDP is generally large and positive while 
distance clearly reduces lending. In line with previous studies such as Kleimeier et al. 
(2013), the results indicate that financial crises increase cross border lending stocks to 
the EU as it is seen that the crisis is in the latter stage. This is in addition to banks 
lending to foreign customers as domestic banks balance sheets weaken. However, the 
Euro debt crisis from 2011 onwards was associated with a clear reduction in the 
intensity of European financial integration as risks of cross border activity rose 
significantly. It appears from these results that the reaction of cross-border loans to 
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financial crises depends on the nature of the crisis. It is found that the Euro debt crisis 
has had a significant and often long-lasting effect on cross-border lending to the EU. 
Moreover, EU membership has a large effect that suggests that banking integration has 
taken the form of increased cross-border lending across EU members. The findings 
suggest that EU membership has led to a substantial expansion of banking activities 
across EU members. It was found that the time zone differential between the lender and 
the borrower has the effect of mitigating the direct distance effect between countries. 
These results are robust to the inclusion of a range of variables such as exchange 
rate volatility and the Euro currency effect, and this is in addition to the primary factors. 
It is found that membership of the EU has been a spur by reducing the impact of 
exchange rate volatility, and reducing the effect of common currency. Additionally, host 
country characteristics may drive bank efficiency as a result of the impact of recognised 
financial centres, but of these only Luxembourg amongst other countries such as 
Switzerland and the UK have a significant effect. This might be as a result of 
Luxembourg maintaining a favourable regulatory and fiscal environment to attract 
foreign banks (IMF, 2009).  
Finally, the specifications are estimated over sub-samples involving Euro zone 
membership that is with both lender and borrowers in the Euro area. It is found that the 
effect of the Euro debt crisis has turned out to have a stronger effect than the primary 
regressions for EU members. The results confirm the importance of variables used in 
the primary models. 
This study contributes to the understanding of the crisis in international banking 
and this chapter goes beyond the identification of statistically significant drivers of 
cross-border lending stocks on the economic significance of the estimated parameters. 
Specifically, the analysis quantifies the impact of global and country factors on 
observed cross-border stocks. Therefore, enabling an evaluation as to how financial 
stress is effectively transferred from more advanced economies across the European 
market economies. According to the best knowledge, the study in this chapter is one of 
the earliest to consider the lending to all the EUs 29 member states in the European 
Union during the crises. The EU is particularly suitable and interesting for this 
investigation since the regulation and structure of national banking markets is still 
heterogeneous despite national and European legal systems gradually becoming 
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intertwined, but with the primacy of EU law. 
These findings suggest a need for further research. Further work is required to 
empirically evaluate how politics and institutions impact the capital movement 
behaviour such as portfolio investment. Or attempt to model a nonlinear relation with 
distance by including some other variables which capture the real transaction cost such 
as internet effect. 
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Appendix (A4) The table offers a list of the countries included in the sample. 
 
Lender Countries (19) Borrower Countries- EU Countries61 
AU: Australia AT: Austria 
AT: Austria BE: Belgium 
BE: Belgium BG: Bulgaria 
CA: Canada HR: Croatia 
CH: Switzerland CY: Cyprus 
DE: Germany CZ: Czech Republic 
DK: Denmark DK: Denmark 
ES: Spain EE: Estonia 
FI: Finland FI: Finland 
FR: France FR: France 
GB: United Kingdom DE: Germany 
GR: Greece GR: Greece 
IE: Ireland HU: Hungary 
IT: Italy IE: Ireland 
JP: Japan IT: Italy 
NL: Netherlands LV: Latvia 
PT: Portugal LT: Lithuania 
SE: Sweden LU: Luxembourg 
US: United States MT: Malta 
 NL: Netherlands 
 PL: Poland 
 PT: Portugal 
 RO: Romania 
 SK: Slovakia 
  SI: Slovenia 
  ES: Spain 
  SE: Sweden 
  CH: Switzerland 
  GB: United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
61 As classified by the World Bank 
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Appendix (B4) Countries in the sample experienced borderline systemic 
banking crises62 
 
Borrower Country Year-Quarter 
AT: Austria 2008-Q4 
BE: Belgium 2008-Q4 
BG: Bulgaria - 
HR: Croatia - 
CY: Cyprus - 
CZ: Czech Republic - 
DK: Denmark 2008-Q4 
EE: Estonia - 
FI: Finland - 
FR: France 2008-Q4 
DE: Germany 2008-Q4 
GR: Greece 2008-Q4 
HU: Hungary 2008-Q4 
IE: Ireland 2008-Q4 
IT: Italy 2008-Q4 
LV: Latvia - 
LT: Lithuania - 
LU: Luxembourg 2008-Q4 
MT: Malta - 
NL: Netherlands 2008-Q4 
PL: Poland - 
PT: Portugal 2008-Q4 
RO: Romania - 
SK: Slovakia - 
SI: Slovenia 2008-Q4 
ES: Spain 2008-Q4 
SE: Sweden 2008-Q4 
CH: Switzerland 2008-Q4 
GB: United Kingdom 2007-Q4 
 
 
 
                                                            
62 Laeven and Valencia (2013) and Drehmann and Juselius (2014). 
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Appendix (C4) Accession into the Euro zone 
 
Euro zone countries Adopted in year  
Austria 1999 
Belgium 1999 
Cyprus   2008 
Estonia 2011 
Finland 1999 
France 1999 
Germany 1999 
Greece 2001 
Ireland 1999 
Latvia 2014 
Luxembourg 1999 
Italy 1999 
Malta 2008 
Netherlands 1999 
Portugal 1999 
Slovak Republic 2009 
Slovenia 2007 
Spain 1999 
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Appendix (D4) Conversion rates of exchange rates for entry into the Euro63 
 
 
Country Currency Code Fixed rate Fixed on Yielded 
Austria Austrian schilling ATS 13.7603 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Belgium Belgian franc BEF 40.3399 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Cyprus   Cypriot pound CYP 0.58527 10/07/2007 01/01/2008 
Estonia Estonian kroon EEK 15.6466 13/07/2010 01/01/2011 
Finland Finnish markka FIM 5.94573 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
France French franc FRF 6.55957 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Germany German mark DEM 1.95583 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Greece Greek drachma GRD 340.75 19/06/2000 01/01/2001 
Ireland Irish pound IEP 0.78756 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Latvia Latvian lats LVL 0.7028 09/07/2013 01/01/2014 
Luxembourg Luxembourgish franc LUF 40.3399 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Italy Italian lira ITL 1,936.27 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Malta Maltese lira MTL 0.4293 10/07/2007 01/01/2008 
Netherlands Dutch guilder NLG 2.20371 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Portugal Portuguese escudo PTE 200.482 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
Slovak Republic Slovak koruna SKK 30.126 08/07/2008 01/01/2009 
Slovenia Slovenian tolar SIT 239.64 11/07/2006 01/01/2007 
Spain Spanish peseta ESP 166.386 31/12/1998 01/01/1999 
 
 
 
   
   
   
                                                            
63 Preceding national currencies of the Euro zone   http://www.ecb.Europa.eu/ 
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5 Chapter	Five	
Conclusion	
 
This Chapter summarises the major findings of the thesis, policy implications and 
possible future research areas. The central research topics are divided into three research 
chapters.  
The thesis adds to the previous literature on FDI in a number of ways. Chapter 2 
considers what are now viewed as the most significant economies in the world, the G7 
countries. In contrast to some of the earlier studies the relation between exchange rate 
volatility and FDI inflow and outflow is handled for all the G7 countries to study the 
extent to which exchange rate volatility impacts developed economies. Secondly, this 
study analyses the period from 1980 to 2011 that includes the financial markets crisis.  
A further aim of this thesis was to establish in Chapter 3, the impact of the 
volatility in the exchange rate on bilateral FDI outflow stock from 14 high income 
countries to all the OECD countries for the period 1995 to 2012. The conventional 
gravity model also controls for bilateral exports, real GDP, distance, free economic 
index, unit labour cost differential, and other common characteristics. As mentioned 
above another feature of this analysis is the further study of crises. 
In addition to capturing exchange rate volatility, the gravity model is used in 
Chapter 4 to explain cross border lending from the advanced country to European 
Union over the period 1999:01 – 2014:04. An important feature is that it can be 
augmented by a wide set of cross border characteristics such as bilateral exports, GDP, 
distance and the free financial index to capture country differences from both the 
perspective of the lender and the borrower country. These transactions have a 
geographical dimension well suited to handle information required to explain the 
mechanism by which the global and then the Euro zone crises have developed and 
spread.  
Then, once it is observed that the aggregate FDI inflow and outflow series are 
non-stationary a key objective of Chapter 2 was explain their long-run behaviour. In 
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particular, in terms of an explanation of inflow or outflows of FDI stock in terms of 
either nominal or real exchange rate volatility. This analysis is undertaken from the G7 
countries to the rest of the world. As this analysis spanned the years 1980 to 2011, 
beside exchange rate volatility the further influences of other economic and political 
factors on the FDI inflow and outflow needed to be considered. The key variables 
required for a long-run explanation were equity return, relative unit labour cost, R&D, 
and the openness of the economy.  
As the sample, although using annual data is relatively small the analysis is 
handled by cointegrating regressions (Engle and Granger, 1987) and error correction 
models. The approach in terms of cointegration having found at least one I(1) series to 
combine with FDI, is based on finding stationary linear combination that produce 
minimal long-run relations (Davidson, 1998). The definition of cointegration is 
extended by Szafarz and Flores (1996) to allow for the further inclusion of stationary 
series in the long-run model and these variables especially when the sample is small are 
likely to enhance this explanation. Once cointegration is found the long-run form is 
embedded into a dynamic model estimated using SUR. The results support the 
hypothesis that exchange rate volatility is an important determinant of FDI for the G7 
economies.  
In terms of the inflow models, following the SUR estimations the coefficients 
indicate that there is a negative effect of nominal exchange rate volatility on FDI 
inflows for the European countries (France, Germany and Italy). These economies were 
among the original six that formed the Iron and Steel community after the Second 
World War and then entered the crawling peg alignment of exchange rates via the EMS 
in the 1980s. They then entered the Euro Zone in 1999 so these exchange rates were 
relatively (or completely) fixed against each other over most of the sample period. 
These coefficients also had the same sign for the US and the UK. This suggests that FDI 
in all these countries is strongly related to trade, either as a result of the secondary 
import of components or aligned with the direct export of products. There is a strong 
effect of real exchange rate volatility in the case of both Canada and Japan, suggesting 
that production there is for the home market. Moving on to the more conventional 
variables applied in the literature, it was found that trade openness has had a significant 
and positive impact on FDI inflow for all the G7 countries except Japan and the UK 
suggesting that an efficient environment with more openness to trade is likely to attract 
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FDI. This result is consistent with the idea that a higher degree of openness is seen to 
create a favourable environment for FDI in export oriented industries. A further finding 
is a positive relation between relative costs and FDI inflow and this would appear to 
suggest that foreign firms are not moving to cheaper locations, but rather taking firm 
specific skills to produce, perhaps more cheaply, in higher cost locations. The 
coefficient on return on equity is statistically significant and has a negative impact on 
FDI into Germany that suggests that this occurs when equity returns are low in the 
home market so that firms investing into the home market might be finding bargains. 
In terms of FDI outflows, openness has a significant positive effect, as would be 
expected. The impact of relative costs is also positive, but this coefficient is not always 
significant. This suggests that such outflows are directed to low cost economies and 
these are likely to be the destinations that lie outside the G7 block. Interestingly, R&D 
has a positive effect on FDI and is predominantly significant, with the only exception 
Canada, suggesting that firm specific technology or techniques are being exported. 
While in terms of outflow, nominal exchange rate volatility always has a positive effect, 
with the exception of France. This may be bought at the cost of a reduction in 
production at home, though this coefficient is not always significant. 
Focusing on the role of exchange rate volatility it is important to distinguish 
between the impact of volatility in terms of inflow where the relationship is 
predominantly negative and outflow where it is positive. These findings support some 
of the earlier results in the literature that indicated that volatility in the exchange rate 
decreases inflows of FDI. However, here these effects may be reversed in countries 
such as Canada and Japan. The results are also robust to the presence of other 
conditioning variables such as openness. Moreover, the findings for the outflow model 
show some signs of a systemic pattern for the G7 countries as an increase in volatility 
normally encourages FDI outflows. 
This chapter has investigated the determinants of the outward and inward stock of 
FDI for developed countries. In this respect, there has been little empirical research in 
the literature. Furthermore, this study is one of the first to consider the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on FDI with regard to all the G7. So this chapter complements 
much of the recent research by focusing on developed countries and investigating 
aggregate inward and outward FDI stocks data both from and to the rest of the world. 
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By comparison much of the empirical research on developed countries has employed 
firm and industry level data or they have adopted bilateral FDI data. 
This study contributes to the literature by emphasising the importance of 
exchange rate volatility expectations on FDI decision making and to further our 
understanding of the relationship between FDI and exchange rate volatility. The results 
based on SUR, provided strong evidence that FDI inflow has been influenced by 
exchange rate volatility in the long-run and more, that it seems to have a positive effect 
on FDI outflow. The SUR results also showed that openness is positively related to FDI 
in the selected sample, meaning a liberalisation of the trade and investment environment 
positively affects the FDI decision and trade openness in the host country attracts FDI 
inflows. 
These findings have valuable implications for policy makers in developed 
countries as: Firstly predominantly for the G7 economies any policy that helps reduce 
volatility will help improve FDI inflow. While less volatility may also help stem the 
outflow of investment funds from a G7 economy. It is also of interest to note that 
although the outflow effect is still positive for the G7 economies, then this effect is 
reduced and this may reflect the extent to which these economies have effectively had a 
fixed rate for a substantial part of the sample used here. So outflow will not be so 
stimulated relative to three core EU economies. Secondly, for all the G7 economies any 
strategy that enhances openness will also enhance FDI inflow and this ought to enhance 
growth. While, policies that enhance R&D will have the side effect of increasing FDI 
outflow. 
This study would have benefitted from a more extensive set of data both in terms 
of the time period and the countries analysed. Further data would enhance the statistical 
findings and lead to the adoption of more advanced methods to estimate the long-run 
behaviour. Further insight might then be gained by being able to better analyse the 
different financial crises in addition to the impact of exchange rate volatility.  
An important objective of chapter 3 was to further investigate the nature of the 
relation between exchange rate volatility and FDI by analysing BFDI stock from 14 
high income countries to all the OECD economies. The analysis is conducted on data 
collected over the period 1995-2012. The persistent nature of aggregate FDI data 
observed in the previous Chapter called into question the application of static models, 
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but given the time series dimension it seemed less appropriate to directly investigate the 
long-run. The very nature of the BFDI data does suggest the use of the Gravity equation 
and in the first instance this is estimated to provide a benchmark comparison to much to 
the existing literature. Were the time series longer, then it may have made sense to 
analyse the long-run, but here the focus has been on estimating the Gravity equation 
using a dynamic panel data approach. 
Consistency of the panel equations estimated by a regression estimator depends 
crucially on individual random effects so any of the indicators and/or regressors not 
being correlated with the disturbances (Greene, 2011). The problem is less acute were 
the model static, but as mentioned previously this is not relevant with FDI data as either 
they require differencing to make them stationary or they require cointegration. 
Dynamic panel data models (Arellano and Bond, 1991) provide a mechanism by which 
these issues can be accounted for by estimating the model in first differences. 
Unfortunately when the levels specification is correct, then time invariant regressors are 
removed by this transformation. This leads to the SYS-GMM estimator of Blundell and 
Bond (1998) that applies the same procedure to remove the fixed effects as Arrelano 
and Bond, while still allowing the parameters of time invariant variables to be backed 
out of the system. Few studies have obtained descent findings from the application of 
dynamic panel models to BFDI data and there has been even less research that has 
successfully applied the SYS-GMM approach. 
In this chapter, it is shown that past behaviours in FDI can provide relevant 
insights to the current FDI slump, and interestingly the impact of the global financial 
crisis is more significant than the Asian crisis. Furthermore, when the host country 
suffers from a systemic crisis, BFDI to that country reduces and so systemic banking 
crisis have a significant impact on BFDI. So constraints to finance impact on the 
decision to engage in new FDI, expressed through the extensive margin.  
While it needs to be stressed that exchange rate volatility is a significant and 
negative factor for all specifications of the Gravity model in a short run and a long run 
sense. While the effect of the dynamic is that the short-run effect is further compounded 
in the long run so that the short-run impact feeds through more strongly in the long-run.  
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The focus is on SYS-GMM in terms of the reliability of the coefficient 
estimations and all specifications are composed of significant variables at the 5% level, 
except in terms of the common currency and unit labour cost differentials. These 
variables are not considered critical to explain BFDI. As expected, the key factors still 
make sense for this form of the Gravity model, because higher GDP, higher openness, 
lower distance, a common language, economic freedom and lower exchange rate 
volatility all have a positive impact on BFDI stocks. Moreover, countries with good 
institutions, more trade openness, and fewer restrictions on FDI are likely to receive 
more FDI. While, it is observed that exchange rate volatility consistently plays an 
important role in driving BFDI stocks and it seems to capture the impact of using the 
same currency.    
The results obtained in Chapter 3 have serious implications for international 
business by identifying the financial crises impact on FDI is crucial for understanding 
the possible reverse effect of FDI on governments’ responses. This chapter has 
identified a gap in the literature that long-run exchange rate volatility impacts FDI in 
this panel country bilateral stock data study. While there is a fairly large body of 
literature addressing the relationship between exchange rate volatility and FDI, there is 
very little research on the relationship for the OECD countries, especially as the crises 
spread. 
Several policy implications can be derived from this study. The results of Chapter 
3, suggest a major change from the policy recommendations made in previous studies. 
These findings can provide an analytical foundation for the evaluation of country 
policies and institutions aimed at making OECD countries more attractive to foreign 
investors. In line with the finding made here, the study provides guidance on which 
major macroeconomic and institutional determinants of FDI might be most important 
for policymakers in these countries. As has been seen in previous studies GDP has a 
powerful effect, but also as mentioned in the last chapter exchange rate volatility along 
with the impact of labour costs, and improving the overall infrastructure. Moreover, 
there are significant effects for the economic freedom measure, indicating that efforts to 
improve governance and combat corruption and bureaucracy will have a direct impact 
on FDI in these countries. 
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It also needs to be understood that there is some inertia in terms of the significant 
impact of the past level of outward FDI stock that provide incentives for domestic 
companies to invest abroad.  
Nevertheless, there is still more work to be done in future research. This Chapter 
opens up a new line of research, which could benefit from further empirical effort. 
Further benefit can arise from using more detailed data in order to evaluate the overall 
impact of the crises on the FDI stocks by region, sector and mode of entry. It is 
expected that the results will be very useful if there is a pattern for different categories 
of countries such as those in the Euro area regarding the main effect of the financial 
crises and the link between exchange rate volatility and FDI. Another direction for 
further study will be to analyse and compare results for two sub periods, that of before 
and after the crisis. 
Chapter 4 considers the consolidated international bank lending data collected by 
the BIS. The transaction data adopted is on an immediate risk basis appropriate to study 
bilateral foreign asset transactions of reporting countries vis-a-vis customers in foreign 
countries. Firstly, it was intended that this research be used to clarify the determinants 
of cross-border lending stock. This is done by the application of a Gravity model to 
which have been added further factors including variables to capture the spread of 
crises. In addition to other variables such as GDP, distance, bilateral exports, the 
financial freedom index for lender and borrower countries, interest rate differential 
between both countries, the differential in time zone and variable capturing the EU 
membership. The study focuses on the period 1999-Q1 to 2014-Q4 for lending from the 
19 advanced economies to the 29 European market economies. In addition to analysing 
the push and pull factors, this chapter extends the recent literature (Buch et al., 2010, 
McGuire and Tarashev, 2008, and the World Bank, 2008) by linking the determinants 
of cross-border banking with financial stress indicators. These issues have not been 
addressed in detail by the existing literature. The Gravity model was estimated using a 
random effects panel data model. It was then shown that the results were robust to 
alternative panel methodologies.  
The analysis takes into account exchange rate variations. This was critical to 
achieve a representation of the evolution of bank claims across Europe. The large 
impact of the sharp change in the dollar/euro exchange rate over the period 2008-09 was 
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an important source of stock variation during the period under study, but it comes from 
exchange rate movements and not from changes in the underlying position of banks. To 
eliminate the impact of exchange rate valuation, quarterly exchange rate-adjusted stocks 
are calculated.  
From the application of a panel study, it is possible to find that the variables of the 
standard Gravity model were significant drivers of the cross border lending stock. 
Therefore, lending is reduced as the distance increases between lender and borrower 
countries while cross-border loans to the EU markets increased significantly from the 
markets of larger lenders. While larger markets related to borrowers increased the size 
of cross-border lending stocks. Cross-border stocks were also impacted by the 
transmission of financial stress, and the analysis revealed that the size of the financial 
freedom index increased transactions in lender as well as borrower countries.  
The variables for which the strongest effects are found relate to the presence of 
bilateral trade agreements. Furthermore, financial frictions are proxied by gravity-type 
variables like distance, common language and time zone differential that appear to 
matter for international banking. The time zone differential which directly captures 
information costs had a negative and significant effect. This reveals that in the case of 
international lending an important component of distance is the relative time zone over 
which transactions occur, there being an impact from the real-time interaction.  
Moreover, this chapter indicates that during the financial crises international 
banks did not reduce their cross-border lending stocks in an indiscriminate manner; 
there was no run for the exit. Instead, the proximity of bank-customers was strongly 
related to the flexibility of cross-border credit. While banks continued to lend more to 
borrower countries that are geographically close, especially where they were integrated 
into a network of local co-lenders, and where they had more lending experience. Further 
explanation, as the global financial crisis, systemic crises, and Lehman Brothers crisis, 
hit Europe in 2008-2009 and according to Dornean and Sandu (2012), the global 
financial crisis had a strong effect on the EU economies. Almost all countries started to 
feel the impacts of the financial crisis in September 2008 mainly following the filing for 
bankruptcy by Lehman Brothers, but for the EU countries the peak impact was recorded 
in 2009, when they experienced dramatic falls in the GDP. On the other hand, the Euro 
Debt Crisis had much more impact on cross border banking than previous events as it 
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brought to the fore the necessity for lender country specific regulation of banks, and 
hence reduced the incentive to undertake foreign banking.  
In this study it is found that cross border lending stocks clearly depend on 
standard gravity variables, with the exception of a common land border. The impact of 
GDP is generally large and positive, while increases in distance reduce lending. On top 
of the application of and extensions to the Gravity model mentioned above another key 
reason to extend the analysis was to discover how cross-border loans responded to 
different types of financial crises. It is shown in this chapter that the global financial 
crisis, Lehman Brothers crisis, and systemic banking crisis have had a significant 
positive effect on cross border lending stock. While, the Euro debt crises has been seen 
to have a long-lasting negative impact on cross-border banking. While, membership of 
the EU as may be expected is found to have had a positive and significant effect on 
cross border lending among member states. On top of that when a sub-sample is run for 
the Euro zone, it was observed that the Euro debt crisis has had a stronger effect when 
compared to the original results. While financial friction turns out to have less of an 
impact except for the distance variable, which becomes more important. 
 Studying different forms of financial shock are an important part of the analysis 
conducted here. With financial crises per se causing an increase in cross border lending 
as banks lend to foreign customers when domestic banks weaken and this is in line with 
previous studies. However, the Euro zone crisis from 2011 onward was associated with 
a clear reduction in the intensity of European financial integration as the risk of cross 
border activity rose significantly. It is shown here that the reaction of cross-border loans 
to financial crises depends on the nature of the crisis. 
Policy making is conducted in the EU at both a country and a system level. For 
this reason it is important to understand the lending behaviour of international banks to 
unearth the possible determinants of international banking stocks. From a policy 
perspective the evidence indicates that improving the efficiency of the bureaucratic 
process and enhancing legal system competence are likely to attract cross border 
lending.  
Here the "random-effects" specification was applied and it was found that 
Governments that pursue policies to enhance political liberalisation, EU integration and 
financial freedom, enhance cross border lending. While, European integration has had a 
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double effect, because it eliminated exchange rate risk and reduced the impact of the 
Euro zone currency countries. In addition, it had spurred on cross-border bank lending 
activities within the EU. In particular, we found evidence that advanced economies 
adjusted the loan stock of cross-border banking to the European markets in response to 
a reassessment of financial crises and this is in line with the findings of Kleimeier et al. 
(2013). Additionally, stronger financial and monetary linkages between the lender and 
borrower countries encouraged stability in cross-border stocks even in times of financial 
stress. 
These results suggest a need for additional research. Further study is required to 
empirically evaluate how politics and institutions affect the behaviour of capital 
movements such as portfolio investment. The theoretical literature on international 
capital movements needs to devise a model that features the mechanisms by which 
institutions affect the investment decision.  
A key focus in this thesis has been on the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
FDI and other types of capital transactions. However, for cross border loans the 
coefficient has been relatively robust to different types of crisis relative to the findings 
on FDI. This evidence has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the 
contributions not only FDI but also bank lending has had on economic growth in 
receiving economies. 
It would be a great benefit to the analysis thus far undertaken were the time series 
available, longer. Unfortunately, the study of FDI is limited by the data being annual 
even though all of the analysis considered is capable of study by panel methods. 
The measure of volatility adopted here is intended to capture the behaviour of the 
underlying series as compared with being a structural specification of risk. Originally 
ARCH was devised by Engle (1982) as a test of specification as compared with a 
coherent model of dynamic variance. Here, the appropriateness of the measure of 
volatility in terms of the study of the G7 countries data is in terms of the capacity to 
represent the behaviour of the underlying series and with no prior knowledge as to how 
the variance is specified, the GARCH(1,1) model may be as good as any other. In terms 
of the analysis of Chapter 3 and 4, the many specifications are not the key purpose of 
the study so these measures of variance are secondary to the main goal of these studies 
and this is the reason to adopt the GARCH family of models. However, for Chapter 2, 
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the G7 study as there are fewer combinations, further consideration of these 
specifications may enhance this study. While the cointegration method adopted may 
also benefit from the panel extension to the single equation tests that seem best suited to 
this.   
In the main the samples have been selected following the existing literature and 
this may not have been done for adequate statistical reasons. The selection of a panel 
assumes it is appropriate to pool the selected data. When this is not the case, then 
mechanisms to capture heterogeneity are not likely to be adequate. There has been 
some discussion of the nature of the panel selected, but it may make sense to better 
consider the samples selected. For this reason and also based on the method adopted in 
Chapter 3, the study of BFDI may benefit from further analysis of the nature of the 
samples selected. This will help determine whether there are some special 
characteristics of the selected countries, which could affect the findings on the impact 
of the financial crises on BFDI. One direction for further study could be to analyse how 
financial crises affects BFDI among Euro member states. 
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